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MYSTICISM IN PRESENT-DAY RELIGION[1]

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These opening years of the twentieth century have been marked by a profound revival of interest in Mysticism, though we are perhaps not yet justified in speaking of a distinct revival of Mysticism itself. This revival of interest in Mysticism can be traced to no one explanatory cause, but is due to a confluence of many contributory streams of influence. Our expanding historical knowledge has very freshly brought to light the important part which Mysticism has played in the religious life of the world, and especially in the nineteen centuries of Christian development. A group of psychological researches has aroused an immense interest in the inner life, and particularly in the deep-lying regions of the subconscious, where vast sources of hidden spiritual energy appear to lie. The prevailing tendencies in philosophy—common to many schools—to attack "in-

[1] Von Hügel, The Mystical Element of Religion (1908); Eternal Life (1912).
Evelyn Underhill, Mysticism (1911); The Mystic Way (1913).
W. K. Fleming, Mysticism in Christianity (1913).
W. H. Dyson, Studies in Mysticism (1913).
E. Lehmann, Mysticism in Heathendom and Christendom (translated by Hunt, 1910).
H. Delacroix, Études d'histoire et de psychologie du mysticisme (1908).
Joseph Zahn, Einführung in die Christliche Mystik (1908).
W. E. Hocking, The Meaning of God in Human Experience (1912).
Rufus M. Jones, Studies in Mystical Religion (1908); Spiritual Reformers in the 16th and 17th Centuries (1914).

tellectualism," to humble the claims and pretensions of "knowledge," and to exalt, on the other hand, intuition, first-hand experience, knowledge of acquaintance, appreciation, and valuation, have given aid and comfort to those who prefer the "heart" to the "head."

But beyond question, the present-day collapse of the traditional elements in religion has had by far the greatest influence in shifting to the inner way the direction of man's quest for God. Science has sternly shaken men awake from their childish dreams of a God above the sky or back of special creations. Every clue in the hand of science leads outward, or backward to bottomless infinites—not to a God who began the series. In like manner, exact, historical methods of research have shattered the old conceptions of "dispensations," divine interferences, and specially chosen races, and have forced us either to consider all history sacred or, as an alternative, to count all history secular. They have, further, robbed us of our easy faith in infallible sources of knowledge about God and the world and life and the hereafter. Finally, by an irresistible maturing of mind the world has outgrown the theory of the church which made *it* an infallible guarantor of truth concerning eternal realities and the dread issues of the life to come. Men have found themselves compelled to discover the sources of truth and the resources of life within themselves, or, failing in that momentous undertaking, to flounder about in the fog, strangers to unfailing lights and unsetting stars.

This present return to Mysticism is, however, in marked contrast to the mystical movement of the pre-Reformation epoch, or to that of the counter-Reformation in Spain, Italy, and France, or, finally, to that of the spiritual reformers of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In all three of those characteristically different movements the leaders and exponents were themselves luminous

mystics who interpreted their own experiences, while today, on the other hand, very few first-hand prophets of mystical religion have appeared among us and our movement has been in the main confined to the historical and psychological interpretation of Mysticism as revealed in the autobiographies and expositions of dead prophets; though this may be, and probably is, the necessary preliminary stage to a far profounder *return* to a religion of the inner way.

The definitions of Mysticism which have been proposed by the recent writers are still somewhat vague and hazy and leave the way-faring man confused as to its real scope and nature. But one important point receives strong emphasis in the writings of the leading present-day interpreters of Mysticism, namely, that it is a heightened, intensified way of life, a distinct life-variation. Evelyn Underhill makes an unsatisfactory attempt at definition in her chapter on "The Characteristics of Mysticism," where she calls Mysticism in its pure form "the science of ultimates, the science of union with the Absolute;" and she says that "the end which the mystic sets before him on his pilgrimage is conscious union with a living Absolute."[1] But the moment Mysticism is called a "science of ultimates," or a science of anything else, it seems to be handed over to that very "intellectualism" against which it is a protest, and as soon as the goal of the soul's pilgrimage is declared to be union with an Absolute, it is difficult psychologically to see how it can still be "a *conscious* union." She is much more successful farther on in this chapter, where she contends that Mysticism is not an opinion, not a philosophy, not occult knowledge, but *an organic life-process*, something which the whole self does, a way to enhanced life; not merely admission to an overwhelming vision of Truth but rather an ordered movement toward higher levels

[1] Mysticism, p. 86.

of Reality, which is arrived at by a definite and arduous psychological process—the so-called Mystic Way.[1]

In her second book, this "Mystic Way" is expounded and illustrated through concrete examples of persons who have lived by their "conviction of an over-world," who have "sent exploring tentacles into the unseen" and have found the Reality their passionate souls sought after. These mystics she describes as persons who exhibit "a fortunate variation of the race," persons who reveal an *élan vital*, an internal push which has carried life forward to a higher form and a higher destiny. "Under the spur of their vivid faculty of intuition," she continues, "they gather up all their being and thrust it forward—the whole personality, not its sharp intellectual tip alone—on a new free path. Hence it is that they live and move in worlds to us unrealized; see other aspects of the many-levelled, many-colored world of Reality. Living with an intensity which is beyond the scope of 'normal' men, deeper and deeper layers of existence are revealed to them."[2] On this theory of Mysticism as the emergence of a new type-level of life, she finds her supreme examples in the loftiest spiritual genuises of the race—in Jesus, in Paul, and in the author of the Johannine writings.

Von Hügel's masterful studies of the problems of religion do not furnish any ready-made definitions, nor does he ever admit that there is a distinct and differentiated *mystic way* on which the soul can successfully make its pilgrimage home to God. For him all adequate religion involves three elements—the historical and institutional element; the analytic and speculative element; the emotional and volitional element, or experimental element. This third deep interior and unanalyzable element of

[1] Mysticism, pp. 96, 97.

[2] The Mystic Way, p. 12. The reader notes everywhere in Evelyn Underhill the profound influence both of Bergson and Eucken.

human personality is, he says, always in evidence, and bears as its deepest characteristic a sense of and hunger for the Infinite. Through all the deeper and nobler movements of our wondrously various inner life, he says, obscure but profoundly powerful instincts and impressions of God work and operate, by which man discovers God to be his deepest ideal, and at the same time his true congenital element and environment.[1] This experimental or mystic aspect of personality brings into function the deep-lying intuitions of the soul, the active surge of the will toward its ideal, the inner response of the finite to the infinite, and supplies to the religious life an element of religion which is rather felt than seen or reasoned about, is loved and lived rather than analyzed, is action and power rather than either external fact or intellectual verification.[2] The mission of the Mystics, then, "who are the great benefactors of our race," is, in Von Hügel's judgment, to bear personal and experimental testimony to the presence of the Infinite in man and to awaken men to the significance of this "operative consciousness."[3] He finds, however, four tendencies in the Mystics which have lessened the full value of their ministry. They tend (1) to find their joy in recollective moments of the soul, and so to neglect or unduly to minimize the contact of mind and will with things of sense; (2) to rise above succession and clock-time and to approximate eternity, the one great Now, and thus to slight the importance of history; (3) to find their joy in pure receptivity, with a constant bent toward Quietism, and thus to ignore the truth that God can be apprehended only by the persistent and many-sided moral and spiritual activity of the whole self; and (4) to find their joy in so exalting the difference between the finite and infinite, between man's nature and God's, and in so in-

[1] The Mystical Element of Religion, Vol. II, pp. 346, 349.
[2] Ibid., Vol. I, p. 531. [3] Ibid., Vol. II, p. 340.

sisting on the incomprehensibility of God as to cut away all ground for any experience or knowledge of what God is or is not.[1]

Delacroix asserts that Mysticism is not tied to any one religion, people, or historic period, but is a native trait, springing out of certain fundamental tendencies of human nature.[2] The Mystics of the highest rank, he holds, have been persons possessed of creative power, of extraordinary psychological organization, of rare genius, and they have succeeded, without themselves knowing how, in expanding their being and in pushing out into a new dimension of life.[3] These supreme spiritual geniuses have moments of absorption in God, when they seem to attain a union with the divine, but ecstacy was not their aim; their central ambition was rather to make of their souls divine instruments, places where the divine power could dwell and incarnate itself—in short, they aimed at nothing less than to become, in their measure, *Christs*, persons in whom own-self was annihilated and in whom God could reveal Himself.[4] True Christian Mysticism is thus for Delacroix, not something pathological, not a state of self-initiated ecstacy, but a new level of life-power. "Christian Mysticism," he says, "substitutes for ecstasy a wider state, in which the permanent consciousness of God does not suspend practical activity, in which definite action and thought spring out of the inner deeps, in which the disappearance of the feeling of self-hood and the spontaneous and impersonal character of the thoughts and motor-tendencies impress the subject with the idea that these acts do not originate from him but from a divine Source, and that it is God who lives and acts within him."[5] Mysticism, for Delacroix, is an organizing power, a higher variation of life.[6] Hocking too

[1] The Mystical Element of Religion, Vol. III, pp. 284–287.
[2] Op. cit., p. i. [3] Ibid., p. iii. [4] Ibid., p. xiii.
[5] Ibid., p. xi. [6] Ibid., pp. xviii, xix.

calls attention to *enhanced life* as a characteristic of Mysticism, though his main interest in Mysticism is plainly in its cognitive value. It is, he says, a way of recovering the natural vigor of the *whole-idea* (which ordinary consciousness and empirical pursuits break up and shatter), and thus it is a recovery of the full worth of life.[1] Mysticism, he says again, is "deed and not doctrine; it is a way of dealing with God; it is a process by which the central unity of the soul meets the Central Unity of the World."[2]

As soon, however, as we turn to the vast collections of first-hand "material" which the interpreters of Mysticism have gathered, we discover that there is a profound distinction to be made between the *mystical experience* and "Mysticism." The mystical experience which, indeed, is life at its highest level of inward unity, feels as though the usual insulations of the narrow individual life were broken through and as though actual contact were attained with an enfolding Presence, life-giving, joy-bringing, and light-supplying. All the deep-lying powers of the inward self, usually so divergent and conflicting—the foreground purposes defeated by background inhibitions and by doubts on the border—become liberated and unified into one conscious life, which is not merely intellectual nor merely volitional nor solely emotional, but an *undivided whole of experience*, intensely joyous, enriched with insight and pregnant with deeds of action.[3]

"Historical Mysticism," on the other hand, as is implied in Evelyn Underhill's first definition—"Mysticism is the science of ultimates, the science of union with the Absolute"—involves a certain metaphysical conception of God and carries, further, a doctrine of the "way" to union with Him. God, according to the metaphysi-

[1] Op. cit., p. 419. [2] Ibid., pp. 354, 355.

[3] This account of the mystical experience is quite similar to that given in the Introduction to my Spiritual Reformers; see especially pp. xx, xxi.

cal conception which underlies "historical mysticism" is absolute Reality, that which Is, Pure Being. In order to maintain the absoluteness of God, it seemed necessary to insist on His immutability and His oneness, as opposed to all duality or plurality or otherness. To find Him, therefore, the face of the seeker must be sternly turned away from all finite things, all transitory happenings, all passing states of mind, all that is *here* or *now*, all that can be seen or felt or known or named. The Absolute, by processes of elimination, seemed best conceived as "a nameless Nothing," "an undifferentiated One," "an abysmal Dark," "the Silent desert of the Godhead where no one is at home." All Christian Mysticism that came under Neoplatonic influences—and that includes pretty much the whole of Roman Catholic Mysticism from St. Augustine to Madame Guyon—is profoundly marked by this characterless Absolute at the centre—a God who is everything which finite things are not—and is consequently committed to a *via negativa* as the only way up to Him. This *negative way* is taken by many interpreters to be the real differentia of Mysticism, and the whole mystical process is thought of as the pilgrimage of "the alone to the Alone"—the merging of an abstract self with an abstract Absolute.

But this abstract and negative cast is by no means confined to Mysticism. It is involved in the very structure of all metaphysical thinking that follows the track of Eleatic, Platonic, and Neoplatonic philosophy. This great intellectual movement insisted that That which Is—Τὸ ὄν—is one, permanent, immutable, and free from all becoming. Mind, in order to know Reality, must itself be that Reality, and therefore if we human beings can rise from our world of shadows, from our cave-dwelling, and perceive That which Is, it is because there is something in the soul unsundered from that Reality which it

seeks. But this dialectic consummation is attained only by processes of rising above and sloughing off the finite and the mutable, so that the individual of necessity arrives at his goal with empty hands. This metaphysic lay at the heart of Mysticism no doubt, but it lay at the heart of all mediaeval dialectic as well, and Mysticism took the negative way because, for the fearless and venturesome seeker who was determined to cut all cables and swing clear out to sea with God, there was no other way. It has taken all the philosophical and spiritual travail of the centuries to discover the possibility of a concrete Infinite—a God of character, interrelated with us and with the world—and to find that the way to share in His immanent and comprehending Life is as much a way of affirmation as of negation. Mysticism will not be revived and become a powerful present-day force until it is liberated from its age-long alliance with classical philosophy and translated into the thought-terms of our time.

This tendency, to which I have alluded, to define Mysticism as a life-type, is a movement in the right direction, for all life-types conform to their changing environment. But unfortunately much of the work of present-day interpretation carries on consciously or unconsciously the abstract, dialectic, and negative features which doom Mysticism to remain an affair of books. Evelyn Underhill, whose work is everywhere characterized by wide knowledge of sources, profound insight, and rich experience, is, I feel, too much under the spell of the outworn thought-forms through which the great mystics whom she loves endeavored to utter themselves. Both of her books are committed to a well-marked, sharply-defined "mystic way." It is a *way* which many mystics of the past have taken, but it is esoteric and more or less artificial, not grounded in the inherent nature of the soul and not a universal highway for the

whole race of the saved. The "ladders" of mystical ascent, the carefully labelled stages of the way, are the creation of dialectic rather than of religious experience, and one feels how artificial they are when an attempt is made, as in *The Mystic Way*, to fit the mighty life-experiences of Christ and of St. Paul and of the author of the Fourth Gospel into these mystical model-forms and to make them follow the "purgative," the "illuminative" and the "unitive" stages.

The modern studies in this field have, I think, convincingly shown that Mysticism cannot safely be isolated and made a "way" either of knowledge or of life. Both life and knowledge are far too rich and many-leveled to be reduced to one elemental aspect of experience. There can be no doubt, to those who have been there, that there do come moments of mystical opening, fresh bubblings of the stream of life, swift insights, the inrush of new energies, when the soul feels an irresistible surge of certainty. But it is as impossible to live by inarticulate experiences alone as it would be to live physically on ozone alone. The actual *content* of religious faith, the definite beliefs which give us marching direction, the concrete ideas which furnish body and filling to our religion, the whole structure of our thought of God and of the world and of man and of duty and of eternal destiny, are the slow accretions of racial experience and do not come to us by the secret door of mystical openings. In so far as mystics receive definite "openings," with concrete content, they are likely to be the product of group-influence. They are gestated by the literature on which the mystic has fed himself, or they are suggested by the social environment in which he is saturated, or they have subconsciously ripened within under the maturing guidance of expectation. It is always possible to show that the content of the mystic's insights has a history, as our ideals of right and wrong have and as our ideals in art

and literature have. What the mystic delivers to us as his positive contribution is an interpretation of his experience, not the experience itself; and what he brings to us is always heavily laden with the immemorial gains of the spiritual travails of men behind him. Mysticism, in its full historical meaning, is as much a slow accretion, a group-product, as is art or grammar or mathematics.

But the mystical experience itself as it bursts upon the soul is a unifying, fusing, intensifying inward event. It may not bring new facts, it may open no door to oracular communications, it may not be a gratuitous largess of knowledge; but it enables a soul to *see* what it knows, to seize by a sudden insight the long results of slow-footed experience, to get possession of regions of the self which are ordinarily beyond its hail, to fuse its truth with the heat of conviction and to flood its elemental beliefs with a new depth of feeling. This dynamic inward event is not dependent upon any peculiar stock of ideas and is not confined to what is usually called the purview of religion; it is the sudden transcendence of our usual fragmentary island of reality and the momentary discovery of the *whole* to which we belong. We can best help our age toward a real revival of Mysticism as an elemental aspect of religious life, not by formulating an esoteric "mystic way," not by clinging to the outgrown metaphysic to which Mysticism has been allied, but by emphasizing the reality of mystical experience, by insisting on its healthy and normal character, and by indicating ways in which such dynamic experiences can be fostered and realized.

THE ETHICAL VALUE OF ORIENTAL RELIGIONS UNDER THE ROMAN EMPIRE

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To estimate with any considerable degree of accuracy the moral value of the Oriental religions under the Roman Empire is a hard and perhaps an impossible task. The difficulties arise in part from the fact that these religions, like most others, did not aim primarily at developing what we understand by morality in the individual, but rather at establishing such relations with the gods as to give men security and prosperity here and hereafter; and in part the difficulties are due to the paucity of our data and our liability to error in the interpretation thereof. Yet a religion, like any other form of human expression, inevitably influences as well as reflects the conduct of the social group which cultivates it; that is to say, it cannot exist apart by itself. Therefore it is not an unprofitable thing to attempt to determine with such accuracy as may be attainable the relation to morality of the imported Oriental cults which were widely cultivated in the Occidental part of the Roman Empire between the first and the fourth centuries of our era. We confine our consideration to the Western half of the Empire, for there the evidence as to these exotic religions is most plentiful and it is possible to see them isolated, so to speak, from their native environment. It will be necessary, however, first to consider the moral and religious environment into which these cults entered.

The temper and the experiences of the Roman people down to the end of the third century B.C. tended on the

whole to develop self-control, fidelity to duty, a certain stern intolerance, and a strict discipline—virtues which we usually regard as distinctly Roman; virtues, moreover, which were never wholly lost even in the times of Rome's degeneracy. These virtues did not originate in the Roman religion, although that religion fostered certain characteristics, such as a regard for family obligations and a scrupulous care in the observance of duties toward the gods, on strict attention to which men believed the material safety and prosperity of the State depended. But beyond inculcating a sense of the obligation of social duty, of loyalty, and of reverence, Roman religion did not go; and it had no higher purpose than to secure the material prosperity of the family, the gens, and the State. The Greek religious ideas which were received into the commonwealth, even in their noblest form, did nothing more than lend a certain support to family and civic relations; and the influence of Greek mythology in general must have been bad. Whether believed or not, the tales of a god's amours could not but degrade, and the extreme was reached when such liaisons were chosen as subjects for dramatic representation, as in the *Amphitruo* of Plautus, or when a poet like Ovid could make Jupiter a model for human gallants in their vicious pursuits. Doubtless many a lover like Chaerea in Terence's *Eunuchus*, excused his wanton loves by appealing to the example of Supreme Jove. The period from the close of the Second Punic War (202 B.C.) to the end of the republic was a time of much demoralization and decay. The rapid increase of wealth and the growth of luxury, the acquisition of great numbers of slaves, the large freedom from external dangers, the loss of political vitality which made the State the prize for contending political bosses from the Gracchi to Octavian, above all, the rapid growth of a sceptical rationalism and the development of a selfish individualistic spirit, together with many other influences,

broke down the sense of social duty and of political obligation which had hitherto proved an effective and vital power in Roman life. The elder Cato was quite right in his belief that the Hellenism of his day was destroying the stern character of an earlier time. The new rationalistic spirit could not but despise the superstitions of the old Roman religion which still saw a fearful portent for the State in the birth of a two-headed calf, and it clearly recognized the fact that the beliefs of the fathers could not support the new ideas of morality and justice which were coming into existence. The Roman had a habit of judging institutions by their practical value to life; and measured by such pragmatic standards Roman religion could no longer claim the support of enlightened men. The educated might hold, with the famous Scaevola, that the traditional State religion was good for the mass of citizens; but on the whole the moral influence of that traditional religion was distinctly weak in the last hundred and fifty years of the republic; even the sacred rites of the family were neglected, and religious obligations had long been regarded as burdens which one would gladly avoid. The reforms of Augustus were unable to restore the influence which religion had once exercised. The belief in collective responsibility, according to which the sin of an individual brought punishment on all members of the social group, had been abandoned in favor of individual responsibility; the individual was the one who must reap the reward of his good or evil deeds. To this idea of individual responsibility neither the native Roman nor the imported Greek ideas of religion gave much support. Philosophy had become the moral guide in life.

The practical Romans at every period left metaphysical speculation to the Greeks, and found their chief philosophical interest in ethics. This is one of the reasons why, out of all the forms of philosophy which

Greece passed on to the West, Stoicism with its emphasis on a stern self-control and independence made the strongest appeal to the citizens of Rome. The central theme of the philosophy of the Porch, as the Romans knew it, was the art of living in obedience to nature, free from all control or influence of external circumstances. Furthermore, Stoicism inculcated a sense of duty, of responsibility, and for all its individualistic tendencies taught the subjection of the individual to common laws—things which appealed to the native instincts of the Roman. Epicureanism also had many devotees, especially in the last century of the republic; under the Empire its tenets naturally favored a safe policy of quietism and accommodation. Its ethics, like those of Stoicism, fostered the social virtues, though possibly with less earnestness and far-reaching influence than the system of its rival. As for Stoicism, we must remember that in the hands of Panaetius this philosophy had lost many of those uncompromising and doctrinaire characteristics which earlier marked it, and that by appropriation and accommodation it had developed into a universal philosophy for all mankind. There can be no doubt that it both strengthened the moral fibre of men when the few supports which religion had once given were weakened, and that it actually elevated and ennobled the moral concepts of its followers. In the first century of the Empire, when politics no longer offered any large field for action, when the extremes of extravagant luxury and hopeless poverty alike depressed society, and terror of the imperial power weighed heavy on all prominent or ambitious citizens, men sought support and peace in the resistant elements of the various eclectic systems of the day, above all in those of Stoicism, which had become almost exclusively a moral philosophy. It was not now busy with speculation, but concerned itself almost wholly with the art of living—

an art which was not to be learned from books in the closet, but from preachers in the market-place, and which was to be developed by constant and severe practice. Abstention from all that lies outside the will's control, daily advance toward the ideal, contemplation and realization of the divine nature, the practice of a kindly altruism, the captaincy of one's own soul—these are the teachings which Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius repeat over and over again. Philosophy with them had acquired a strong religious trend.

Along with this shift in the spirit of philosophy had come a change in social ideals. The rude soldier Vespasian on the imperial throne set the example of a simpler and less extravagant scale of living in Rome, to which financial exhaustion and sated appetite were already turning the higher classes; and the common condition of all citizens as subjects of the imperial power tended to lessen social differences and to give a visible support to the Stoic doctrine of the equality of men. This with the sister doctrine of the natural rights of men led toward that humanitarianism which begins to be marked in the second century.

These tendencies were the natural manifestations of those great movements of thought which had been going on around the Mediterranean for fully three centuries. The mighty political and social changes produced by the conquests of Alexander, and later by the extension of the Romans' power and by the establishment of the Roman Empire, had turned the individual back on himself and had made him seek peace and freedom for his soul in escape from the external world by means of philosophy; but neither the Epicurean ἀταραξία nor the sterner Stoic ἀπάθεια could satisfy all, and men were gradually drawn into new religious movements. There was a sense of estrangement from God, a desire to secure satisfactory relations with the divine, which

had found its outlet through the Greek Mysteries and which was bringing about a revival of Platonism and of Pythagoreanism. At the very beginning of the Empire thoughtful men were oppressed by a sense of weariness produced by the civil wars and by the social disasters which came in their train—a weariness which is unmistakably expressed by Horace, Livy, and Virgil. This feeling, united with that persistent belief that ultimately all the physical, political, and moral well-being of the State depended on the fulfilment of duties toward the gods, made welcome to many the moral and religious revival which the Emperor Augustus had attempted to bring about. The fact that the Emperor's efforts had small success did not affect the sentiments of the people. Scepticism gradually gave way to faith, and license was opposed by a revived moral sense. The moral ideal was intimately connected with religion; and this connection finds clear expression in the writings of the later Stoics. Seneca would teach his young friend, the Epicurean Lucilius, that only goodness can propitiate the gods and that service of the gods consists in imitating their righteous character; that worship is the devotion of a pious and upright will. Epictetus shows that in the generation between Seneca and himself philosophy had come still closer to religion. Obedience to heaven's law, happy submission to the divine will, joyful praise of God, more than once form the subjects of his lessons. It is true that the God of Epictetus does not differ very much from the Nature and Providence of the earlier Stoics; but his emphasis on the concept of the divine all-ruling power as a personal being was destined to have significant results. There is also in his teaching a sense of man's dependence on God which is far removed from the self-sufficiency of the earlier Stoic doctrine; and there was developing a religious mysticism also which was to find free expression in the second century. Philosophy

urged its moral aim as insistently as ever, but it no longer regarded man's reason and will as sufficient for his needs; it taught that to fulfil his duty and secure his freedom man must depend on divine aid. Thus even among the Stoics we find something like a union of philosophy and religion accomplished.

Now it was into this world whose social, moral, and religious ideas we have been sketching that the Oriental religions entered. The earliest of these was that of the Great Mother of the Gods, to whom the state was turned in 205 B.C. by the disasters of the Second Punic War. Her worship was of a wild and orgiastic nature, wholly unlike anything which the Romans had seen before on Italian soil, and we can well believe that the citizens were greatly shocked and disgusted by the processions and rites of the emasculated Phrygian priests who under the republic were imported to carry on this Asiatic worship. No citizens were allowed to join the priesthood for over two centuries and there is abundant evidence that the Romans on the whole shrank from the cult which the guardians of the Sibylline books had imposed on their trusting ignorance. Yet the worship of the goddess gained ground, so that it was the most important of all foreign cults under the republic; in spite of the repugnance which the excesses of her priests undoubtedly excited, it is clear that the Great Mother was always regarded with reverence and trust. Under the Empire she acquired new popularity. In the reign of the Emperor Claudius, apparently, the goddess was especially favored; new festivals were added to her worship, which was celebrated with great pomp; and Roman citizens were no longer barred from the priesthood. The Emperor Caligula had favored Isis, whose worship had already existed for a century in spite of all opposition. Close contact with the East and Eastern immigration brought many other Oriental divinities to the West—Syrian Baalim

under various names, Atargatis, the goddess of Bambyce, known to the West as "The Syrian Goddess," and her male consort Adad, conceived as the "Divine Sun"; and before the end of the first century the Persian Sun-god Mithras came, who was destined in the second and third centuries to exert a greater influence than any other. There were many others whose names need not be repeated here. With regard to the most of these divinities our data are so scanty that we are obliged to content ourselves with conclusions drawn by analogy from the cults with which we are acquainted. We must therefore confine ourselves mostly to the religions of the Great Mother, Isis, and Mithras.

The popularity and the spread of these cults were not due in the first instance to any superior morality which they inculcated, but rather to the emotional satisfaction which they gave, and the assurance of salvation which was offered to the individual. We have seen that in the native Roman as well as in the composite Greco-Roman religions of the republic scanty means were offered by which the individual could draw near to God and through emotional experience gain assurance of present security or of a happy future life. But these were the very things which the Oriental religions, like the Greek Mysteries, did offer in various forms and ways. The demand for such assurances in Rome itself had been early shown by the popularity of the Bacchic Mysteries, which had acquired so deep a hold on the people of Italy that when the attention of the authorities was called to them in 186 B.C., the senate did not dare to attempt to repress them completely, but only checked and regulated the celebrations. The Oriental cults then owed their popularity first of all probably to the orgiastic and mystic elements in their ritual rather than to a recognition of any moral value which they might possess. Indeed the possibilities for evil in these cults were many. The noc-

turnal celebrations with their accompaniments readily lent themselves to immoralities, as historic instances show. Intense excitement leading at times to self-mutilation, the Oriental excess of emotion, the obscene elements in the myths of Attis and the Great Mother, of Isis and Osiris—none of these tended to elevate morality or to inspire a noble code of ethics. Unquestionably too the exotic orgiasms of these cults were employed by charlatans and impostors to secure their own base ends.

Yet no great religious conquest can be explained on emotional grounds alone, and undoubtedly the Oriental cults possessed elements which could furnish stronger moral stimulus and make greater moral demands than the traditional forms of religion in the western half of the Roman world. It is hardly necessary to point out that this is in no way disproved by the fact that the majority of the devotees of these gods down to the second century of our era belonged to the classes which were socially despised—foreigners, slaves, and freedmen—and that the apparent devotion of the demi-monde to Isis, for example, can no more be quoted against the character of the goddess's cult than can the devotion of the same class to the Virgin today. Yet it seems probable that until the empire these cults lagged behind the higher moral standards of the day, but that they eventually responded to the rising ethical demands so that by the second century of our era those elements within them which made for a higher morality had become effective. The coarser parts of the myths had long been allegorized and their symbolism was universally accepted; indeed even revolting tales were given an ethical significance by the subtle but not dishonest skill of the learned. The Emperor Julian wished to make the temples centres of religious instruction; and St. Augustine tells us how he had heard the ancient tales of mythology interpreted to the assembled peoples for their moral edification.

The germs of the moral development of these Oriental religions naturally lay in the nature of the religions themselves.

First, we must note the conception of the nature of God which now prevailed in the Oriental cults. Greek religious thought before the close of the fourth century B.C. had come to regard not only justice but goodness as essential attributes of divinity, although popular religion then, as always, lagged far behind the thought of the intellectual leaders. The philosophers of the Hellenistic and Roman periods—Stoics, later Platonists, and Eclectics —advanced to the idea of God as a divine providence, who at times was also conceived to be a personal divinity, filled with an infinite kindness toward men—one on whose grace humanity's life and happiness depend. The Eastern religions had come to conceive of their gods not only in this general fashion, but also regularly as gods who care for the individual.

In the eleventh book of his *Metamorphoses* Apuleius gives us valuable information on these points. To his hero Lucius the goddess Isis is the ever-present divine providence and source of salvation, the one who always saves and cares for mankind; like a mother she is patient with the immature prayers of her children, kind and pitiful toward men in their afflictions; in her good time she calls her chosen ones to the secrets of her service. Serapis likewise is represented by the rhetorician Aristides as everywhere and eternally present and active, at once kind and most fearful, but inclined to pity. The god's gracious pity toward men is indeed adduced as a reason why his devotees should exhibit the same character toward their fellows. Thus the religion of Serapis and Isis led toward that humanitarianism to which philosophy came by another road.

In the course of time even the Great Mother of the Gods ceased to be the wild Phrygian goddess, who con-

demned her scornful lover to his fate, and who found her joy in human blood. Long before the last century of her sway she had become the kindly mother of all Nature, while Attis became the Sun-god, the common symbol of all-embracing divinity. Inscriptions of the fourth century show that the Mother Goddess drew the devotion of the noblest and most intellectual pagans at Rome.

Furthermore, the Oriental gods claimed the whole of their devotee's life; they were not satisfied with occasional worship or with participation in other sacred rites. The concept of God as not only omnipresent and omniscient but also as ever caring for individuals—a belief to which the Stoic hardly attained—led to the ideal of the religious life as one constantly devoted to the contemplation of the divine. So Apuleius makes Lucius close his prayer of praise to Isis with the promise that he will always guard within his heart and there contemplate the sacred image of the goddess. As the characteristics of the goddess were now nobly conceived, such religious contemplation had its moral value.

Again, these religions laid stress on the necessity of removing moral pollution by penance and purificatory rites. Juvenal would regard Isis as a procuress, and he mocks at the women of his time who, naked and trembling, crawled on bleeding knees about the Campus Martius; but the very severity of the satirist's verses shows the influence of the goddess. Baneful as the Orientals undoubtedly sometimes were, the practices which call forth Juvenal's scorn were intended to purify the devotees of their sins and to restore them to divine favor. The doctrine of the dual nature of man, according to which the soul is noble and divine but the body base and evil—a doctrine introduced into Greek thought by the Orphics and adopted by Plato—had been reconciled with the Oriental ideas of opposing good and evil powers in the world. The Zoroastrian belief in the constant warfare

between good and evil, in the cosmic struggle for supremacy between the god of light, Ormazd, and Ahriman, the lord of darkness, was paralleled by the doctrine of the strife between Osiris and Typhon. Zoroastrianism had a strong moral motive from the first. When the practical synthesis of its ethical ideas with those of other religions was accomplished, and when religion adopted the Stoic view of man as a microcosm, these dualistic notions acquired a heightened ethical value.

Not only were penance and purification required of the devotee, but similar acts were necessary before one could be admitted to the company of consecrated worshippers. The would-be initiate into the mysteries of Isis had to refrain from animal food and wine for ten days and undergo purificatory baths and sprinklings before his initiation could begin. Similar requirements were made in other cults, the purpose of all being to cleanse the neophyte from sin and to prepare him for that union with the divinity which was to be granted him during initiation.

Yet neither such initial purification nor occasional penance was sufficient; for, as was said above, the Oriental gods required continual devotion on the part of their followers who wished to attain to full knowledge of the divine. Such knowledge, Plutarch points out, is the chief thing to be desired; but he adds that the goddess Isis grants this knowledge of the true doctrine only to those who, being initiate in her mysteries, continue in a life of sobriety, refraining from the pleasures of the senses and the passions, and who constantly perform in her temples the stern and rigorous service which she exacts. The devout Chaeronean dwells on the lesson that the purpose of these religious exercises is to secure that knowledge of the first and supreme being which the purified spirit alone can comprehend, and that only in constant association with divinity. Thus in the Oriental religions, as in

the prevailing philosophies under the Empire, advance toward perfection was made dependent on a life of religious exercise, and the ideal of purity included a certain asceticism.

Reference has already been made to the concept of the struggle between the good and evil powers in the cosmos. The conflict was emphasized more in Mithraism than in any contemporary religion. In it man's moral obligation was to range himself on the side of Ormazd against Ahriman that he might secure his own salvation as well as contribute to the general victory of the good. Although we lack satisfactory data, we may reasonably believe that the Mithraist was taught to imitate Mithras, not only as the companion, helper, and ally of the faithful, but also as the god of truth, justice, and purity. The devout believed that Mithras promised his followers victory over their human enemies and over their unseen foes, the powers of evil which constantly threaten human safety. The religion of Mithras was essentially a religion of soldiers. One of the grades of initiation was named "the soldier," and in fact devotion to the god was conceived as a military service; the neophyte, like the new recruit to the army, took an oath. The Isiac devotee was likewise enlisted in the goddess's sacred service. Indeed the term *miles* was a common designation for the devout in Oriental paganism; and it is a familiar fact that from the time of Paul the service of Christ was described in military figures.

Not least significant was the influence of the Eastern religions in turning the gaze of their devotees from this world to the next. The common goal for them was future security and happiness, with which safety and joy on earth might or might not be united. Roman and Greco-Roman religion had been concerned with prosperity here and now, and had taken practically no account of the next world. Greek philosophy too had for

the most part concentrated men's attention on this world. The effect of the Oriental religions was directly the opposite of this. The whole life of the *sacrati* was conducted not with reference to the sensible realities of the present existence, but as a preparation for the realization of ideal hopes in the life beyond this. Now any religion which shifts the view of its followers to the next world is certain to have a profound effect on ethical ideals, and in general to make its devotees think less highly of the present life; wealth, comfort, and immediate success become matters of less moment than the permanent welfare of the soul. Such was the influence exerted by the Oriental gods. Their devotees were ready, for example, to give of their wealth, counting such loss as gain. Dedications to all gods involving money expenditure are common enough; but apparently few shrines of the Greco-Roman gods were so rich in expensive votive offerings made by private individuals as those of the Oriental gods; such as, for example, a shrine of Isis at Acci in Spain, or that of Isis and Bubastis near Nemi in the Alban Hills. Toward the close of the fourth century, when the State's support had been withdrawn from pagan shrines, a pious devotee rebuilt the shrine of Mithras which his grandfather had founded at Rome on the spot where San Silvestro now stands, and added at the end of the recording inscription these lines:

> "Damna piis meliora lucro; quis ditior illo est,
> qui cum caelicolis parcus bona dividit heres?"

"But loss for the pious is better than gain; who richer than he,
Who saves his ancestral wealth and divides his goods with the gods?"

Symbolical poverty at least was cultivated. According to the anonymous *Carmen contra Paganos*, the devotee of the Great Mother, when about to descend into the pit that he might receive the bloody bath of the taurobolium,

put on a dress of rags and humbled himself as a beggar. This and other evidences show that the Oriental religions actually aroused in their followers a disregard for the things of this world as of little value in comparison with those of the next.

Thus we find that there were many elements in these Eastern religions which in the last three centuries of paganism at least made for righteousness. The concept of divinity as a kindly providence which cares for the individual and exacts the same good qualities from man, the unremitting devotion demanded of the devotees, the sense of moral pollution and a longing for moral purification, the shifting of men's eyes from the material gains of this world to the ideal rewards of the next—all these and many other things gave to the Oriental cults distinct and positive ethical and spiritual values. Furthermore, the self-restraint, the gentle asceticism, the obligation to strive unceasingly on the side of righteousness against the evil powers, which these religions imposed, are not to be neglected. Within the religious bodies, whose members were brothers (*fratres*, *consecranei*) the individual learned submission to the head of the society (*pater*), gained self-control and courage for his struggle against the evils of life. No one can read the evidence we possess and not be impressed by the earnestness and devotion of the faithful. That the Oriental religions actually contributed to the higher moral and spiritual life of the Roman Empire during the second, third, and fourth centuries is beyond question. With all the attacks which the protagonists of Christianity made on its opponents, they do not charge the devotees of these Oriental cults with moral degradation. Their silence is significant. As a matter of fact, the Pagans and Christians in the fourth century certainly held to similar standards of morality, and a change from one belief to the other did not require any great read-

justment of ethical principles. It is very true that the pagan religions from the East had their charlatans and quacks in abundance, that their noblest elements were often entangled in a mesh of magic, superstitions, and false beliefs; but Christianity too suffered from the same evils. Christianity triumphed because of its own inherent superiority to the other religions, not because its rivals were wholly evil and degrading. To fail to recognize the real moral value of Oriental Paganism is to fail to understand the first centuries of our era, and so to remain blind to the true nature of the world in which Christianity established its superior worth.

THE ATONEMENT AND THE MODERN PULPIT

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Interest in theology shows no signs of dying out in our time. The theology most frequently and eagerly discussed may be different from what it was a century ago; the conception of the relation between theology and the other sciences may have changed; and a number of interests have crowded in where theology was once supreme. The sermon is not now the sole or even the chief intellectual event of the week. We are for the most part much more interested in knowing a man's political or economic convictions than in discovering his views on inspiration or the Trinity. But if we may judge from the columns of reviews or the publishers' lists, theology is as much written, and presumably as much read, as ever.

This is especially true of the doctrine of the Atonement. In the last half-century no other doctrine has received more careful consideration. We have but to think of the names of Bushnell, Campbell, Dale, Simon, Lidgett, and Moberley. Those who are interested in theology as a whole, like Denney, show that they regard the Atonement as vital. It is vital for us all. If we take our theology seriously, we cannot afford to suspend our judgment here. We are bound to be partisans. Even in refusing to form a theory, we are accepting a theory. In fact, a doctrine that deals with any part of theology is bound to find itself as a doctrine of the Atonement. Every conviction about God's relation

to the world runs up into a conviction about what Christ has done for man.

Yet it will probably be the experience of most attendants at public worship that appeals to the Atonement in religious services are few and hesitating. References to the Cross, indeed, are perhaps more frequent than formerly. Christ, as living in Palestine and dying on Calvary, occupies a much larger place in our preaching than two or three generations back. The very influence of the Pauline presentation of the Gospel is strong enough to make us see the solemn shadow of the Cross of Christ stretching along every path trodden by His feet. But it would not be easy to decide as to what is gathered from most of these references by the ordinary hearer, or even as to what is meant at times by the preacher. The Cross appears to be regarded very often merely as the basis for a vague and emotional appeal for conversion or for a deeper consecration, like the pictures of the Stations of the Cross so popular in Catholic churches. On this point I find my own experience constantly confirmed by that of others. Sermons on the Atonement, like doctrinal sermons generally, are disappearing from our pulpits.

Similar reflections are suggested by the present-day use of hymns. Our hymn-books, indeed, are not lacking in hymns that deal with doctrine. Isaac Watts and Charles Wesley, the most fertile of our English hymn-writers, filled their hymns with doctrine as instinctively as they clung to the phraseology of the Scriptures; and no doctrine is expounded or alluded to more frequently than that of the Atonement. The most impressive of Newman's hymns is simply a poetical setting of the theology of the Atonement. But such hymns are rarely composed now. References to the Atonement in modern hymns are generally adapted to the older theological point of view. A sermon that

attempts to expound the Atonement from the standpoint of Lidgett or Moberley will find very little assistance in the hymn-book of any denomination.

Nor are the hymns which directly deal with the Atonement by any means the most popular. The experience of most modern organists seems to be that the hymns chiefly selected by preachers and welcomed by congregations express mystical experience, somewhat vague and poetic sentiment, or ideals of Christian service and character. Hymns on doctrine are becoming as rare in our worship as hymns which embody an appeal for instantaneous conversion or hymns which guide the thought to the other world.

This conclusion is roughly true of all the different churches; and nothing shows more clearly the distance we have travelled in the last century. With all the enthusiasm of the Evangelical Movement, the eighteenth century was as much the century of theological doctrine as was the seventeenth. The consuming passion for souls which we connect with the early evangelists inside and outside Methodism was based on very definite theological convictions; their sermons and their hymns dealt with nothing else. Without the doctrine, the appeal and the passion are alike unintelligible. It is true that a belief in the doctrine was not presupposed in the hearer; the appeal was directed primarily to his conscience. But it was worked out in accordance with a definite "scheme of salvation," which he was expected to accept; and as soon as he could recognize himself as a "sinner saved by grace," the work was regarded as done.

The difference of tone in our evangelistic appeals today is reflected in our treatises on the Atonement. There is a note of apologetic and even of apology. It seems to be taken for granted that the reader is hostile, or at any rate unconvinced; that he is a critic rather

than a student. He comes with difficulties which must be answered. Some time must be spent in clearing away his prejudices, or in persuading him that in the book before him he will find none of the mistakes of previous writers on the subject. The doctrine itself is on its trial.

Why has the change taken place? Is there something in the modern mind which naturally rejects what to the mind of earlier generations was central? In the following pages we wish to consider this question, especially as it affects the doctrine of the Atonement. Dr. Denney has made out a list of reasons for this want of sympathy.[1] He refers to the momentous development of physical science, to the idealist movement in philosophy, and to the modern devotion to historical study; and he reminds us that the modern mind will have everything based on experience, and "desires to have everything in religion ethically construed." All these factors tell against any readiness to welcome a doctrine of the Atonement; though, rightly understood, their effect, as Dr. Denney properly asserts, should be the reverse.

But there are other considerations which make the average man of today unwilling to attend to the doctrine. His impressions of the significance of physical science and the importance of the historical method will dispose him to turn from all theological presentations of truth; and whatever influence they exert on his attitude to the Atonement they will exert on his attitude also to miracles or to the idea of revelation. With regard to the Atonement, however, he has his special difficulties.

[1] Denney, J., The Atonement and the Modern Mind (London, 1903), Chap. I. "Sin has no place," as Sir Oliver Lodge has said, "in the vocabulary of science." In this connection we may note the words of an influential modern preacher, Dr. G. A. Johnston Ross: "Much of the religion of this generation is lacking in vivid apprehension of certain values formerly recognized in the Cross of our Lord and Saviour. In this matter there is a very deep cleavage between representative Christian experiences of this hour and those of, say, thirty years ago." He adds, "The faith which magnifies the unmerited and sin-destroying grace of God is the only religion."

He cannot understand, in the first place, that presentation of the wrath of God which seems to be inseparable from any interpretation of the Atonement which he knows.

> "Nothing can be good in Him
> Which evil is in me."

And it is in no desire (as is sometimes hinted) to escape from fear of the consequences of that wrath to himself, but from a genuine conviction as to its origin in an antiquated anthropomorphism, that he turns away perplexed even from the New Testament expressions. Nor does he fare much better with vicariousness and substitution. He knows enough of moral responsibility to sympathize with Ezekiel's axiom, "The soul that sinneth, *it* shall die"; and he cannot see how another's dying in his place can or ought to make any difference to him. Equally hard does he find the doctrine of imputed righteousness. He is not in the habit of imputing righteousness, as he understands the matter, to other people, however eagerly he may desire righteousness and encourage it in them. And he prefers that any righteousness in himself should be his own, rather than received in some mysterious way from another. The whole proceeding is apt to seem to him unreal and even unethical; and if he does not actually reject the doctrine, it fails to exert any influence on his thought or conduct. Religion to him is action, struggle, penitence, achievement.[1]

Now it is an unhappy fate for a doctrine when it rouses antagonism or meets with neglect of this kind. A doctrine may make too large an ethical demand for the ordinary man, like that of entire sanctification; in this case select souls will feel its attraction all the more. Or it may pass the limits of intellectual comprehension,

[1] Such is, roughly, the view of Eucken; and it is not difficult, bearing in mind the foregoing, to understand the fascination of Eucken for the high-minded and the intellectual today—the men and women who, in the atmosphere of a century or even a generation ago, might have made eager and enthusiastic evangelical Christians.

like that of the Trinity; in which case it may still be respected. But when a doctrine collides with the plain man's conviction of what is right and just, it rouses the best rather than the worst elements in his nature against it; or else, by dividing his moral convictions against themselves, it leaves him in a condition of paralysis. His only refuge is to turn away from the doctrine altogether and try to forget its existence.

It will of course be urged that these difficulties can all be explained; that in the form in which they appear to the "man in the street" they result from a mistaken and now discredited presentation of the doctrine. They have been explained. No modern teacher of the doctrine has overlooked the necessity of such an explanation. Yet the two facts remain: first, that those whose duty it is to explain them seem unable to make themselves clear, or even to agree with one another as to the point of their explanations; and next, that whatever explanations are given, something seems to be left in the mind of the hearer which is untouched by them all.

The true reason of the refusal to find room for the doctrine lies deeper. The explanations fail to satisfy because the problems they set out to solve are not the real difficulties. Otherwise, how is it that after these years of reverent and eager study they have not ceased to exist? As a matter of fact, the fate of doctrines is not decided by arguments but by affinities. There are certain tides and currents in contemporary thought which have always to be reckoned with, however ingeniously the little boats of our syllogisms may be rowed or steered. The idea that the great act in which "God commends His love toward us" reveals an unintelligible wrath in the Deity, could never have escaped refutation if it were not for something which makes us impatient with the attempt to refute it and unwilling to listen to such an attempt. The truth of vicarious suffering, so deeply

implanted in all our human experience, could not have seemed for a moment to clash with the consciousness of moral responsibility in the mind of an intelligent thinker, if something had not prevented a majority of thinking people from giving any serious consideration to the subject as it appears in theology.

What is this underlying cause? Manifestly, it is one whose operation is comparatively recent. A century ago most people felt no need for explanations at all. Now few people will even pay attention to explanations. The reason is that we have experienced a change both of attitude and interest. Before, we looked back, at our sins; now, we look forward, to our needs or hopes. We are of the opinion, with Walt Whitman, that it is not a fine thing to lie awake at night and think of our sins. We can read of the heart-searchings of Bunyan's hero and admire the acute psychological analysis of his terrors; but we do not feel these terrors ourselves. It is seldom, even in mission services, that we hear of men crying for mercy. If we do, we can hardly understand it. The phenomena of a Welsh revival or a negro camp-meeting set us asking questions about the religious "crowd-consciousness." We may indeed be frightened as to the consequences of our sins; but even then we look towards the methods of the doctor rather than of the spiritual guide; we ask how we can shape the future rather than how we can annul the past. Here lies the great difference, in the sphere of religion, between the eighteenth century and the twentieth.

Nor is this altogether to the discredit of our own times. There can be no doubt that, for all its culture, the eighteenth century was much less respectable and moral than the twentieth. Its sins were distinctly grosser and more pagan. Heaven knows, there is enough of evil in our own days. The plague spots of our modern life have swollen into areas undreamt-of when New York and

London were no bigger than moderate-sized country towns. But that region in our social life in which the coarser evils cannot parade themselves is very much larger, relatively to those plague spots, than a century ago. The whole conception of the Atonement as a way of salvation from sins whose horror deserves instant death or eternal torment is therefore becoming, for many persons, increasingly difficult.

Further, religion has grown rather ashamed of its evangelical self-centredness. We shrink from being thought "other-worldly." We do not like to be convicted of being intent on saving our own souls. And we question whether any transaction in the past can be sufficient, of itself, to assure us about the future or justify us in regarding our ultimate happiness as placed beyond the reach of doubt. George Eliot and Dickens have done more to weaken the old evangelical attitude than most people are aware. But along with these influences has worked some dim sympathy with the words of Christ, that to save his soul a man must lose it. The old call for the salvation of the individual soul at all costs falls on puzzled ears.

Another wide-spread influence makes for this forward look. Our age has seen a very significant advance in humanitarianism. We are not satisfied with telling people who live in a slum that they are wicked. We want to get them out of the slum altogether, and even to destroy the slum. It is not enough for us to convict the drunkard of self-indulgence and callousness; we wish to close the saloon. We long for a clean earth around us to answer to the clean heaven above. Where our forefathers saw evil to denounce, we see suffering to sympathize with, to cure, and to prevent. This attitude is the direct result of the Evangelical Movement. The social problem was the discovery made by the men who were at the centre of that Movement. But by a

strange irony of fate, the daughter has been set against the mother. It may be true that behind each social disease lies a sin. The humanitarian thought of today finds it easier to remember that behind each social sin there lies a disease.[1]

Yet this change of front cannot be attributed to any lack of moral seriousness, or any unwillingness to take into consideration the phenomenon of sin. On the contrary, we are inclined to turn from contemplating sin simply because we have taken it into consideration. For if we are to convict people of sin for the presence of social diseases, who are the persons to be convicted? the starving girl who fell into evil ways, or the well-fed youth who tempted her? the unskilled half-employed man who has tried his hand at some bungling crime, or the shareholders of the company which needs a large reserve of stagnant labor? In such a complicated society as ours it seems impossible to say with confidence, "Thou art the man." We feel safer when we put aside the thought of guilt altogether, and concentrate our attention on restoration.

Now, interest in the doctrine of the Atonement finds it very hard to make headway against such influences as these. The soil is unprepared for such seed. The difficulty is clear when we remember the large number of thoughtful and high-minded people who, though not antagonistic to religion, sit lightly to church membership, and give to the community what once the churches would have demanded and received. It is equally clear when we think of the professed adherents of the churches themselves. In the last few years social service has begun

[1] The attitude of the more serious people in England to the problems raised by the war suggests a further illustration. There have been appeals for penitence and humiliation for the selfishness and materialism whose presence in this as in other countries has made such a war possible. That these sins exist, few would deny. But the appeals have been timid and somewhat half-hearted. People prefer rather to concentrate on the purpose to fight the war through and then to make another such war an impossibility.

to take a very strong hold upon the churches, and especially on their younger and more vigorous members. To many persons the Unions for Social Service in the different denominations seem the most hopeful thing about our modern church life. It is a relief to turn from long discussions on denominational orthodoxy or connexional finance to some eager attempt to make the churches forget what concerns their own prosperity and play the rôle of the Good Samaritan or answer the test of Matt. 25. But this again means to think less of doctrine and more of service; less of the Atonement as a cure for past sin than of some scheme which shall prevent misery or ignorance in the future.

In these days too there is a growing though vague desire for reunion. "We cannot yet think alike, or even perhaps as yet pray together. But let us work together and carry out in common those great gospel precepts of practical redemptive work over which, happily, no deep disagreement is possible, and we shall come closer still later on." Those who argue in this way know that they expose themselves to grave criticisms. One criticism at least they can ignore—that which springs from the belief that the church must stand well with the comfortable and rich, and that the modern preacher is not called upon to stir up strife, like an Amos or an Isaiah. The case is more serious when we are reminded that to seek reunion along this road will drain off the attention from the great matters of our doctrinal loyalties. This follows both from the wish to avoid calling further attention to our divergencies, and from the fact that enthusiasm for social service produces that forward look which leaves the Atonement neglected. Is reunion itself to be bought only at the price of doctrine?

A similar conclusion faces us when we think of the modern attitude of the churches to Foreign Missions. Foreign Missions used to be the stronghold of evangelical

fervor. And they never enjoyed more support from the churches as a whole than at the present time. But the reasons which prompt that support have changed entirely in the last two generations. Few of us believe that the unconverted heathen will be consigned at death to eternal punishment. The older view of the Atonement taught that a way of salvation has been provided in the death of Christ, if and when people will "accept" it, but that failure to accept it, voluntary or involuntary, means ruin. But in relation to Foreign Missions this view has lost its attractiveness, and no new one has been reached. At the same time, our ideas of the work needed on the foreign missionary field have been revolutionized by anthropological study and sympathy, and medical and educational skill. Social service has played proportionately a larger part in the mission field than at home. Sin and Atonement are categories of thought that are steadily dropping out of use.

The problem of the Atonement in the modern world is thus a very complicated one. It is not a matter that calls simply for correct theological statement. It appears to set itself against all the more hopeful and attractive currents of our social life and even of our religious aspiration. "Why keep us dwelling on the past, discussing how we can be reconciled to God or washed from our sins? We do not feel the stain of sin. We do not want to waste time over reconciliation. We wish to put right actual wrongs and help men to love where hitherto they have only hated." What should be our attitude to such a claim?

Some would reply, "You are underestimating the sense of sin and the need of faith. Without faith it is impossible to please God; and what is this faith but faith in Christ's atoning and sacrificial death for our sin? Until you have learnt to think rightly of the past, it is useless to reach forward to action in the future."

Such a reply will have great weight with some—with those who feel guilt as a paralyzing burden, and who can think of nothing else until they are assured that their own souls are saved and their own consciences clear. But these are not the majority. Recent investigations into the phenomena of youthful and adolescent conversion show that the larger number are influenced at the time of their change of heart by the desire to lead a useful or happy life, by social pressure, or conviction of sin, rather than by fear of death or hell as the results of sin.[1] Into a numbing or paralyzing "sense of sin," most people cannot be argued. Even so, the reply suggested above would be necessary for a Christian if the New Testament were itself committed to the position of the backward look and if Christianity were a ministry of reconciliation and nothing more. But is this the case?

Even to question it seems audacious. Does not the Cross stand at the very centre of Gospels and Epistles alike? Has it not been central in the whole experience and preaching of Christianity? It has, and yet only as a means to an end; and this in a double sense. Christ's death was the way to His resurrection; and in His own predictions and in the Pauline Epistles this connection is always recognized and emphasized.[2] And the end of that death and resurrection was that men might live.[3] Life is more than an event or an experience. Christ did not die on Calvary or rise from the tomb in Joseph's garden that we might be forgiven or feel ourselves liberated from the past. That both of these things should

[1] Starbuck (in The Psychology of Religion, p. 52) points out, for instance, that in one investigation fear was the main operative cause in fourteen per cent of the cases, remorse for sin in sixteen per cent, and other motives connected with some moral ideal — the influence of others, or altruistic service — in the remaining two-thirds.

[2] Mk. 8 31; Lk. 18 33; Rom. 4 24, 25; 8 34, etc.

[3] Rom. 5 10, 6 11; Heb. 9 14; Rev. 1 5, 6, etc.

come about, indeed, was indispensable. But His purpose was that we should live the life of men and women who had been forgiven and were delivered from the prison house. It was much that the prison doors should be flung open and that we should hear the words, "Go forth; you are free." It was more that we should be able to *behave* as those who had passed from darkness to light.

This will be seen more plainly when we consider the functions and experiences of the early church. What were the differentiæ of early Christianity? The thought of deliverance from the past was a common one in the period of the beginning of our era. All the results of the recent studies of the ancient Mysteries have made this clearer. In this respect, Christianity was only one of a number of rivals competing for popular favor, and in the mind of the general public perhaps the least respectable of them all. What distinguished Christianity from the rest was the result of the deliverance she promised.

The sense of deliverance was the prelude to entrance into a community; a community with a quite definite and explicit conviction as to its vocation. In the first place, this vocation was personal holiness. Theft, adultery, lasciviousness, pride, the quarrelsome disposition, and the idle or malicious tongue—all the evil things natural in a heathen society and especially among slaves and the classes contaminated by the contagion of slavery —these were to be sternly repressed and banished; and secondly, a new set of relations was to be cultivated both towards "insiders" and "outsiders." The adherents of the church saw in each other the members of one great family, whose actions and thoughts to one another were to be always "in the Lord"; and those who were "without" had to be treated with all honesty and good-will and forbearance, readiness to forgive and refusal to take advantage, as men who were themselves

intended to find their way into the warm and sacred fellowship. In other words, the church was set, not to cherish or encourage or even arouse an experience, but to make the world the scene of God's will. Its eyes were fixed on the future.

But how can we reconcile all this with the prevailing emphasis of the Pauline Epistles? We need not hesitate to admit the difficulty. St. Paul seems unable to escape the recollection of his own deliverance from "the body of this death," the corpse of his old evil self to which he had felt himself chained, or from the thought of Christ's sacrificial death. It is true that he does not often use sacrificial terms, like the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews. But the thought of the sacrifice is always before him. Even if he writes to Gentiles, he is still a Jew; and the Temple is always more familiar to him than the Agora or the Forum.

The difficulty, however, is more apparent than real. The technical language of our theology owes more to St. Paul than even to the Gospels. And St. Paul knew the sense of sin, the longing for forgiveness, and the horror of a misspent past, as few men know it today. But even of those who do know it, few know it like St. Paul. To him this horror was not for actual vices or crimes, the commission of what we should call today open sins. From the beginning, his passion had been for righteousness. His earlier life had been misspent because it had been wasted; because it had not resulted in the kind of righteousness he desired. And the deliverance which at last he found turned his dream into a reality and fulfilled in him that righteousness which before he had sought in vain. If St. Paul emphasized the Cross, it was because the Cross meant to him the indispensable condition for the life of loyalty, obedience, and triumph, which he could not describe better than as the life that was risen with Christ. As the grammarian

would say, St. Paul worked with a perfect tense instead of an aorist.

When we turn back from the Epistles to the Gospels, discussion seems hardly necessary. Whether we think of the Sermon on the Mount and the parables and longer discourses in the Synoptics, or the sermons in the Fourth Gospel, we are aware of the stress laid either on action of a quite concrete kind or on a principle of mutual love which necessitates concrete action for its achievement. There are whole regions of Christ's teaching which do not suggest that anything more than this is needful. On the other hand, no one can fail to observe the explicitness of Christ's demands for the service of the weak and helpless, the widow and the little child, the poor and the sick—a service which both the church and the State are beginning to see in a new light. Nor can any one mistake the importance in all His teaching of repentance and forgiveness; but the end of both of these is a new kind of activity. Action appropriate to repentance must be performed, or where is the repentance? If a new obedience does not follow forgiveness for disobedience, forgiveness itself is useless.

Much of the most recent study of the New Testament has led us to feel that where the ethical interest appears to be weak, its place has been taken by eschatological considerations. Eschatology implies the forward look, but one of a very different kind from that of which we have spoken. The world—that is, the present organization of society—is expected to come to an end at no distant time; but there is no evidence that, except by some individuals at Thessalonica and perhaps at Corinth, the early disciples modified their conduct because of this belief, any more than those who have professed similar beliefs in modern times. The result of the eschatological expectation was neither to discredit ethics in favor of the experience of an inner change nor to establish an

interimsethik of any kind, but to inspire conduct worthy of those who were continually waiting for the consummation of a more glorious citizenship.

It would thus appear, first, that the New Testament as a whole is in distinct harmony with the modern tendency of thought noted above, in so far as both underline the necessity of a certain type of activity as essential to Christianity; and secondly, that the presentation of the specific doctrine of the Atonement, as a whole, supports this view. In spite of various well-known passages, the Atonement is recognized as doing more than annulling the past. It fits us for playing our part in the present and the future. One very serious objection, however, would seem still to remain; namely, the sacrificial coloring inseparable from the New Testament exposition of the Atonement. It is beside the mark to urge that the actual language of sacrifice, outside of the Epistle to the Hebrews, is only employed sporadically. The New Testament is the work of Jews; and to Jews such phrases as "laying down one's life," "offering oneself as a ransom," "dying for men," could hardly be more explicit.

But, it will be urged, the Jewish sacrifices make directly against the view we have been considering. The sacrifice is an *opus operatum;* it is for sin; and when once it is duly performed, the offerer need have no further concern. If then we are to think of Christ as made a sacrifice for us, must we not fall back on the older evangelical conception once more? Such a question arises from a mistake as to the real nature of sacrifice, either in the Old Testament or in the earlier religion of mankind as a whole. At the bottom of all religion is the desire to approach to God, to be in harmony or fellowship with God or with the powers that are thought of as divine. Such fellowship may be desired for either honorable or selfish purposes. Unfortunately, it cannot in prac-

tice be maintained unbroken. That which breaks it, or renders man unable without danger to approach God, is, in the language of the Old Testament, sin. But sin does not mean simply a deliberate and "high-handed" disobedience to the known will of God. It may be the violation of some apparently unmeaning prohibition or "taboo." Indeed, certain Hebrew legal texts question the possibility of atonement by sacrifice for "high-handed" wrong-doing.[1] The point is that whenever a rupture of the relations between man and God has come about, it can only be healed by some formal and sacrificial shedding of blood. This is said to "atone for" the "sin."[2]

The original meaning of the root translated "atone" seems to be hardly recoverable. Equally difficult is it to decide exactly what the worshippers, at various stages in the history of sacrifice, understood by the word. But in early ritual what the worshipper understands or thinks is always a minor matter. What is important is the correctness of the ritual and its consequent efficacy with the Deity. And in any case, the sacrifice is distinctly a means to an end. What was desired by the worshipper was free access to his God and the removal of the sense of uncleanness felt before the sacrifice was offered, whether the offerer was a recovered leper or a woman after childbirth or a person who had not paid his voluntary or stated dues at the Temple punctually. The prescribed sacrifice was offered, and then he was free to resume the old relationship with God and with the community in general.

It must not be forgotten that the sacrifices are not all represented in the Old Testament as having this atoning efficacy. Before the exile, one of the oldest Semitic rituals, the "peace-offering," is generally a festal meal, in which God, the worshipper, and his friends and de-

[1] Num. 15 30; Deut. 17 12. [2] Lev. 4 26, etc.; see also 12 7, 14 53.

pendants, as well as the officiating priest, all have their part—a feast which itself demands a preliminary sanctification.[1] The "burnt-offering"[2] is a solemn function of prayer or thanksgiving, wherein the victim was offered entire to God. The distinctive post-exilic sacrifices, however, the "sin-offering" and "guilt-offering,"[3] have a definitely "atoning" significance. Yet even here the thought of the sacrificial animal as a substitute for the worshipper appears to be wanting. The important fact about the worshipper is that he is unclean and cannot himself approach God with impunity. The important fact about the sacrificial animal—ox, sheep, or goat—is that it is clean, and can go where the offerer cannot go till the offering has gone first. This is definitely true of the Paschal lamb, a very familiar type of Christ in the early church. The goat "for Azazel," in the curious ritual of the Day of Atonement, is certainly unclean. But though this ritual was constantly in the mind of at least one New Testament writer, Christ is never regarded as driven away, like the doomed goat, into the wilderness, but, like the other goat in the ritual, as offered on the altar.[4]

In discussing the references to sacrifice in the New Testament, it is not out of place to refer to one small but not insignificant group of passages in which sacrificial terms are used, not of Christ, but of His followers. The Christian himself has a sacrifice to offer. It is not, of course, a sacrifice for sin, to enable him to regain a lost fellowship with God. That has been offered once for all on his behalf by Christ. The Christian's priestly function

[1] 1 Sam. 16 5. [2] Gen. 22 13; 1 K. 8 64. [3] Lev. 4 2 ff., 5 15 ff.

[4] Ex. 12 5; Lev. 16 9 f. Of the sacrifices here enumerated, some were offered occasionally, when the "sin" of the offerer needed "atoning." Others were periodical and at stated times and for the people as a whole; e.g., the daily sacrifices in the Temple and the sacrifice on the Day of Atonement. But these were as definitely purificatory and remedial as the others. The whole nation was regarded as having broken some of the prescriptions, either in the course of the day or in the year, and needing by one comprehensive and regular act to be brought back into communion.

is the offering of a devoted life, or even the carrying out of a single act of love, like a collection for the poorer brethren. Such passages, of course, have no direct bearing on the Christian view of Christ's death; but they show how the conception of sacrifice, instead of being confined to a single annulling act, tended to connect itself with a life of continuous activity and service in communion with God.[1]

"The theme of all religion is redemption"; or, as a German scholar recently expanded these words of Kant, "Religion is the desire for communion with the Godhead along the road of release from the power of what is essentially evil." That is true. But it is only half the truth. When we recognize that the words do not contain the whole truth, we can do justice to the truth which they do contain. The theme of religion is communion with God in redemption. That is what people today are increasingly unable or unwilling to understand. But the theme of religion is also communion with God in obedience and service and the joyful struggle for an ideal. This statement, as we have seen, is in a position to find a readier acceptance today. And it is sound doctrine. It is rooted in the conception that underlay the venerable body of Jewish Temple ritual. It lies at the very heart of that prophetic teaching which so strangely neglects any specific doctrine of atonement. It is implied by the presentation of the Atonement in the New Testament.

But there is more in it than this. Let us emphasize religion as service, and we shall find ourselves able also to emphasize religion as redemption. To serve God,

[1] The one passage in the Old Testament which seems to speak quite explicitly of substitution is Is. 53. But even there it is not stated that the sufferer bore the sins of others instead of the sinners themselves. The guilt offering is properly, in the Levitical law, the compensation for the withholding of some due (v. supra) and the end of the servant's suffering is to "make many righteous"; i.e., to put them in the right with God, make them capable henceforth of living the good life.

you must serve man. "The true and undefiled practice of religion is to visit the fatherless and widow in their affliction, and to keep oneself unspotted from the world." Is this unspiritual? On the contrary, the attempt to carry it out will prepare the soil today, as nothing else can prepare it, for the preaching of religion as redemption. If I am told that I must repent and be reconciled to God, I say "No; I must act and serve." If I am told that I must act and serve, I agree; but I then discover how hard that same service really is. I find, perhaps for the first time, that something must be done of which I had previously never thought. It is when I desire to live and act in communion with God that I become conscious of the need of a sacrifice. I can recognize it, at this point, as a means and not an end, and I can therefore understand it.

Such a presentation of the doctrine will have its effect on the other difficulties that have troubled the modern mind with reference to the Atonement. Substitution and vicariousness seem to clash with the ethical sentiments of mankind only because we have been accustomed to view them from the self-regarding standpoint. Let us think of them in relation to our powers rather than our status, and their apparent injustice vanishes. To tell me that I am to be credited with a righteousness that I do not possess may naturally perplex me. To tell me that because of what some one else has done for me, I am able to do what was before impossible, is to give me another instance of a principle to which all experience bears witness. To put the matter in another way: if salvation is simply a privilege to be received and enjoyed, the Atonement may well seem a needless subtlety. Why could not God have given it to us at once, instead of telling us that we had gained the right to it, when we had done nothing of the kind? So people will still ask. But if salvation is also a responsibility,

the case is different. Unless I am to cease to be a person, God cannot make me able to do "at a clap" what was before out of my reach. A far more intimate and appealing process is necessary. The personality of some one else must invade my own, yet in such a way as to make my own personality more fully mine than it was before. Paradox as this may seem, it can be done, though it can be done only by the sacrifice that springs from another's purity and love.

A similar relief is afforded with regard to the question of the wrath of God. If God is simply interested in individuals, His anger seems as contrary to His love as to His justice. For how can He be angry with those whom He is said to love? and how, even if He does not love them while they are still unreconciled, can He be justly angry with them except in so far as they have deliberately rejected His offers of pardon? If, on the other hand, He is anxious—to put it crudely—that certain things should be done; if what He desires is the maintenance of certain relations by human beings with one another and with Him; then we can easily imagine a very real anger—we can use no other term—breaking out where those relations are sundered. But that anger, at a state of things against which His nature is bound to react, is in no way contrary to the warmest love to every individual man and woman, or to the justice which can recognize in the fullest way the varying responsibility of each; while, at the same time, such an anger must inevitably work for the formation or resumption of those relations and for the means by which this end is attained. That is to say, God's anger, rightly understood, is a direct motive for the commending of His love to us in the death of Christ.

The danger of the older Evangelicalism, as of so much popular Catholicism, was undoubtedly in the emphasis which it laid on the gloomier aspect of its faith.

To speak "as a dying man to dying men," and about the dying Man, was the ideal of the preacher. We have very naturally felt a rebound from that point of view. Our danger lies in the other direction. We are apt to forget both the immensity of the task of Christ and the horror of disobedience to the will of God. We do not "whine over our sins." We hardly think them worth a regret. The reasons for this change of mind have become clear to us, but the consequences may be disastrous. It is just the most eager and reverent minds which have felt the torture of sin most deeply. To forget this is to neglect the most striking facts of human experience, and to relinquish all hope of attaining the heights of spiritual achievement. Yet to attempt to cultivate or induce this sense is useless. It must come of itself or it had better not come at all. And it will come when we pass, in our thinking, from condition to function—when we turn our attention to what we ought to have done and have not done, rather than to what we are. Most of us are not good enough to feel this sense of sin. We shall feel it when, like St. Paul, we are consumed with a passion for righteousness and are overwhelmed to think how we have failed. But for such a passion there must be an ideal; and it is such an ideal which is forming itself with increasing clearness in the ethical and practical aspirations of the present age. The change that makes us fear that we are losing the power to repent is preparing us, in the providence of God, for repentance.

The Atonement therefore is not a doctrine which may be pressed by the theologian but forgotten by the preacher. It is needed in the pulpit as imperatively as ever. The human heart, at its best, has suffered alienation from God. There are barriers to be removed. There are stains to be cleansed away. Sin is a fact, and a fact as real and terrible among the respectable and church-going

classes as among the outcast and criminal. But let the preaching of the Atonement take its right place. Let it be content to follow the imperative of conduct—the law that men will be judged according to their works—and the ideals of the new life of communion with God and of the new heaven and the new earth wherein dwelleth righteousness. When this is done, the modern mind, now led by its qualities to think that the Atonement is unnecessary, will be forced by its defects to find in the Atonement the one thing needful.

RELIGIOUS RESERVE

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Two difficulties especially beset religion as a working force among thoughtful people. One is to find an adequate terminology, which shall somewhat nearly approach in expressive power the infinitely illusive realities with which religion has to deal. The other is to guard such a terminology, when once it has been accepted, from a too literal and insistent use. Nothing is so repellent to cultivated minds, for instance, as the too frequent familiarities which men take with the name of deity. Especially is this the problem of the one who has to deal professionally with religion, and who with all his handling of divine reality must not lose that which most truly characterizes it, its reticence and reserve. It is his function to declare the being of God, and to make real to others the relations which that Being sustains toward men. All other accomplishments on his part will fail without this fundamental fitness for impressing men with a sense of some one infinitely good and enduring above the passing shows of daily living. The true minister of religion is one who has walked and talked and lived with God. Amidst human limitation and change, the fixed lights of the Spirit for him stand out clear. For him at least, intellectual doubt and moral reaction have not dimmed the eternal verities of righteousness, truth, and love. The world remains for him God's world, whatever men may have done to deteriorate it morally; and he continually seeks to renew in others

a consciousness of this essential worth of life and to spur them to a greater realization of it in themselves.

The very attempt to do this, however, invites the danger of weakening the impression by straining the symbols and overworking the assurances of the Spirit. Religious experience and religious speech have not always been able to find common ground. The depth and reality of the one cannot always be converted into the objective power and effectiveness of the other. Even if the listener gets no sense of this impending danger, the speaker himself will feel it; and fortunate will be a clergyman, if he wholly escapes those Monday reactions which act upon the sensitive conscience as a warning that the safe limit of assertiveness has in his case already been passed.

It is not an edifying experience to hear a devout and conscientious minister of religion, healthy in body and mind, confess on Monday morning that the modesty and restfulness of agnosticism look attractive to him. All working ministers of religion must have felt at times this momentary appeal of materialism, and often the more so in proportion to the fineness of their spiritual insight and the general trustworthiness of their faith. Beyond a point, to make religious verities real to others is not to increase their reality to oneself, simply because so much more can be felt here than can be expressed, and because expression must ever bear such a delicate and often reactionary relation to the deeper experience of the mind and heart.

There is this, however, to be said, that a normal, unforced exercise of spiritual faculty for the purpose of increasing recognition of and reverence toward God, both for ourselves and for others, has no after-effects to fear. Speaking to and for each other is as natural and necessary here as elsewhere, where speechlessness may be at the risk of thoughtlessness, and where the

pressure of externalism upon our lives is so insistent and so distracting. In writing frankly to his friend, Dr. Bellows, Dr. Dewey finds in him a certain "want of spiritual depth and vitality." "Your nature," he says, "runs to social communions, to visible movements (to outwardness, in short), more than to the central depths within"; and he questions whether his friend has, in the same measure that he has other things, "that deep heart's rest, that quiet, profound, all-sufficing satisfaction in the infinite resource, in silent and solitary communion with God, settling and sinking into the soul, as into the still waters and the ocean depths."

And yet, with his love of expression and his faculty for definite, tangible results, Dr. Bellows was a much-needed force in the religious life of his time. Such men are quickeners of the moral sense. They stir the depths in others, however it may be with themselves, and make us see the dangers which beset all individualistic conceptions of duty, all piety of the merely contemplative sort. Without them and their arrestive word, current religion would become a stagnating pool, instead of a clear running stream which has the ocean ever in view. The religious life can no more afford to be anti-social than can the intellectual or the physical. The broad basis of our inspirational life is in our human relations, and we cannot hope to realize our thought of God if we cut ourselves off too much from our fellow-men. "So long," says Dr. John Tauler, "as thou hast a whole and undivided love towards all men, a share of the virtues and divine influences bestowed upon all flows out unto thee through them. But I tell thee, if thou dost sever any one from this universal love, thou wilt not receive the precious benefits of the outflowings of this love."

However guarded and sparing our anthropomorphism may have to be, we cannot altogether do without it. The very language of the religious emotions is a redeeming

element in our daily speech, which without some such lift and suggestiveness would greatly suffer in depth and richness of meaning. It is very noticeable in our language how large a part the word which stands for deity has to play. There is no department of literature, no field of oratory, no form of social intercourse, in which the thought and the name of God do not at least occasionally occur. No one can appeal to men, hoping to move them deeply and to call their whole nature into play, without making some use of the terminology of religion. There is so much that we can refer to no other source and suggest by no other means, that sometimes it is necessary for us to say *God*; and even if it does not stand for something vital to our inner consciousness, the word does at least convey that impression of the possible and unknown which is seldom if ever wholly absent from men's minds. The atheist himself, in the absence of any adequate substitute, has to fall back at times upon common social usage and repeat the word which throughout the world has a recognized value and a definite utility.

The facts of life and the necessities of speech seem to require the term God; and yet there is no word which makes such quick and certain reprisals upon him who overdoes its use. The Hebrews recognized this condition when they carefully removed their word for God from the commoner and more familiar usages of daily speech. Yahweh was a Power to be looked up to and feared, but not to be loved or taken liberties with. Nor was there at any time an effort to comprehend either his action or his character. "Who by searching can find out God?" The ways of Yahweh were indeed past discovery, nor had man even in his loftiest prophetic flight come near enough to understand his providence or realize his love. Any possible gain which might come from intimate personal communion with him would be more than offset by the attendant loss of dignity and

commanding power over the imagination of men. It was not so much the heart that was to be touched by the motives of religion as it was the will which was to be swayed; and this was felt to be better accomplished by preserving the natural distance at which God stands to man. And so the Hebrews resorted to circumlocution or to suggestive terms, when reference to their national deity was unavoidable.

A modern approximation of this position is found in the attitude which Goethe maintained toward religion. The poet was eighty-two years of age when Eckermann thus speaks of him: "He is far from supposing that he truly apprehends the Highest Being. All his oral and written utterances have inculcated the belief that God is an inscrutable Existence, whereof man has but approximate glimpses and presentiments. All nature and we human beings are, nevertheless, so penetrated with the divine element, that it sustains us, that in it we live, work, and be (are); that we sorrow and rejoice through the operation of eternal laws, which we fulfil and which are fulfilled in us, whether we perceive them or not. He is firmly convinced that the Divine Power is everywhere manifested and that the Divine Love is everywhere active."

There was something peculiarly offensive to a mind like Goethe's in the professional assumption and complacency with which the priestly class try to realize this power to the average intelligence and the average conscience of mankind. In another conversation with another individual he is reported as saying, "With the people and especially with the clergymen, who have him daily on their tongues, God becomes a phrase, a mere name, which they utter without any accompanying idea. But if they were penetrated by His greatness, they would rather be dumb, and for very reverence would not dare to name Him." This is a sweeping criticism, and indi-

cates in a sufficiently aggressive manner the dangers which Christianity invited in abandoning the safe reserves of Judaism. The moment that Jesus proclaimed a Heavenly Father in place of the mere governmental deity of his ancestors, he opened the door to a brood of religious monstrosities, and affected for worse as well as better the vocabulary of religious worship. It is not always that the earthly father succeeds in keeping the children that he loves in a proper attitude of intelligent respect and reasonable obedience, but it has proved a much more difficult task to teach a daily oneness and communion with God without infringing on the manifest reticence of deity and the proper humility of man.

So long as the Hebrew or the Puritan idea of fatherhood prevailed, the full danger did not appear; for parental affection, according to this conception, concealed its tenderness under an aspect of law and order and exacted from its dependents merely a silent and unquestioning obedience. But with the freer modern interpretation of fatherhood, which invites confidence and permits familiarity, it has not been so easy to eliminate the vices of anthropomorphism from private feeling and public worship. To go into the ordinary prayer-meeting or to attend many of our church services on Sundays, is to get the impression too often that the note of filial trust and devout affection is being decidedly forced in the interest of popular effectiveness. The tone of prayer and exhortation becomes at times offensively flippant, not to say irreverent. Deity is not only argued with and condescendingly enlightened as to human affairs, but even joked with and, as it were, patted on the shoulder. The assumption seems to be throughout that God looks upon His creatures with an alternating mixture of facetiousness and affectionate tolerance, and is to be exploited by them for possible blessings in the manner most likely to render Him complacent and generous. It

is as if long familiarity with the filial attitude had begotten a subtile sort of disrespect, as if, the weaknesses of Deity having been found out, the establishment of pleasant relations between the Divine and the human had become all too fatally simple and easy.

Somewhat the same result is reached by the modern turning from the sterner side of the Divine character to its softer and more attractive aspects. Walter Bagehot has warned us that "we must not be invited to approach the Holy of Holies without being made aware, painfully aware, what holiness is; we must know our own unworthiness ere we are fit to approach or imagine an infinite Perfection. The most nauseous of false religions," he tells us, "is that which affects a fulsome fondness for a Being not to be thought of without awe or spoken of without reluctance." The significant fact here is that it is the secular mind which thus recalls us to the severe and chastening phases of the character of God, without which religion ceases to be a real power for righteousness in the world. Mere speculative detachment never yet advanced the soul a step on its way to spiritual certitude or moral freedom. "It is not hard to know God, provided one will not force oneself to define Him," says Joubert. And again, "'Fear God' has made many men pious; the proof of the existence of God has made many men atheists."

Nor have the more enlightened methods of religious approach in our day always escaped the temptation to abuse the confidence which has been reposed in them. Indeed, the difficulty is present in nearly every form of stated worship—except that silent one of the Friends, which has thus far shown little adaptation to modern religious needs—that a free and familiar use of the name of deity shall degenerate into what Goethe calls a "mere habit of speech," as little available for purposes of spiritual communion as for those of practical religious effec-

tiveness. All this goes with that abomination, the professional tone, and with that air and manner and dress which are known as priestly; the more of which one succeeds in acquiring, the farther off the unaffected religious consciousness feels him to be from the simplicity of Christ and the real nature of God. The parrot-like repetition of what should be a sacred symbol not only weakens the truth for which it stands, but it tends at last to bring about a revulsion of feeling in the mind of speaker and listener alike.

The line which separates one who is familiar with deity from one who is *too* familiar is often so tenuous that it is not strange if sometimes devout people content themselves with the opposite extreme of a wholly impersonal approach in their worship of the True and Good. But this would be to only repeat the error of materialism, and to lose some of the finest fruits of religious experience. "Where spiritualism," says Joubert—and by spiritualism he means merely the spiritual consciousness—"where spiritualism employs the words *God*, *creation*, *will*, *divine laws*, the materialist is perpetually obliged to make use of abstract terms, such as *nature*, *existence*, *effects*. He feeds his mind on ghosts, without features, without color, without beauty."

This may indeed be preferable to the unconscious materialism of over-dogmatic statement, but the soul will never be nourished by spiritual negations or mere generalities of faith. "Take away belief in the self-conscious personality of God," says Tennyson, "and you take away the backbone of the world. On God and Godlikeness we build our trust." Even an ethical culturist like William M. Salter holds "that one of the needs of our time is some kind of constructive thinking that shall enable us to see and feel the Divine in the world once more, that shall again put us in the attitude of worship, and again lift us and make us strong in a strength

not our own." And yet we are told that Tennyson "dreaded the dogmatism of sects and rash definitions of God." "I dare hardly name His name," he would say; and accordingly in *The Ancient Sage* we remember he called Him the Nameless.

It has been said that "people treat it [the divine name] as if that incomprehensible and most high Being, who is even beyond the reach of thought, were only their equal. Otherwise they would not say the *Lord* God, the *dear* God, and the *good* God." It was Cotton Mather who remarked of Parson Brock, "He dwelt as near heaven as any man upon the earth. I scarce ever knew any man so familiar with the *great* God as our dear Servant Brock." There was an old fisherman on Star Island who used, as a pious duty, to ferry the people across from Appledore and Londoners whenever Parson Brock held divine service. His boat, however, became lost in a storm; and he resented what he considered to be shabby treatment on the part of Providence in view of the services which he had rendered to the cause of religion in the past. Cotton Mather tells us that Parson Brock met the old man's complaint with these words: "Go home contented, good sir. I will mention it to the Lord, and you may expect to find your boat tomorrow." Sure enough, the next day the boat was brought up from the bottom of the sea on the fluke of a vessel's anchor; and another help to unwholesome piety seemed to be afforded.

The gifted Lavater, the friend of Goethe, according to Lewes formed for himself even in childhood "a peculiar and intimate relationship with God, which made him look upon his playfellows with scorn and pity, because they did not share his 'need and use of God.' He prayed for wonders, and wonders came. God corrected his school exercises, and brought to light his virtuous deeds." Out in Denver, Colorado, home of advanced thought which is nothing if not able to "make good"

every time, there is an editorial writer (Thomas J. Shelton, in *The Christian* magazine) who apparently never feels the necessity of adding to his faith, humility. On the cover of a recent number of his magazine, *The Christian*, he has this confident approach to divine realities in the name of Friendship: "Make friends with Mammon. Money is a great friend. It all belongs to you. Make friends with it. . . . Above all, make friends in your mind. Shake hands with your thoughts. Call all your thoughts good. . . . Eternal friendship with everything! Shake, Old Universe! Let us all shake hands with God."

Considering the depth and poignancy of human need, and how in many a time of stress the Divine Sufficiency seems to hide from us and to disappoint our expectations, such exaggeration may not be wholly inexplicable to a patient and pitiful mind. Even the moral side of the Divine Character, so necessary for our guidance, has been providentially withdrawn from our commoner observation in order that that primary condition of human virtue, disinterestedness, might not be impaired. Man must still be able to shun the evil because it is intrinsically bad, and not because either the weight of universal public opinion or the punishment of God is too plainly in evidence against it. Convictions of duty and conceptions of religion vary among men apparently for this purpose, that, as Bagehot has shown, the freedom of our action and the purity of our virtue may not be destroyed.

In that masterly essay of Bagehot's on *The Ignorance of Man*, than which I know of few more stimulating deliverances of the human spirit, the part which this necessary ignorance of man plays in his development is fully indicated and the possible value of "a latent Providence, a confused life, a puzzling universe" made plain. And if, having no moral difficulties to trouble us, we are still oppressed by our intellectual inadequacy of proof, let us listen to "the shrewdest man of the world

who ever lived"—Lord Bacon—when he says, "If we begin in certainties, we shall end in doubts; if we begin in doubts, we shall end in certainties."

As it is the life of God which affects our life, so it must be in most part that we approach him in living ways. Any denial of this supreme reality of existence, be it by thought, word, or deed, must be fatal; none more fatal than that by speech. When some philosopher shall do for blasphemy what Professor Royce has done for loyalty—blasphemy which, in denying God, denies the sources of our life and strength—we shall understand why Jesus spoke as he did against this impiety. But to claim a certain knowledge of God is not necessarily to assert that such knowledge is always communicable to others. Least of all is it always communicable by word of mouth. Our confidence and affection here happily have other means of demonstration than the spoken word. If we are at one with God, there will be the witness of our whole walk and conversation. Definite and formal confession will seldom be needed, the eloquent *life* being generally chary of verbal expression.

The same law should govern us with respect to that other great religious word, the name of Christ, which has greatly suffered in the common usage of the churches. The reverent admirer and would-be follower of Jesus often comes to share in Emerson's reaction against that "noxious exaggeration," which applies to person and name alike. And yet the life, the character of Christ, have an almost unlimited adaptability to human need. The *name* has, indeed, been made to serve many conflicting purposes, and many times historical accuracy has been sacrificed to immediate and superficial effects. But there is something here which is better caught and preserved by reticence than by unrestrained assertion, a deep heart of meaning and power into which one grows by silent meditation, by obedience, and by the quiet

reserves of faith. By this name, so dear and so influential in the better life of Christendom, we still must conquer. What we need is to hold the word up to its best; by moderating the frequency and modulating the tone with which we mention the name of Jesus, to avert the danger of reactionary sentiment which has not disappeared since Emerson's day.

Religion must doubtless be looked at from two points of view. As an instrument of practical effectiveness among men, and as a private and personal experience, it may at times call for varying methods of expression. The essentially illusive quality, the somewhat rare and remote character of the emotion, however, always remain. And always there remains also a certain pity that so high a sentiment should ever need to be taken out of the inner circle, the more intimate and secret enclosures of our life, to suffer public exposure and the indiscriminate handling of a professional cult. Religion is so essentially a private and personal concern, and so much remains for faith and trust to do in even its most confident assertions, that the sense of its reality cannot but suffer from the rude touch of familiarity. Not even science has done as much to weaken spiritual certainty in our day as the dogmatism of theology and the unwarranted assumptions of the elect.

The very existence of such a word as agnosticism, together with the fact to which it corresponds, is an indication of this unfortunate tendency. We know that an age which coins such a word and gives it currency must have succeeded an age of over-assertiveness in theology. To have staked all on a complete and infallible system of doctrines and to have attempted an actual topography of heaven, was to invite inevitable reactions such as we have seen.

The human mind, indeed, is all too easily antagonized in these concerns of the spirit. Its devotional appetite

can be forced, or it can be over-indulged, to the point where indifference to stated worship sets in. The object to be sought in any wise ordering of religious observance is, of course, to create and satisfy a healthy spiritual hunger without inducing revulsion or satiety. In proportion to the elevation and intensity of the emotions involved will always be the difficulty of the task. A church, for instance, which can do its work, and show a people, reverent, peaceable, and pure, and at the same time not infringe the threefold character of Sunday as a day of religion, rest, and recreation, has found the better part of public worship. Rest and recreation may be helpful conditions of religion, by freeing its observances from strain and correcting any tendency to over-insistence, both of which threaten the effectiveness of the church in an age of clear seeing and thinking such as ours.

Even of individuals it is true that we most value them for their reserves; and God has infinitely blessed us in what He has held back from our knowledge and denied to our utterance. Fully as much by the divine reserves as by the divine revelations does He humble our conscience and energize our will.

Let there then be prophets of the divine reticence, teachers who make clear that eye hath not seen nor ear heard nor hath it entered into the heart of man what God hath prepared for them that love him. For purposes of dogma we know little about God. Spiritually, however, He stands to us for certain transcendent facts and forces of life; for the realities of communion, for enlightenment to see and inspiration to do, for inward strength and hope and courage. All this and more we must ever associate with the Sacred Name. That name will never cease to stand for a great constructive possibility of experience, even though the best part of our deliverance concerning it remains what we do not say. The

age-long effort to feel after God, in faltering words, if haply we may find Him in experimental fact, will go on as of yore. But let us hope that it will proceed with less of unhealthy extravagance and extreme than in the past. To seek here, as Jesus said, is to find. To draw near in reverence and humility is at least to feel dimly the mighty influences of the Spirit. The work of the mystic is not yet done in life. The quietist has his office still, to purify our vision and revive our faith. Perhaps we shall never get farther along in our religious progress than the attitude and spirit of the German divine, who after many hours of labor in his Master's service, always closed the day with the one prayer, "All is as ever, Lord, between me and Thee."

THE CONTRIBUTION OF PROFESSOR ROYCE TO CHRISTIAN THOUGHT

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Theology is constantly recognizing, more fully and more freely, the closeness of its relation to philosophy. Starting though they do from different impulses—theology attempting to interpret experience and philosophy to attain knowledge—they converge upon a common field. No great theologian but influences philosophy, no great philosopher but affects theology.

Of American philosophers since Edwards, no one has made so rich, profound, and extensive a contribution to religious thought as Josiah Royce.

I

It is impossible to understand Professor Royce's philosophy without realizing its close relation, from the very start, to the problems of *religion*, or rather of theology. It is not without significance that the title of his earliest volume is *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy* and that of his latest, *The Problem of Christianity*. That the religious interest was uppermost in the awakening of this puissant mind is left without a shadow of doubt by an unequivocal statement in the preface of the first volume, as follows: "The religious problems have been chosen for the present study because they drove the author to philosophy, and because they, of all human

interests, deserve our best efforts and our utmost loyalty."[1]

The note of loyalty, as well as that of religious interest, thus early struck, emerges later as the keynote of his ethical teaching.

One does not read far in this first fresh and vigorous volume, written at the age of thirty, before realizing that it came from the reaction of a deeply reverent and penetrative mind, trained in a home of piety and a church of power, against the religious conceptions then prevalent in practically all, even the freest and broadest, American churches. The author sees that religion cannot be true to itself without asking "how the highest thought of man stands related to our highest needs and what in things answers to our best ideals."

> "Here are questions of tremendous importance to us and to the world. We are sluggards or cowards if, pretending to be philosophic students and genuine seekers of truth, we do not attempt to do something with these questions. We are worse than cowards if, attempting to consider them, we do so otherwise than reverently, fearlessly, and honestly."[2]

In particular, it was the limitation of *the idea of God* then prevalent in both orthodox and liberal churches which aroused his concern, and it is with this doctrine that the book is mainly occupied. Very clear and imperative rings his challenge to those who are content with "their own little contemptible private notion and dim feeling of a God." "Take heed," he writes, "lest your object of worship be only your own little pet infinite, that is sublime to you mainly because it is yours."[3]

The Being whose existence depends upon the traditional arguments "aptly compared to medieval artillery

[1] The Religious Aspect of Philosophy, p. v. [2] Ibid., p. 5.
[3] Ibid., p. 13. The quotations are from the First Edition.

on a modern battle-field," the God "who is constantly producing noteworthy effects and so getting himself into the newspapers," is, in his unfettered, critical judgment worse than none. In place of such a god the author prefers to conceive of God as "Universal Thought," and as such he essays to interpret Him.

The pathway by which he reaches the certainty that there is such a Being is the study of the nature of error. The argument drawn from the possibility of error is, in brief, as follows:

"That there is error is indubitable. What is, however, an error? The substance of our whole reasoning about the nature of error amounted to the result that in and of itself alone, no single judgment is or can be an error. Only as actually included in a higher thought, that gives to the first its completed object, and compares it therewith, is the first thought an error."[1]

This "Inclusive Thought" is none other than God. Everything else may be doubted except this.

"They reckon ill that leave me out;
When me they fly, I am the wings;
I am the doubter and the doubt."[2]

The All-Thinker is also the All-Enfolder, the Infinite Spirit, Universal Will. Yet His inmost essence is Thought.

"Not heart nor love, though these also are in it and of it. Thought it is, and all things are for Thought, and in it we live and move."

II

In Professor Royce's next book, a fascinating and penetrative review of modern philosophy, entitled *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy*, published in 1892, he moves forward toward a fuller conception of the Divine

[1] Ibid., p. 431. [2] Ibid., p. 434.

Being as containing not only Thought but Worth—the values of the "world of appreciation." This advance in his interpretation of God came to complete and signal expression in the philosophical discussion at the University of California in 1895—perhaps the most noteworthy that has occurred in America. The chief contributions to this discussion were published in the volume, *The Conception of God.* In the brilliant address with which Professor Royce opened the discussion, he presented the conception of God as embodied in the attribute of Omniscience. God is the Absolute, Organized Experience, "related to our experience as an organic whole to its fragments." [1] The existence of such an Absolute Experience is proved—and here we have the proof from the nature of error in another form—by the fact that the very denial of it is an appeal to it as vindicator of the denial; for nothing can be true or false except it be such to an Inclusive Experience. "The very effort to deny an absolute experience involves, then, the actual assertion of such an absolute experience." [2]

Without lingering upon this subtle form of proof—a stronghold of philosophical argument which the forces of scepticism find it easier to go around than to demolish—is it impertinent to ask: What is gained by proving that there is a Universal Experience? That is easily granted without proof. The thing needing proof is that this Universal Experience is God.

Professor Royce claimed for this conception of God that it was "distinctly theistic and not pantheistic." [3]

"For my own part, then, while I wish to be no slave of any tradition, I am certainly disposed to insist that what the faith of our fathers has genuinely meant by God, is, despite all the blindness and all the unessential accidents of religious tradition, identical with the inevitable outcome of a reflective philosophy." [4]

[1] The Conception of God, p. 44. [2] Ibid., p. 43.
[3] Ibid., p. 49. [4] Ibid., p. 50.

Against this assumption Professor Howison, who represented the distinctly personalistic point of view in the discussion, protested, declaring that such a representation of God "is not the conception of a Being that we can adore at all. The fault of it at the bar of the religious reason is, that by force of the argument leading to it all the contradictions and tragic discords belonging to experience must be taken up directly into the life of the Absolute; they are His experiences as well as ours, and must be left in Him at once both dissolved and undissolved, unharmonized as well as harmonized, stilled and yet raging, atoned for and yet unatoned." [1]

Under the searching criticism of Professor Howison, who insisted that the conception of the Divine Being as Absolute Experience is not only unworshipful but inimical to God's ethical nature and also that it contradicts the freedom of the individual, Professor Royce wrote a supplementary essay upon *The Absolute and the Individual*, which is included in the same volume. In this he lays stress upon the process of individuation which takes place in the Absolute, endeavoring to show that the Absolute "has room for ethical individuality without detriment to its true unity." [2]

In seeking to accomplish this end, Professor Royce—whether consistently or not we will not here pause to discuss—defines God both as a self-conscious individual and as "the only ultimately real because the only absolutely whole individual." [3] This Whole Individual embraces every individual ego, each individual's plan being "identically a part of God's own attentively selected and universal plan." [4] The language reminds one of a certain Protestant theologian not now in so high repute as formerly.

[1] Ibid., p. 123. [2] Ibid., p. 137. [3] Ibid., p. 272. [4] Ibid., p. 292.

III

The Absolutism thus outlined reaches its full expression and defence in Professor Royce's greatest and most profound work—on the whole probably the most thorough and sustained work of American philosophy—the Gifford Lectures, *The World and the Individual.* If I venture not only to characterize but to criticise this masterpiece of philosophical thought, it is not without a reverent sense of the original power and imperishable worth of this burning bush of high and holy thinking which so few turn aside to see.

Just as "Universal Thought," becoming suffused with feeling and reality, gave place in Professor Royce's conception of God to "Universal Experience," so "Universal Experience" has here become purified and uplifted into Universal Selfhood. Will has become more central than Thought, and Moral Purpose than Experience. In a word, the conception of God has advanced in the Gifford Lectures distinctly toward that of a Person.

Nowhere perhaps, unless it be in Fichte's works, has the nature of personality and its relation to God been so richly and sympathetically unfolded as in these two volumes—*The World and the Individual.* And yet the task so splendidly assailed is in itself more than a labor of Hercules, and the want of success in establishing the main thesis cannot but be felt by the reader. To show how the One can be the One and yet the many, the Self a Self and yet the selves—this is indeed a "stickit" problem even for a mind possessed of all the subtlety as well as the sincerity, the power as well as the persuasiveness, of the author of these extraordinary volumes.

These lectures, however, constitute a rich mine of philosophic theory. Several truths essential to our

understanding of the interpretation of personality and of knowledge, stand out in them with a definiteness and completeness of statement seldom reached in the literature of philosophy. Such, for instance, is the remarkable exposition of the distinctness and yet the relatedness of the "World of Description" and the "World of Appreciation." Professor Royce has, in these volumes, together with his analyses of consciousness in *Studies in Good and Evil*, given us an insight into the nature and meaning of the self which constitutes a most valuable contribution to the understanding of personality, and thus of Christianity as the religion of personality.

Sensitive as he is to the inner autonomy and worth of the finite selves, Professor Royce nevertheless does them an essential injustice. He endeavors to conserve their selfhood while encompassing them all within both the purview and the activity of an All-Inclusive Self. With extraordinary resourcefulness and patience he pursues the task of the adjustment of these contrasted selves, seeking to guarantee to the finite selves a freedom that will save them from the paralysis of determinism, and to the Inclusive Self a transcendence that will save him from the responsibility of the evil committed by the finite selves.

These antinomies of selfhood are, indeed, by no means peculiar to the philosophical premises of Professor Royce. Snares and pitfalls beset every theory that tries to explain with accuracy the relationship of God and man. And yet Professor Royce's monism serves to aggravate the difficulties to the highest degree. The personal God of theism is at least free from complicity with the materialities and imperfections and misdeeds of the finite selves. He may indeed seem too separate and remote from the finite selves to enable us to say with so much realism as does Professor Royce of his Absolute, "In whom we live and move and have our being."

Nevertheless, the immanence which a Perfect Person may have in imperfect, finite persons through the operation of sympathy—"grace," as the old theologians called it,—may be a truer immanence than this all-inclusive absorptionism.

At all events Professor Royce's discussion of the relations of the Self to the selves concludes with an unresolved problem. In the end, all the participants suffer from this universal Absolutism. The individual finite self suffers because he is so nearly swallowed in the Whole. To be sure, each of us possesses, according to Professor Royce, a "uniqueness of meaning" which gives him a certain worth and significance to the Universal Self; but *for himself* and *to himself* he is a zero. The conception of God suffers too in this monism, because He is, after all, not a true Person, but only the Aggregate of persons. It is in vain—is it not?—that Professor Royce assigns personality to such a Being, though defining it in these comprehensive words:

> "Now from our point of view, God is a Person. Temporally viewed, His life is that of the entire realm of consciousness in so far as, in its temporal efforts toward perfection, this consciousness of the universe passes from instant to instant of the temporal order, from act to act, from experience to experience, from stage to stage. Eternally viewed, however, God's life is the infinite whole that includes this endless temporal process, and that consciously surveys it as one life. God is thus a Person, because, for our view, He is self-conscious, and because the Self of which He is conscious is a self whose eternal perfection is attained through the totality of these ethically significant temporal strivings, these processes of evolution, these linked activities of finite selves."[1]

This conception of God as eternally and consciously surveying his life as one, rescues Professor Royce's Deity from being a mere symbol for the evolutionary

[1] Vol. II, p. 418.

process, or the mere totality of the striving selves. Yet can He be both the perfection and the process, both the strivings and their beholder?

IV

The Gifford Lectures were published in 1901. Between this time and the publication of his remaining books a marked change of direction, or at least of emphasis, appears in Professor Royce's thought. It is a change away from the speculative and abstract toward the ethical, the practical, and the social. A more deeply human interest pervades his later work, a closer touch with the more immediate needs of his fellow-men and of his time.

How far this was due to the stirring crusade of Pragmatism which began about this time, especially to the acute and telling thrusts at Absolutism made by Professor James, how far to the general change in the temper and interest of the age, and how far to the natural development of his own ever vital and progressive thought, it is hard to say. A rare and beautiful catholicity of mind is one of Professor Royce's finest traits. Whatever pains he may have felt from the stings and arrows of his outrageous pragmatic foes, he has manifested no resentment, made no efforts to defend Absolutism—doubtless thinking that it is able to defend itself—and without deflecting from his own course—only pausing at Professor James' death to pay him such tribute as only a great thinker can give to a comrade—he has quietly appropriated whatever was relevant in the criticism aimed against Absolutism and moved steadily on his way in the development of his own philosophy.

Now emerges in the symphony of his teaching that ethical and spiritual note destined to take its place as

the recognized and resonant refrain of his whole teaching, the principle of *Loyalty*. Here at length appeared in clear radiance a truth fundamental in the structure and quality of his thinking which all the world could grasp. It is as the "philosopher of loyalty" that Professor Royce will be most widely known. The volumes which embody this new attitude are, *The Philosophy of Loyalty* (1908); *William James and Other Essays* (1911); *The Sources of Religious Insight* (1912); and *The Problem of Christianity* (1913).

In his *Philosophy of Loyalty*, with all its noble idealism and ethical realism, a self-refuting note was incidentally struck which it remained for the author himself tacitly to correct in his later work. I refer to the possibly unethical and irrational implication of the principle of loyalty which is there put forth, *i. e.*, insufficient discrimination as to the cause to which loyalty devotes itself. "Loyalty to loyalty" means, when carried to its logical conclusion, that the loyalty of the criminal to the gang, of an obstinate man to an opinion, of the patriot to his country "right or wrong," are all covered by the aegis of a virtue that may thus be distorted into a sanction of the most selfish and disastrous ills. Loyalty to a worthy cause, unselfish, pure, rational—as of course the author intended—alone is good and great. Professor Royce fastened upon such a cause, incomparable in its worth and beneficence, when, in his latest philosophical book, he took up again definitely the subject out of which his thinking had originally sprung and about which it had ever been revolving—Christianity. The Manchester College Lectures upon *The Problem of Christianity*, delivered at Oxford in the spring of 1913, touch the problem to the quick.

"The Problem of Christianity." Ever to the philosopher Christianity is too much a problem and too little a solution. And yet it could never be an adequate solution,

did it not also offer an ever insistent problem. Professor Royce solves the problem in terms of Loyalty. The terms are true—though perhaps Love comes even nearer than Loyalty to the heart of Christianity[1]—but is his object of loyalty the real one? The Beloved Community is the *loyal* community. Yes, but to what is it loyal? To itself, says Professor Royce, and no one would wish to contradict him. But what is the secret of its loyalty? Who created the Community? Loyalty does not spring objectless and motiveless from the void. The Community is loyal to itself because loyal first to one who created it and holds it together.

It is difficult to understand how Professor Royce could have so far failed to recognize the potency of the Christ personality as the cohesive centre of the Church. It is true he makes a place for the Indwelling Christ—the Spirit of the Community—but not for the incarnation of the Spirit in Jesus. It was the incarnate Word who gave origin and impetus, concreteness and unity, to the early church. Nor has the personality, thus vital at the outset, however obscured, ever been lost in the subsequent life of the Church. In answer to the question, Who was the founder of Christianity? Professor Royce replies, Not Jesus, nor Paul; we first find the essence of it in the Pauline churches. In other words, he leaves the question of its founder unanswered. To leave it unanswered is to leave the problem of Christianity unanswered.

V

What is the conception of God in the Oxford Lectures? The answer cannot be a definite one, for there is no distinct and clearly apprehensible teaching upon this topic, either in the Bross Lectures upon *The Sources of*

[1] Loyalty represents the *will* side of love; love includes both spontaneous and volitional elements.

Religious Insight or in *The Problem of Christianity*. The very term "God," so frequent and so pregnant with meaning in earlier volumes, is rarely found in the later. Not that the author has rejected his former point of view. Indeed, in the lecture on the *Doctrine of Signs*, the theory of "Absolute Voluntarism" is strongly reaffirmed. Yet the emphasis has changed. Manifestly the conception of God has passed into a new stage of development. Is it a more potent conception, or not?

Throughout *The Problem of Christianity* a distinction is made between the Community and the Spirit of the Community, and at one point at least a third distinction is suggested—namely, that of "Charity itself, the love of the Community by all its members, and of the members by the Community."[1] Definitively or inferentially, the reader is led to associate God with each and all of these—the Community, the Spirit of the Community, and the Love of the Community. Here is a striking correspondence—though Professor Royce does not himself point it out, and possibly does not himself recognize it—with the threefold trinitarian distinction, God the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.

In the Community there is thus always, even when viewed as the Universal Community, or Humanity, something spiritual and ideal. This it is which sets Professor Royce's Community-loyalty far apart from and above Positivism and every other form of the worship of Humanity. It is never the Community in its empirical nature or its mass aspect, that Professor Royce presents to us as divine and worthy of devoted loyalty, but always the Community as an *Ideal* in process of realization. This Ideal Community, we are led to infer, is practically what we have all along been ignorantly worshipping. Whom therefore we have ignorantly worshipped, He, or It, is declared unto us.

[1] Op. cit., p. 192.

The actual Community corresponding to this burning inner ideal, Professor Royce admits, nowhere exists. The Community, though a Community of memory, is still more a Community of hope, of expectation.[1] The Church is an invisible ideal rather than an actual institution.

"For the true Church is still a sort of ideal challenge to the faithful, rather than an already finished institution—a call upon men for a heavenly quest, rather than a present possession of humanity. 'Create me'—this is the word that the Church, viewed as an idea, addresses to mankind."[2]

Thus does this "institutionalist," as he is amusingly termed by Canon Inge in the *Hibbert Journal*,[3] describe the Church. Institutionalist he is only in the sense of one who cries, "Ring in the *Church* that is to be."

It is impossible not to feel that this divinity of the Community is, in effect, a form of the doctrine of Divine Immanence, and that it only lacks the supplementary truth of transcendence to become a fresh and illuminating expression of Christian Theism. And yet true and complete transcendence is never predicated of God by Professor Royce. The Community has indeed a kind of *immanent* transcendence, so to speak. It transcends itself, holding within itself ever the seed of its own perfection. But this possibility of perfection is never conceived as coming from Above, from the Father of lights. If, instead of being simply the Spirit *of* the Community, this Spirit were only conceived as the Spirit *in* the Community, having its source *above* the Community, we should be able to recognize at once the Holy Spirit, the Indwelling Christ of Christian experience; but this distinction Professor Royce does not permit us to make.

[1] II, p. 51. [2] I, p. 54. [3] July, 1914.

Very closely does this untrammelled thinker approximate to the theistic conception, especially in the fascinating lecture on *The Realm of Grace*. But always he stops just short of it and retreats to his stronghold of a society of individuals, a community which he prefers to call *superpersonal*—although he is willing to call it a person, "if by person you mean a live unity of will, of love, and of deed."[1] No one surely would object to that definition of person, if only again that unity is in and of and for itself as well as in and for others. In other words, to be a person the Divine Person must, like the human, be an entelechy—an end in Himself. That is, according to Christian theology, God is not only immanent but transcendent.[2] According to this conception a society having a composite consciousness cannot be in the full sense a person, nor a person a society.

Universal Thought, Universal Experience, Universal Selfhood—this, roughly speaking, is Professor Royce's ladder to perfection. Manifestly it is a progressive approach to that which for Christian theology is most essential in Deity—Personality. And yet the goal is never reached. For this Universal Person is not only an incomplete Person but worse, since there is limitation and evil in Him—the limitation and evil of all the selves composing Him.

In *The Problem of Christianity* Professor Royce partly overcomes this objection by identifying God, not with universal humanity but with those groups, or that inclusive Group, which includes the best in the human persons—the "Universal Community." But even so, not one of these groups alone, nor all together, can be re-

[1] I, p. 352.

[2] It is unfortunate that, as Professor George F. Moore has pointed out to the writer, the term *immanence*, in its exact derivative sense, precludes transcendence. That which *remains in* a thing obviously cannot transcend it. Yet what can the theologian do in such a case but assert that meanings transcend terms?

garded as having perfect or fulfilled personality. Limitation and evil exist in even the highest, the Christian Community.

There is no such thing, then, in fine, as Fulfilled Personality, the Perfect Person, according to Professor Royce—except in idea. If one is content with this conclusion, as satisfying either the intellect or the heart, he has here the highest formulation of his creed. But let him not infer that this is the only God rationally defensible. For out of the intuitive insight of the soul, out of the deeper implications of the moral nature, out of the teleology of the universe, natural and spiritual, there arises a conviction of the reality of a Perfect Person, high and lifted up, yet whose Presence fills the temple of humanity. This conviction of God has possessed the major mind of humanity in all the thinking ages, including our own. It has appealed more strongly than any other to reason as well as to faith.

VI

In the second series of the Manchester Lectures, dealing with the metaphysical aspect of Christianity, Professor Royce brings forward a conception in which Philosophy and Christianity throw light upon each other and to whose elucidation he has been giving further attention in a recent course of lectures at the University of California—namely, the principle of *interpretation*, involved in what he has termed the *Triadic Theory of Knowledge*.

The Community is a community of interpretation. Its most useful member is the interpreter. Knowledge of self and of others is interpretative knowledge. The most serviceable function in the life of the Community is that of interpretation or mediation. Christianity is

a religion of interpretation. It is a "Doctrine of Signs."

This is no new principle, to be sure, in Royce's thinking. It runs through all his work. Its deepest and most searching application to Christianity had already been made in the last of three addresses upon *What is Vital in Christianity*, given at the Phillips Brooks House at Harvard University in the spring of 1909, and published in *The Harvard Theological Review* and later in the volume, *William James and Other Essays*. In the last of these addresses, having shown the shallowness of that conception of Christianity which regards it as a culmination of cosmic evolutionism and leaves on one side its ministry of reconciliation, in words that touch the deeps of human experience the speaker concluded thus, concerning the meaning of comradeship in sorrow:

> "God wins perfection through expressing Himself in a finite life and triumphing over and through its finitude. And our sorrow is God's sorrow. God means to express Himself by winning us through the very triumph over evil to unity with the perfect life, and therefore our fulfilment, like our existence, is due to the sorrow and the triumph of God Himself. These two theses express, I believe, what is vital in Christianity."

This truth finds still ampler expression in the lectures on *Time and Guilt* and *Atonement* in the first series of the Oxford Lectures.

It has thus been given to Professor Royce to recall to the mind of our time, from the vantage-ground of philosophy, one of the great realities of Christian faith, too far overlooked in the hasty superficialism of present-day theology—the doctrine of Atonement.

Yet here once more Professor Royce pauses upon the hither side of a great truth as Christian theology has, in its larger insights, conceived it. Not merely from

within the community but from *above* comes interpretation. Incarnation, according to Christianity, means, not simply that the Spirit of the Community incarnates itself, but that the Spirit that created the Community is also its Savior, entering into a lower order of spiritual life than its own to inform and redeem it.

"As individuals we are lost," says Professor Royce, and we assent. We are saved, he affirms, by coming into right relation with the Community. Yes, we answer, but by coming into right relationship not primarily with the Community, but with the Spirit of the Community, with God, and through Him into relation with the Community. In other words, the primary and fundamental redemptive relationship is that between the soul and God—mediated by the Community. In this conception the only dyadic relation which is "dangerous" is, as a friend of mine has remarked, not that between a pair of persons as such, but that which has not become "triadic" through the presence of the Universal Interpreter who was in Christ—yes, and in every loving member of the Community in the degree of his sacrificial spirit—reconciling the world unto Himself, and thus to itself. It is such a God, "above all and through all and in you all" who alone satisfies our need,

> "That we may lift from out of dust
> A voice as unto Him that hears,
> A cry above the conquer'd years
> To One that with us works, and trust."

VII

In an all too rapid and inadequate way we have endeavored to follow the course of Professor Royce's thought as it relates to Christianity, from the clear cold springs of its earlier critical and speculative beginnings along the deepening and broadening channel of

its profound study of the nature of God and the relationship of the One and the Many, to the later period of its calm and fertilizing flow into the fields of great social interests, where it encircles the broad meadows of human fellowship, waters the roots of loyalty, and interprets some of the deeper truths of Christianity.

It is quite too cheap and professional for the philosopher to dispose of this original and resourceful contribution to philosophy as a form of Hegelianism. It will not stay within these limitations. Or for the theologian to set it down as an insidious form of scepticism or pantheism. It is far too genuinely informed with the spirit of the article, "I believe in the Holy Ghost; the holy Catholic Church; the Communion of Saints." Throughout the later volumes indeed, barring the philosophical phraseology, the very spirit of Christianity, as Paul interprets it, is reflected. In the entire literature concerning Paul, it may be said in passing, few have interpreted his mind with so keen and sympathetic a discernment as has this unconventionalized Christian.

Whatever further amplification or modification this fertile and inexhaustible mind may give to his philosophy, it stands before us as a noble and impressive whole, demanding to be evaluated and put to usury. It would be a grave loss not to honor with criticism as well as with application to life, a philosophy of so large and vital significance. It is ripe for interpretation, for testing, and for food—food for the many as well as for the few.

It is somewhat strange in view of the position which Professor Royce holds in the philosophical world, the deep and extensive influence he has exercised as a teacher, the originality and scope of his contribution to the literature of philosophy, that so few attempts have been made either to expound or to estimate his philosophy as a whole—especially from the view-point of theology.

Eucken and Bergson have in Royce a worthy American compeer in the great task of spiritualizing life. His philosophy, like theirs, makes for the regnancy of the Ideal. It is a deeply religious philosophy. As time throws it into perspective it will be seen how truly great a philosophy it is—great in its success, greater still in unfulfilled endeavor. For it may well be that we have in Royceanism the last and most splendid—yet futile—effort to construct an enduring temple of Monism. The structure as such is not only incomplete but insecure—not so much from assault from without as from a general abandonment of the monistic position and from self-criticism. For the very dialectic of the philosophy itself, the inner strife of its contending principles, refusing to submit to a foreordained synthesis, has adjudged itself and led to that extraordinary self-expansion in Professor Royce's system which has brought his thought ever closer to the throbbing human interests and problems of our time and made him so great an "interpreter." In other words, Professor Royce has tacitly passed judgment upon his own system by constantly surpassing it. It is true that his whole work has a marked unity of purpose and movement, but it is the unity of a development that is too large to be self-fulfilled.

It is this very self-transcendence, therefore, this constant advance, that gives us the assurance that in this philosophy we have that which no closed system can rival—a philosophy full of fructifying ideas, bound together by a constantly enlarging conception of the world, the self, and God. We of the theological guild, who are too easily content with conventional ideas, have much to learn from the philosophy of Professor Royce, and, whatever the degree of our dissent, should be eager to acknowledge our large indebtedness to him.

SIR OLIVER LODGE'S BRITISH ASSOCIATION ADDRESS

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The list of Sir Oliver Lodge's writings is long and varied, ranging from school text-books in elementary science through *The Ether of Space*, *School Reform*, *Life and Matter*, *Reason and Belief*, to *The Survival of Man*. With most of these writings I have no direct acquaintance, but on the mere evidence of their titles one may with reasonable safety venture certain particulars toward an estimation of their author. He must have intellectual vigor, he must have an instinct for vital questions, he must have the power of popular exposition, and, finally, he cannot be overcautious in the formation and expression of his opinions. All of these particulars would, I believe, be found also in any consensus of judgment that his fellows in science might pass upon his scientific work. This, if not unmixed praise, is much to say for a man, and it may be added that in general he speaks out from a sense of well-being natural to one of cheerful and sturdy temper who has achieved fame, station, ten children, and the confident hope of immortality for all of us. Is it then to be wondered at that he says things which multitudes are glad to hear, and holds a position almost unique in the esteem and confidence of the public at large?

It is more than likely, however, that Lodge would stand better with his fellow-scientists today if his reputation were less general and popular; for his efforts in religio-philosophic discussion and psychical experimentation have distracted him from physics, and they have created against him in the minds of many a feeling akin to distrust—not of course touching his sincerity, but touching

the soundness of his judgment. This feeling may be in some measure deserved by the readiness with which he seems to have fallen a victim to certain impostors; but, on the other hand, it is possible that the majority of scientific men today are a little too sceptical, a little in danger of denying on *a priori* grounds the verity of certain alleged phenomena exploited in psychical research and very widely accepted as matters of fact. To this question I shall return in the course of this paper. Meanwhile it can be said that, whatever the sympathies or prejudices of scientific men in general regarding matters psychical or spiritual, it was only fair that the British Association, after the Presidency of Professor Schäfer and his *Address* in support of the purely mechanistic theory of life, should choose Lodge, an especial champion of the spiritistic theory, to utter a counter-blast.

The title *Continuity*, which Lodge's *Address* bears, was shrewdly chosen; for under it he had warrant for the discussion of questions now rife in various fields of science and in philosophy as well. Moreover, the word *Continuity* is a good battle-cry for the conservative. Who does not shrink instinctively from the suggestion of ruin and chaos conveyed by the description *Discontinuity*, which the opposing cause must bear? And yet, undoubtedly, during the last decade or two there has been a movement, in more than one field of profound research or speculation, away from theories which express and celebrate the aspect of uniformity in the operations of nature toward theories which look for, and make the most of, failures of such uniformity. Thus in biology we have seen the "mutation theory" of De Vries, a theory of the sudden, apparently spontaneous, appearance of new species of plants or animals, as descendants of other species, challenging the Darwinian theory of evolution by insensible gradations of change. In physics we have had, if not a recrudescence of Newton's "corpuscular

theory" of light, at least a determined assault on the long and serenely established doctrine of light-waves moving through an all-pervading ether. We have the now almost universally accepted idea of electrons, or definite units, thus far to us indivisible, of electricity. We have Planck's *quantum* conception, according to which the energy of individual molecules comes and goes in quantities of a fixed size, or in multiples thereof, as money circulates in pieces of a definite lower limit. Bergson, the most popular of philosophers, tells us, I believe, that what looks like perfectly continuous existence is really an unending process of extinction and re-creation, that the stone post by the roadside is no more the same stone post that was there a thousandth of a second ago than one pea is the same pea as another that looks exactly like it. Indeed, without further illustration we may sum up current tendencies of thought by saying, in Lodge's own words, "So far from Nature not making jumps (*nihil per saltum*), it becomes doubtful if she does anything else."

In only two of the many quarters where the contest between Continuity and Discontinuity is active does this *Address* seriously engage the field of the much debated light-bearing ether and the field of human personality. With the problems of these two fields Lodge has long been familiarly occupied.

The conception of an inter-stellar medium, which may be called *the ether*, has appeared to be a necessary one ever since the undulatory theory of light was framed and generally accepted in the early part of the nineteenth century; but this conception has always involved properties and relations of the ether difficult to reconcile with the particulars of our knowledge concerning ordinary matter. One of the most troublesome questions raised by it has been whether, for example, the ether close to our earth moves through space with the earth or remains at rest with respect thereto, or effects some compromise

of behavior, as water does through which a solid travels. To answer this question, if possible, Professor Michelson, then of Cleveland but now of Chicago, undertook many years ago, at first alone but afterwards with the help of Professor Morley, also at that time in Cleveland, an experiment to determine whether the time required for light to travel a certain measured distance in the direction of the earth's orbital motion, around the sun, is perceptibly different from the time required for it to travel a like measured distance at right angles with this direction. If the ether through which this light travels is carried along with the earth and at the same velocity, so that there is no relative motion of this ether with respect to the earth near it, we should expect the time required, in the two cases above-described, to be equal. But if the earth in its orbital motion rushes past or through the adjacent ether, as a railroad train rushes through the air close by it, we should expect the time required, in the two cases mentioned, to be different, very much as we should expect the time required for sound to travel a mile in the direction of the wind to be different from the time required for it to travel a mile across the wind or in still air.

The theory of the Michelson-Morley experiment was really more complicated than the simple idea of it here given would indicate; for we have no very accurate and sensitive means of making directly the desired comparison of times. On the other hand, we have extremely effective and precise methods of comparing the times required by light to go forward and back on two equal paths at right angles with each other. But will this serve? Do we not, in taking the time of travel forward and back, eliminate the effect of the relative motion of the earth and the ether, if such relative motion exists? To illuminate this question by analogy, let us suppose that a messenger is required to go from a carriage which

is moving at a uniform rate on a straight road to another carriage moving at the same rate on the same road, but a certain distance behind, and then to return to the first carriage. Will the time required by the messenger, who is supposed to travel with a fixed speed, be the same in the end as if the two carriages were at rest? Evidently not; for if the carriages are moving faster than the messenger can go, he will not be able to overtake the first carriage at all; and if they travel almost as fast as he does, he will lose much more time than he gains by their motion. Now the velocity of light, the messenger, is very much greater than the velocity of the two stations on the earth between which it is sent back and forth; but some slight effect of the assumed relative motion of the earth and the ether might be expected to remain, what is called an effect of the second order. This is what Michelson and Morley looked for; then Morley and Miller, all at Adelbert College or at the Case School in Cleveland. They did not find it, though they did their work so well that no one thinks it worth while to try their experiment again. If the effect looked for is to be found, it must be found in some other way, and no more promising way has yet been devised.

Are we then to conclude that there is no relative motion of the kind imagined, and that the ether near the earth is carried along with it, without relative slip? There are serious objections to this theory of the matter. It would be tedious to detail them or even to enumerate them. I will mention only one, which is based on experiments made by Lodge himself and is set forth by him in brief as follows: "The experiments are described in the Philosophical *Transactions* of the Royal Society for 1893 and 1897, and the conclusion is that when a mass of steel or iron is spinning so fast that it is likely to fly to pieces, and when light is sent by mirrors round and round many times in its immediate neighborhood—so

close as to be actually grazing the spinning disks in some instances—not the slightest effect of acceleration is manifested by the beam of light, however delicately it is tested by means of interference bands. Interference is arranged between beams which have travelled half with and half against the motion, for many yards; but, after spurious results are allowed for, there is no shift of the bands; proving that the velocity is not affected by so much as one-tenth of one per cent. of the velocity of the moving matter. Practically we may say that the ether of space is never carried forward—presumably not even by a planet."

Here we have two directly opposing inferences from experiments—1st, *The ether adjacent to a moving body of ordinary matter must have the same velocity as this body;* 2d, *The ether adjacent to such a body is entirely unaffected by the motion of the body and remains at rest.*

In such a head-on collision of propositions, each supported by admirable experimental evidence, some disruption of old ideas must occur. Conservatives, among whom Lodge is prominent, retain their faith in the veritable existence of a light-bearing ether, which is to be considered at rest in the universe, except for motions within itself; that is, the ether, as a whole, is supposed to have no progressive motion through space. Accordingly the motion, with respect to the ether, of ordinary bodies, is to be taken as their real, or absolute, motion. To account for the failure of the Michelson-Morley attempt to detect such absolute motion it is sufficient to suppose that, when any body which has been at rest with respect to the ether is set into motion in any particular direction, its dimension parallel to this motion is slightly diminished and its dimensions at right angles with the motion are slightly increased, the ratio of change being the same for all kinds of bodies which have thus far been tested in this respect.

This suggestion of change of dimensions, in consequence of motion through the ether, was made independently by Lorentz in Holland and by Fitzgerald in England, twenty-two or more years ago, in order to account for the negative result of the Michelson experiment; but it is not now retained simply for this purpose. Lodge, after giving a graphic account of the way in which the idea came to and came from Fitzgerald, in Lodge's study at Liverpool, adds: "And is such a hypothesis gratuitous? Not at all: in the light of the electrical theory of matter [which Lorentz especially has developed] such an effect ought to occur. The amount required by the experiment, and given by the theory, is equivalent to the shrinkage of the earth's diameter by rather less than three inches in the line of its orbital motion through the ether of space."

It is plain enough that even the conservatives have submitted, during the last twenty-five years, to a very important change of ideas with respect to the relations of the ether and ordinary matter, but nothing short of a revolution will satisfy certain turbulent spirits. These prefer to believe not only that relative motion of the ether and ordinary matter cannot be discovered, but that it does not exist; that, in short, the ether is a fiction, and they propose to get on without it in their theory of the universe. The result is the doctrine of Relativity, in its most pronounced form. The prime mover in this assault upon the established order of thought was Einstein, an official in the Swiss Patent Office. In various aspects the agitation in favor of Relativity may be compared with another movement, also of Swiss origin, revolution toward the initiative and referendum in politics.

Relativity in its thorough-going form involves the interdependence of time and space, and its exponents speak of time as a "fourth dimension." Since the fourth

dimension seems to most of us a kind of fairyland and not a real place to live in, I make haste to say that some writers put this proposition into a comparatively homely and unalarming shape. Thus Professor R. D. Carmichael, who has written a good little book[1] on Relativity, says: "I have no intention of asserting that time is a fourth dimension of space in the sense in which we ordinarily employ the word 'dimension'; such a statement would have no meaning. I wish to point out rather that it is in some measure connected with space, and that in many formulæ it must enter, as it would if it were essentially and only a fourth dimension." But even so the conception is too formidable to be approached more closely in this paper. It will be enough, perhaps, if I state what is to me the most startling result arrived at in this effort to get on without the ether—namely, the conclusion that there is no such thing as a *now*, or *the present instant*, for the physical universe as a whole. In the words of Professor Carmichael, "There is no such thing as the absolute simultaneity of events happening at different places." This demonstration is likely to be regarded as a marvellous triumph of the theory of Relativity or as a *reductio ad absurdum*, according to the philosophical predilections of the inquirer. Lodge is far from standing alone in his unwillingness to accept it and in his preference for the conception of a luminiferous ether, modified as this conception has been modified by Lorentz and others during the past two or three decades.

This matter of the ether and of relativity is so important, in philosophy as well as in science, that I have not felt free to dismiss it with a mere allusion, but it may well be that the chief interest of Lodge's *Address* for most readers of this *Review*, will attach to that part

[1] The Theory of Relativity, John Wiley & Sons, 1913. Science, February 13, 1914, contains an interesting review, by Professor Edwin B. Wilson, of this book.

which treats of the problem of human existence and of the revelations, if they really are such, of psychical research. In one respect this part may prove disappointing. Whether taught caution by some rather mortifying experiences in giving credence to seers and wonder-workers, afterwards proved impostors, or solemnly impressed by the responsibility of his official position, Lodge speaks, in this notable summing up of his observations and reflections, with a dignity and a moderation not always to be found in his habitual utterances. He brings forward nothing new in the form of occult phenomena; in fact, he goes into no details, relates no incidents, and avoids the technical language of psychical research.

In this policy, though sacrificing perhaps a certain piquancy of interest which may have been looked for in his *Address*, he was doubtless well advised. If it be true, as I have heard it intimated, that he was urged to be altogether silent on this occasion concerning matters psychical, we must respect his refusal to comply, in view of his own opinion of the overwhelming importance of this subject in its present state of development. But it is plain enough that he would have gained nothing for the cause he advocated by insisting upon presenting it *in extenso* before an unsympathetic and impatient audience.

In describing the audience thus I have in mind the members proper of the British Association and not the general public which may have furnished most of the hearers. I assume too that, as a whole, British scientific men are not very different from American scientific men in their opinions and prejudices concerning the questions investigated by the Society for Psychical Research. Avoiding the deeper mysteries and keeping to what many intelligent people regard as the almost commonplace phenomenon of telepathy—communication between minds by other means than the ordinary senses—one

upon inquiry finds the leaders of scientific thought in America profoundly sceptical, perhaps even disposed on *a priori* grounds to deny the existence of the alleged action. I suspect that in any distinguished scientific company in our country a member suggesting the verity of telepathy as an open question worthy of some attention would be generally regarded as showing unfortunate mental symptoms.

That Lodge is thoroughly conscious of a general lack of sympathy, among his British colleagues in science, for his psychical opinions and beliefs, appears plainly enough in the following statement, admirable in form and temper, which is made near the end of the *Address:*

"In justice to myself and my co-workers I must risk annoying my present hearers, not only by leaving on record our conviction that occurrences now regarded as occult can be examined and reduced to order by the methods of science carefully and persistently applied, but by going further and saying, with the utmost brevity, that already the facts so examined have convinced me that memory and affection are not limited to that association with matter by which alone they can manifest themselves here and now, and that personality persists beyond bodily death. The evidence—nothing new or sensational, but cumulative and demanding prolonged serious study—to my mind goes to prove that discarnate intelligence, under certain conditions, may interact with us on the material side, thus indirectly coming within our scientific ken; and that gradually we may hope to attain some understanding of the nature of a larger, perhaps etherial, existence, and of the conditions regulating intercourse across the chasm. A body of responsible investigators has even now landed on the treacherous but promising shores of a new continent.

"Yes, and there is more to say than that. The methods of science are not the only way, though they

are our way, of being piloted to truth. '*Uno itinere non potest pervenire ad tam grande secretum.*'"

Whatever the prepossessions of the scientific man, he can hardly quarrel with or criticise the speaker for this brief and dignified declaration of his faith, and it may well be supposed that most readers of the *Theological Review* would be glad to have some presentation and examination of the evidence which has led to the conviction so impressively uttered. Now I do not profess to have made an exhaustive or even a very extensive study of the literature in this field of inquiry, but what I have done should, I think, be told here.

I was an active member of the American Society for Psychical Research for a year or two after its foundation in 1884, and for a time conducted much of its correspondence; but before long I became convinced that the prospect of valuable discoveries through the work of this Society was too small to warrant my continuing in such work to the neglect of my proper engagements. Accordingly I resigned my membership, though retaining a certain interest in the undertakings of those who continued their efforts, and even feeling a sense of indebtedness to them for their persistence. I once had, at the instance of William James, an extended sitting, stenographically reported, with the famous "trance-medium," Mrs. Piper. I read with much care the pamphlet which James wrote in regard to the evidence, obtained through Mrs. Piper, as to the continued existence after death of Richard Hodgson. I have studied with perhaps equal care Lodge's discussion [1] of the "evidential matter which purports to come from deceased members of the S. P. R., among others from the late Mr. Myers." It would be quite out of place here to go into

[1] Evidences of Classical Scholarship and of Cross-Correspondence in Some New Automatic Writings, reprinted in pamphlet form from the proceedings of the S. P. R. for June, 1911.

details regarding such evidence, and I shall do very little more than state the impression made upon me by these two documents. William James seems to me far more critical in his examination of testimony than Lodge is, and far more reserved in his final estimate of its value. The latter believes himself to be critical here, and in a certain sense he is so; but he is critical of the quality rather than doubtful of the source of the communications purporting to come from Myers. Thus on February 10, 1910, having just received through the automatic writer, Mrs. Willett,[1] certain messages which he could not at first understand, in answer to his question, "What does the word Lethe suggest to you?" he writes a letter which begins as follows: "Well Myers, but I want more from you about Lethe and its suggestions than that," etc.

It seems to me probable that both James and Lodge have underestimated the "normal" intelligence, acuteness, and knowledge of the women with whom, as trance-mediums or as automatic writers, they, as investigators of psychic phenomena, have had to do. It would have been very difficult for anyone to impose upon William James by pretence of wit or knowledge; but to pass as a dullard or as an ignoramus in his presence, while keeping the ears and eyes open and the mouth shut, might not perhaps have been so hard.

The most valuable parts of the *Address*, in my opinion, are those in which the speaker makes, as in a passage already quoted, a plea for openness of mind; for openness not merely by way of the avenues of logic and hard reason but by that of sympathy and direct perception, by way of what James called *vision*. Inseparable from this plea is the protest against the mechanistic view of life professed in the *Address* of 1912 by Professor Schäfer. More quotations may well be made here:

[1] An assumed name, I believe.

"The laws of nature are a diagrammatic frame-work abstracted out of the full comprehensiveness of reality." "No mathematician could calculate the orbit of a common house-fly." "To explain the Psychical in terms of Physics and Chemistry is simply impossible." "Do they account for our own feeling of joy and exaltation, for our sense of beauty, for the manifest beauty existing throughout nature? Do not these things suggest something higher and nobler and more joyous, something for the sake of which all the struggle for existence goes on?" "Where full consciousness has entered, new powers arise, and the faculties and desires of the conscious parts of the scheme have an effect upon the whole." "It is not guided from outside but from within, and the guiding power is immanent at every instant." "Of this guiding power we are a small but not wholly insignificant portion."

These thoughts are, to be sure, not new, but they are well expressed. Their importance lies not so much in the authority of the particular speaker who utters them as in the fact that they would be subscribed to, probably, by the great majority of mature-minded scientific men. For these opinions have no necessary connection with the revelations or messages which may come through the machinery of Psychical Research. They are, rather, the product of general human experience and reflection, summed up by what James would have called the dramatic sense for the truth of a situation, the integrating impression of reality or at least of probability. If scientific men are popularly believed to be of different mind from other men in this respect, it is, I think, merely because scientific men, being inclined and trained to precision and responsibility of speech, refuse to repeat creeds which other men urge upon them while saying, in effect, that the exact meaning of these professions is unimportant.

In my opinion Lodge could have spoken the best parts of his *Address* with more effect if he had never been concerned with Psychical Research in its formal shape. What revelations of spiritual import and inspiration may or may not sometime reach us through the avenues which he and his co-workers in this undertaking are striving to open, I shall not here venture to predict; but so far as the matter thus far received goes, even if we accept the interpretation which the investigators themselves put upon it, I find it the opposite of cheering. The impression which I get of the present condition of the personality of Myers, if I take the "messages" at their face value, is that of a dismal state of separation, exile, or incarceration, as one pleases, but in either case not an existence to be desired for one's self or for one's fellows. As support for religious belief, unless the mere expectation of continuing personality, on any terms, after death is regarded as essentially religious and precious, I see no value in these present disclosures, if they indeed are such, of a life after death. There is in them, so far as I am acquainted with them, no suggestion that the spirit has, in any happy sense, returned unto God who gave it. Evil indeed would be the day when those who have felt themselves to be in communion, inarticulate but effectual, with God and with those who are returned to Him, should abandon this mode of intercourse for any thus far indicated by attempts to establish more palpable relations with spirits clad in "ethereal" bodies.[1]

[1] Professor George F. Moore tells us in his History of Religions that "neither in the Old Testament nor in the New is 'spirit' equivalent to 'immaterial.'" I suppose that a like statement would be true concerning the popular conception of spirit or "spirits" in all ages; but it is nevertheless a curious spectacle to see men of science, like Lodge and Crookes and their followers in matters psychical, holding the view that we approach the spiritual by the mere refinement or attenuation of matter.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE SECOND EPISTLE OF THE APOSTLE PAUL TO THE CORINTHIANS. ALLAN MENZIES, D.D. The Macmillan Co. 1912. Pp. lvii, 111. $2.00.

Professor Menzies has rendered a great service to all English-speaking students of the Bible by the publication of his brief commentary on Second Corinthians. While helps for the interpretation of most other New Testament writings have continued to multiply, this important Epistle has received little attention; and yet it is surely here if anywhere that the ordinary reader will welcome all the expert guidance that the best scholarship can give him.

In another regard also the appearance of this commentary is most timely. It has become quite the fashion in England and America to approve the hypothesis which separates chapters 10–13 from the rest of Second Corinthians, and regards them as part of a painful letter that had been previously written by the apostle to the same community (2 3 ff.; 7 8 ff.). Of late so many writers have expressed themselves as in accord with this view that it seemed in the way of gaining currency without serious opposition as a reasonably well established conclusion. There was need that the case for the integrity of the Epistle be worthily presented again and brought up to date. This has been done by Professor Menzies in his introduction and notes.

The main arguments for dividing the Epistle have been derived from the abrupt change of tone and subject at 10 1 and from supposed references in chapters 10–13 to passages in the earlier part of the letter (13 1, 2, 10, cf. 2 1–4; 13 2, cf. 1 23; 10 6, cf. 2 9). As for the first point, Professor Menzies maintains that chapters 10–13 do not differ so radically from what has preceded as is often assumed. There is abundant evidence that the apostle is confronted by the same opponents throughout the entire letter. The innuendoes of these intruders are echoed unmistakably in 1–9 (1 24; 2 17; 3 1, 5–10; 4 2, 4; 5 13, 16; 7 2) and are more clearly stated when a point is reached in 10–13, where he is compelled to measure himself with them in anticipation of the encounter face to face. By the opening words of chapter 10 he intimates "that he is now to speak of things personal to himself, with which Timothy is not concerned"

(p. 69). He then proceeds in 10 1–6 with the topic of "his impending visit to Corinth, distinctly announced in 9 4, 5, and sketches the manner in which he expects it to turn out to various sets of people" (p. 69). The second point is so far conceded as to admit that the passages in question may be so interpreted as to support a theory of division, but they can also be understood as constituent parts of one letter and are so explained by Professor Menzies.

In favor of the unity of the Epistle much emphasis is rightly placed upon the fact that chapters 10–13 are full of the theme of Paul's impending arrival at Corinth, whereas the painful letter was written in place of a contemplated visit and perhaps excused the apostle's failure to come as expected (1 23–2 13; 1 15; 7 5–13). It may be added that there is nowhere any indication that a further message or report is looked for from his readers before he sees them. The entire Epistle is composed from the point of view of an approaching visit to the church.

It is further argued by Professor Menzies that chapters 10–13 do not meet the requirements of a letter that was written with tears. They seem to him to reflect rather "the consciousness of achievement and of power" (p. xxxvi). To assume that anguish of heart and tears were more particularly characteristic of the portion that has not been preserved is hazardous. Under such circumstances the painful letter would closely resemble our present Second Corinthians in being made up of two markedly differing parts. The theory of division is compelled in any case to lean heavily upon a missing fragment whose proportions can have fallen little short of those of a full letter. It contained practically all the explanations and allusions that are absolutely indispensable as a background for 1–9. Nor can one ever forget that we have as yet no manuscript authority or Patristic evidence for the dismemberment of our present letter.[1] If there was an early editing of epistolary material, Professor Menzies thinks that we must conclude that "the most difficult and the severest passages surely have been selected, and then joined together, to be kept" (p. xxxvii).

The evidence for the unity of the letter afforded by the allusions to Titus (8 16–22; 12 16–18) deserves even more emphasis than it has received in the work before us. In the first place, the striking resemblance in phraseology between the passages points to the same time of writing. Professor Menzies lays stress on the fact that in 12 18 we have only a casual reference to Titus, the responsible

[1] For Professor Menzies' discussion of Professor Kennedy's argument regarding this point, see The Expositor, Eighth Series, p. 372 ff. (October, 1913).

leader of the deputation, and to his immediate associate. This is quite in order, coming as it does after the full, formal introduction and authentication in 8 16–24. But the same could not be said if the order of the passages is inverted. He interprets the first two verbs in 12 18, as well as those in 8 17, 18, 22, as epistolary aorists and refers them to the mission which the delegates are about to undertake. Should one prefer to regard them as historical aorists, recalling facts that are now already past, then the argument of Professor Menzies will need to be recast, but it will not be weakened. In any event, most agree that Paul is looking backward when he asks, "Did Titus take advantage of you?" If the apostle could make such an appeal in what is held to be a part of the painful letter, then Titus must have been active in Corinth at some earlier time. Of this we have no evidence. On the contrary, the statement in 7 14 seems to indicate that he was unacquainted with the Corinthians until his mission as bearer of the painful letter. Accordingly, a further hypothesis becomes necessary if we divide the Epistle; namely, that of an earlier and unrecorded activity of Titus at Corinth. If, however, we follow Professor Menzies, the question in 12 18 and the allusion in 8 6 are to be understood as recalling what Titus was able to accomplish on behalf of the collection after the unexpectedly happy outcome of his difficult mission.

It has been charged that Professor Menzies underestimates the force of the argument for the inversion of the two parts of Second Corinthians. If this is true, it can be said, on the other hand, that he might have strengthened the cause of the integrity of the Epistle, and doubtless he would have done so had the plan of his commentary permitted a full discussion of textual details. He does not press certain arguments of secondary importance. For example, he would allow that the charge that Paul sought to terrify his converts by his letters (10 1, 9–11) might be made on the basis of Galatians, and possibly other Epistles, as well as in the light of the painful letter. It still remains true, however, that such an accusation would be particularly in place after *the one* letter, regarding which the apostle himself had so much misgiving. Furthermore, it is natural to think that Paul's adversaries in seeking to discredit him would refer to letters that were well known, rather than to those that had been addressed to other churches and that quite likely were unknown in Corinth at this time.

Professor Menzies does not omit to call attention to the strong feeling underlying the earlier chapters of the letter. It is too often assumed that all is here bathed in an atmosphere of calmness and

reconciliation. In truth, the only question that is distinctly said to have been satisfactorily settled is that touching the punishment of the offender (7 11 ff.). Paul had hoped, apparently not without some misgiving, that the church would support his demands in this instance, and he has not been disappointed. When he speaks enthusiastically of the satisfaction that has come to him through the loyalty and obedience of his readers, he is probably thinking of their action in this particular case of discipline. There is abundant evidence in 1–9 that other issues are still unsettled and that the general situation leaves much to be desired (cf. 7 16; 1 13, 14; 2 6; 6 12, 13; 7 2). Again, it is not always recognized with sufficient clearness and consistency that the question settled in 1–7 concerns an offending member of the church, and that chapters 10–13 are taken up largely with false apostles who have come in from without and who are seeking in the basest way to discredit Paul. Apart from this threatened defection, although perhaps not unconnected with it, there is another grave delinquency that must receive attention. The same situation may be alluded to in 6 14–7 2, which is kept by Professor Menzies in its present context. The repeated warnings of the apostle against heathen vices had not been taken with sufficient seriousness by some within the church. It is now stated in no uncertain way that such moral defects cannot be further tolerated. In times past it has sometimes been erroneously supposed that such a situation cannot have existed when 1–9 was written, because of the unstinted praise which is there bestowed upon the church. It must, however, be borne in mind first, that there was greatest reason for cordially recognizing the loyalty that had been so signally manifested, and, secondly, that Paul is wont to bestow all possible commendation even when there is much in a church of which he disapproves (cf. 1 Cor. 1 5, 6). We may note too that in accordance with the apostle's custom in other letters, praise and blame are not here apportioned to any considerable extent, but that all his message is addressed to the church as a whole.

The opponents from without who are seeking to unsettle the loyalty of the Corinthians are identified by Professor Menzies with Greek-speaking Jewish Christians of the Dispersion. "It is not surprising if, even when circumcision ceased to be urged by Jewish Christians, they still regarded Paul's version of Christianity with deep dislike, and strove to draw his converts away from him" (p. xxxii). Our Epistle is believed to afford evidence that they had a particular aversion to Paul's Christology. A considerable section of Professor Menzies' introduction (pp. li–lviii) is devoted to the apostle's

teaching regarding the person of Christ and to the contrasted views of his opponents.

Particular mention should be made of the English translation of the Epistle, which has been prepared with unusual care and which is printed at the top of the right page opposite the Greek text which appears at the left. The notes given below on both pages are concerned mainly with the development of thought.

The commentary is bound to prove helpful and suggestive to all readers; but its brevity and popular character will often make the student of exegesis wish that the author would supplement it with a volume prepared on a different plan which should make possible a more adequate treatment of the many obscurities and difficulties that beset the interpretation of the Epistle.

WARREN J. MOULTON.

BANGOR THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

THE NEW TESTAMENT, WESTMINSTER VERSION. Vol. III. Part I. The Epistles to the Thessalonians. Rev. CUTHBERT LATTEY, S.J. Longmans, Green, & Co. 1913. Pp. xxiv, 21. 40 cents.

This translation, which is based mainly on the Greek text of Westcott and Hort, aims at intelligibility by using phraseology which is neither modern nor obsolete. It is more literal than that of Rutherford or Moffatt, and more dignified than that of the Twentieth Century New Testament. Concise notes accompany the translation and a brief but excellent introduction precedes it. If the standard of excellence set by the present work is maintained in the forthcoming volumes, the success of the Westminster Version is assured.

J. E. FRAME.

UNION THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY, NEW YORK.

A CRITICAL AND EXEGETICAL COMMENTARY ON THE BOOKS OF EZRA AND NEHEMIAH. (International Critical Commentary Series.) LORING W. BATTEN, Ph.D., S.T.D. Charles Scribner's Sons. 1913. Pp. xvi, 384. $3.00.

One of the latest of a goodly number of volumes, with the appearance of which within the last few years the International Critical Commentary is approaching completion, is Professor L. W. Batten's Ezra and Nehemiah. Professor Batten's acquaintance with these two books is of long standing, his first work upon them being published in 1901 in the English version of Guthe's notes in the SBOT.

The present volume is clearly the result of much thought and arduous labor. Fifteen pages of prefatory matter are followed by fifty-four pages of introduction; pages 55–330 constitute the body of the book; two indexes, covering two pages, form the conclusion.

Professor Batten presents a warm plea for a very conservative position. His attempt to reconstruct in chronological sequence a series of source-fragments containing more or less trustworthy historical information, is rather alluring: for the time of Cyrus, Ezra 1; for Darius I, Ezra 2 70–4 3 and 4 24b–6 18 (a duplicate account of the building of the temple); for Xerxes, Ezra 4 4–6; for Artaxerxes I, Ezra 4 7–24a and Neh. 1–7, 11–13 (the Nehemiah memoirs); for Artaxerxes II, Ezra 7–10; Neh. 8–10 (containing the Ezra memoirs). Professor Torrey's notable work upon Esdras A is utilized, and at one or two points slightly improved upon.

But Professor Batten's own argument is much impaired by serious inaccuracies and errors in matters of detail. As a matter of history, what Semite, of the time of Cyrus or later, would have thought of dating Cyrus' first year in 559 rather than in 539? Is it really so certain that Cyrus was a Zoroastrian? In matters of archaeology much uncertainty is manifested. "Strap-hinges" will hardly do for the city-gates of Neh. 3 6. A similar *faux pas* has completely vitiated an attempt at textual criticism in Ezra 9 2. "הסגנן חמאת, *magistratus iniquitatus*, the officer of lawlessness," need surely only to be printed out together before his eyes to make Professor Batten himself withdraw the suggestion. Finally, the proof-reading has been very lax. Especially unkindly have Greek accents and breathings dealt with Professor Batten. Though he made no attempt at a critically severe reading in this respect, the eyes of the reviewer were disturbed by from one to half a dozen errors of this nature on nearly every page containing Greek words. Perhaps many of these faults may be corrected in a new edition.

Martin Sprengling.

Harvard University.

Studies in Jewish Literature Issued in Honor of Professor Kaufmann Kohler. Georg Reimer. Berlin. 1913. Pp. viii, 301.

This volume was presented to Dr. Kohler by colleagues, pupils, and friends, on the occasion of his seventieth birthday, May 10, 1913. It is a fitting tribute to one who for many years has been one of the leaders of Reform Judaism, and one of the foremost exponents of Jewish scholarship in this country.

Dr. Kohler came to America in 1869, and after serving congregations in Detroit, Chicago, and New York, became in 1903 president of the Hebrew Union College in Cincinnati, where he has also given courses in homiletics, theology, and Hellenistic literature. A biographical sketch appropriately begins the volume, followed by an appreciation of his work as a reformer (by Rabbi David Philipson, of Cincinnati), and a review by Professor Neumark of his *Grundriss einer systematischen Theologie des Judentums*. A bibliography of his publications extends to more than five hundred numbers, not counting separately his many and important contributions to the *Jewish Encyclopedia*, of which he was from the beginning an editor.

The papers contributed to the volume—in English and German, with two short texts in Hebrew—range over a wide variety of subjects. We can only name a few which are most likely to appeal to unprofessional readers. Thus, Israel Abrahams writes on "The Decalogue in Art"; H. G. Enelow has an instructive essay on the "Struggle for Inwardness in Judaism" (*Kawwānā*); Professor Grossmann discusses "Principles of Religious Instruction in Jewish Schools"; Professor Lauterbach takes up again the question of "Sadducees and Pharisees." There is an article on "Levirate Marriage," by Mattuck, and one by Samuel Krauss on *Die Ehe zwischen Onkel und Nichte*. Studies of a more technical kind are contributed by Bacher (whose recent death is a great loss to Jewish learning), Goldziher, Poznanski, and Schechter.

The scholar is to be congratulated whom such a company delight to honor.

George F. Moore.

Harvard University.

Early Zoroastrianism. The Hibbert Lectures, Second Series. 1912. James Hope Moulton. Williams & Norgate. 1913. Pp. xx, 468.

Although delivered two years ago, these lectures, the publication of which was delayed for over a year, may be said to be the latest word in the field of Avestan philology, where harvests ripen slowly. It is indeed somewhat remarkable that whereas every year sees the production of one or more volumes on the life and teaching of Buddha, studies in regard to the history and doctrines of Zoroaster should be so sporadic. Yet the importance of Zoroastrianism for Christianity is, if anything, greater than that of Buddhism.

The present volume consists of lectures which take up special sides of Zoroastrianism; it is in no sense a complete history or discussion of the tenets of the faith, such as Professor Jackson's works

published in the *Grundriss* and in *Zoroaster*. One might even say that it is no book for a beginner; yet that would not be quite fair, since the clearness with which Professor Moulton states his several theses makes it possible for any historical scholar to follow him and obtain an intelligent understanding of the problems involved. But in sum, the author is dealing with special problems rather than with an historical whole. His solution of these problems makes his work one of the most fundamental books on Zoroastrianism published in the last two decades.

At the outset Professor Moulton attacks the whole theory of Darmesteter, whose revolutionary views made a sensation twenty years ago. If few scholars now believe, as Darmesteter taught, that Zoroastrianism is really Philoism, the Gathas owing their chief thought to Philo of Alexandria, it is yet well to have the reasons for this disbelief plainly set forth. These are in brief that the conception of the Amshaspand is in itself not identical with Philo's λόγος θεῖος and that it is far older, so that the logos could not have been the source; also that the form of the Gathas (especially the metre) is not such that it could have been a late invention. Further, Professor Moulton argues (with Geldner, Jackson, and Bartholomae) that Zoroaster is no mythical person but an historical character, whom the author ascribes to a somewhat earlier period than does Professor Jackson. As to date and place there will always be discussion. Professor Moulton regards 660 B.C. as a "minimum date" for the prophet "and his Gathas," while giving strong reasons for believing that the date may be earlier by some generations. He assigns the Yashts to the later Achæmenian age, and the prose Avesta (in particular the Vendidad) to a period "after Alexander." A prime argument for an earlier Zoroaster lies in the necessity for time sufficient to account for the development between Gathas and Yashts, in which latter the apotheosis of Zoroaster stands opposed to the Gathic view. The most important fact brought out in the following discussion of the date is that the cult of Ahura Mazda (Ormuzd) was probably hereditary in aristocratic circles long before Zoroaster. In regard to the place where the prophet began his work, Professor Moulton believes it to have been in Bactria rather than in the West. He urges that the esoteric teaching of Zoroaster (the doctrine of the Pure Thought, etc.) remained for centuries far from the main stream of its history and spread westwards only when adopted by the Magi.

The most original hypothesis in this volume relates to the Magi themselves. In Professor Moulton's opinion, it was they who in

the Sassanian revival made Parsism what it is today. Ahriman, the "enemy spirit," is a title devised by them; Zoroaster knew only the Druj (Lie). The Magi, in the author's opinion, were an indigenous tribe of shamans who led the non-Aryan population of Media, tried and failed to obtain political power in the revolution of Gaumata, but finally secured religious supremacy. The earliest evidence of their activity as a sacred tribe is in Ezekiel 8 16. They were neither Aryan nor Semitic (note, for example, the method of disposing of the dead). They had characteristics, such as next-of-kin marriages and astrology, which never made headway in Parsism. To them, he thinks, is due the ritual, the composition of the Vendidad; it was they who popularized Zoroastrianism. It is probable that this new theory of the origin and influence of Magism upon Zoroastrianism will not be allowed to pass without protest; but it presents a new view very forcibly and explains ingeniously many otherwise inexplicable facts.

To the student of Christianity the paragraphs on the relation of Babylon and Parsism will be of great interest. Professor Moulton discusses and dismisses as "without any real foundation" the religious influence of Babylon. We think he is quite right in protesting against Meyer's extreme view; but it is also an exaggeration to "dismiss all round the notion that Parsism owes anything material to the religion of the powerful culture on her west." In regard to corresponding concepts in the religion of Israel and Zoroaster, borrowing is admitted in some features of apocalyptic imagery and angelology, but otherwise Professor Moulton is very conservative, one might almost say orthodox: "Ahriman and Satan are only superficially connected." The Incarnation "cannot be discussed" in these lectures; which is a pity. It is true that "accidental coincidence" will account for many strange phenomena; but it is also true that coincidence need not be accidental. Perhaps in this regard, as in that of the relation between Buddhism and Christianity, where proofs fail faith must avail. After all, it is not today a very important matter whether the devil was invented in one country or in another, and other theological questions now more burning than Satan may also become in time merely historical problems. Professor Moulton's own attitude is that of a candid and cool inquirer, who has inquired to good purpose. We do not agree with every conclusion he draws, but we believe that he has made an important contribution to our knowledge of Zoroastrianism.

E. Washburn Hopkins.

Yale University.

THE CHRISTIAN LIFE IN THE MODERN WORLD. The sixth series of John Calvin McNair lectures at the University of North Carolina in 1913, expanded and revised. FRANCIS GREENWOOD PEABODY. The Macmillan Co. 1914. Pp. 234. $1.25.

The latest volume by Professor Peabody may be safely counted as perhaps his best. And by best I mean most timely, helpful, and suggestive. The author already has given us books of value and distinctive merit dealing with the approach to the social question, and the bearing of the teachings of Jesus on the social problem and on the Christian character. In this present volume, however, he considers a more practical, personal, and perplexing question. And that pressing and perplexing question is this: Can the modern man in the modern world remain a Christian? That is to say, can he be identified with its great events, participate in its multitudinous and materialistic movements, and still shape his life according to the Gospel teachings?

Professor Peabody puts the question very squarely. In his opening chapter on the practicability of the Christian life he inquires: "Amid the brutal competitions of modern industry, can trade be administered and profit be made in ways which are consistent with Christian discipleship? Amid the plottings of national politics and the collisions of international interests, can we fairly speak of a Christian civilization? . . . On what terms is it possible to live a Christian life in the modern world? Must not one take his choice between the two? Is the Christian religion a practicable faith among the inevitable conditions of modern efficiency and happiness; or is it the survival of an idealism which, however beautiful it may once have been, has become impracticable today?"

In answering these questions in the affirmative, and in pleading for the practicability of the Christian ideals when properly understood, Professor Peabody writes with his customary grace and familiar wealth of illustration and allusion. Indeed, he writes with such a balanced smoothness that one almost feels him to be superficial; while to read him is so easy and delightful that you wonder if you are not being gently led away from serious obstacles and insurmountable difficulties by a form of verbal witchery and rhetorical ingenuity. The author's point of view or method of approach is one with which his readers long have been familiar and which he has followed with consistency and skill. In the last of his incomparable addresses in the Harvard College Chapel he pleaded for what he called "the comprehensiveness of Christianity." In the course of that culminating talk to the students he reminded them of how a

distinguished American politician in a heated campaign telegraphed on one occasion to his friends, "Claim everything." And "that," he adds, "in a much profounder sense, is precisely the summons which Christianity makes on life."

Now of the expansiveness of Christianity there can be no doubt. It has almost "infinite flexibility," as our author well reminds us. "The Christian religion is much larger than many of its critics and some of its defenders have supposed. It assumes many forms, but is exhausted by none. Its fragmentary utterances may become impracticable guides, while its total view of life, its general law of conduct, may have permanent practicability. . . . Personality, character, spirituality, idealism, vision, communion with God, have in them a quality of timelessness, and are capable of expansion, transmission, and utilization in all the varied conditions of a changing world." Yet this process unquestionably can be carried much too far.

In spite of tendencies like these, however, too much emphasis can hardly be laid upon the value of Professor Peabody's service in freeing Christianity from what is merely temporary, occasional, and incidental, and in bringing forward the universal, spiritual, and permanent features of the Gospel. He claims very justly that "a fact may be distorted quite as easily by false perspective as by false definition. The truth of history, as of nature, is the proportion and relation of facts." In pursuance of this principle, we have in this volume a masterful separation of the transient from the permanent and the local from the universal in the Gospel teachings. Professor Peabody protests against the tendency to confuse oriental imagery with universal principles, while he points out that too great literalism distorts the record by mistaking the by-products of the teaching for the main contents.

There are many pungent passages in the book to which attention wisely may be called, as for instance this, in writing of the business world: "If business is not reformed, it is likely to be transformed. The alternative to a violent economic revolution is an accelerated, economic evolution. If capital is to escape confiscation, it must accept consecration. If the present industrial order does not serve, it must surrender." Of Jesus we are happily reminded that "his purpose was not revolution, but revelation. He was primarily concerned not with the distribution of goods, but with the inspiration of goodness. He was not a socialist, but a Saviour. His purpose was not to make rules, but to make men." Of the Gospels we are told that they form "not a text-book of mechanics, but a

source of power"; while "the New Testament is not a book of laws, but a book of life."

Opinion probably will differ as to the comparative value of the various chapters, which deal respectively with the Family, the Business World, the Making and Spending of Money, the Modern State, and the Christian Church. In some respects the last two, perhaps, as presenting wider issues, have the greatest interest and value. Writing before the present European war broke out, Professor Peabody pleads for a renaissance of national idealism, declaring with a conviction which since then has been terribly justified: "The whole creation of government travaileth in pain until now, waiting for the manifestation of the Christian State."

When he comes to consider, in his closing chapter, the Christian life and the Christian Church, his foot is on his native heath. He points with equal pertinence to the failure of Christian teachers to perceive the social bearing of the Christian message, and to the hesitancy of the Christian Church in fearlessly applying it; while those who repudiate the name are giving application to the message. "Here then," he writes, "is a curious situation. The methods and ideals which have been most characteristic of the Christian life are appropriated by many who refuse to accept the Christian name. Fraternity, social justice, co-operation, sacrifice, the bearing of others' burdens—the very words which are expressive of Christian discipleship are inscribed on the banners of new schemes and dreams; and organizations of philanthropy, co-operative industry, trades-unionism, and socialism, go sailing buoyantly down the river of the age, while the Christian Church looks on from the bank and sees its own insignia on those alien flags."

In closing this inadequate review of a most helpful, stimulating, and suggestive book, a word may, perhaps, be said of its dedicatory lines. Professor Peabody has prefaced nearly all of his recent books by sonnets or verses of a tender and touching character, addressed for the most part to members of his family. Such expressions of poetic feeling give evidence of more material of the kind which the world would rejoice to receive in collected form.

Paul Revere Frothingham.

Boston.

THE RELIGIOUS REVOLUTION OF TO-DAY. JAMES T. SHOTWELL. The Houghton Mifflin Co. 1913. Pp. x, 102. $1.10.

This book contains four lectures delivered at Amherst in 1913 upon the William Brewster Clark foundation. The Founders supply a "foreword" indicating their desire to assist in the solution of such problems of personal conduct and public policy as have been complicated by recent scientific progress; and the lectures should be judged in the light of this statement. The reader will find himself wondering, however, as to the impression made by Professor Shotwell upon intelligent undergraduates; since it is to be presumed that some portion of his audience was recruited from the student body. Upon the fact of revolution he is clear and emphatic throughout the first two lectures. His thesis is that the progress of civilization has been also a process of secularization. He does not argue this thesis without qualification, to be sure; indeed, reasons are cited why we should hesitate to accept it, since religion has a vitality which must be reckoned with. But when in his later lectures Professor Shotwell essays to reckon with it, he does so with far less vigor and concreteness than mark his treatment of the process of secularization. In the earlier lectures his appeal is to history and the experience of every day; in the later it is rather to psychology, and too often to that variety of psychology which beclouds what it aims to elucidate. This is not to say that no clear and positive conclusions are reached; but rather to indicate how elementary and vague they seem in contrast with the negative conclusions.

The book is learned, eloquent, and, it must be added, confused and incomplete. The confusion arises partly from the fact that its argument is nowhere indicated with sufficient clearness and succinctness; and partly from Professor Shotwell's disinclination to define his terms exactly. To quote the definitions which he suggests would probably do him injustice; yet he fails adequately to state any substitutes. "Myth" and "taboo" are his favorite characterizations of religion in the earlier chapters; and it is our growing freedom from their control which he calls "secularization." Conscience is "the intrusion of society into our own affairs." Faith is admitted to be "the most potent source of religious vitality," but "taken historically, it is hardly more than the science of habit." Later on he comes to a more positive definition of religion in terms of emotion in face of mystery. "It is the total emotional appreciation of both stimuli and reactions; and we may give it the name *religion* so soon as that appreciation is registered in consciousness." This is an interesting and probably a valid observation upon relig-

ion, but it is scarcely adequate as a definition, and its inadequacy suggests another element of weakness in Professor Shotwell's book. He is keenly alive to the vitality of those activities and influences which he calls "secular," but seems quite oblivious of the high spirit of adventure in religion. He emphasizes almost exclusively the positive features of one and the negative features of the other. Science is pictured as building our civilization, while Religion stands apart engaged in cherishing what the author repeatedly calls, "the un-understood." The book would have gained greatly had it taken account of the fact that fundamental in the religion of the Old Testament is man's commission to subdue the earth; while in the forefront of the New stands the promise of a Spirit who shall lead men into all the truth. The science of Christianity is a study in dynamics rather than statics.

Edward M. Chapman.

Old Lyme, Connecticut.

Our Growing Creed; or The Evangelical Faith as Developed and Reaffirmed by Current Thought. William D. McLaren, M.A. T. & T. Clark. 1912. Pp. xxxvi, 537. 9*s*.

One hesitates to express an honest conviction in regard to this book, owing to the conflict between kindly feeling for the author and the conviction that his work will bring no contribution to the problems in which he is so deeply interested. For this is evidently the distillation of the whole intellectual life of one who can be seen, between the lines, to be saintly. And yet he lays upon the rack the Articles of the Westminster Confession, and never hears their shrieks. He is convinced that theologic belief must be ever growing; yet he cannot persuade himself that its outworn clothes will not be made still to fit by a little pulling and stretching. There are too few today who have his courage to demand that thinking shall result in a complete body of divinity. Yet it is not likely that the system which he sets forth here will be that of the future.

C. George Currie.

Philadelphia.

RELIGIONS AND RELIGION: A STUDY OF THE SCIENCE OF RELIGION, PURE AND APPLIED. JAMES HOPE MOULTON, Professor in Manchester University. New York. Methodist Book Concern.

This book is the forty-third Fernley Lecture; and perhaps the terms of the lectureship require the printing of the lecture. But the lecture has not succeeded in getting itself metamorphosed into a book. The author seems conscious of its defects, but instead of correcting them, he chose to publish them. He properly characterizes his work by saying, "The absorbing demands of my work upon the Hibbert Lectures, from which I have to snatch a few weeks' intervals [!] to write, *currente calamo*, upon the great theme of this little book, will help to account for defects" (page viii); and again, "Meanwhile I will pursue my avowedly desultory treatment" (page 105).

The impression which the book makes is dependent chiefly upon four fixed points, among which the thought wanders: J. G. Frazer's volumes of research, the author's studies of Zoroastrianism (including a long citation from his speech at a meeting of London Parsis), the Historical Catalogue of Printed Bibles (denominated "the most powerful apologetic ever written"), and the Report of Commission IV of the Edinburgh Conference—"the Missionary Message." As these points are quite far apart and as they become visible only once in so often, the impression of the book is a good deal of a blur.

The purpose of the book is to show that the study of Comparative Religions proves that the Christian religion is the crown and completion of all others, and that soil has been prepared so well for it that it would be wasteful not to sow the Christian seed everywhere. First the author shows that the study of Comparative Religion, so far from discrediting the Christian documents, helps us to frame a theory of the "divers manners in which God has made Himself known." The reviewer confesses that he does not apprehend the author's framing of this theory, for he has not been able to find it. Then the author, by a hint or so, indicates that Christianity has absorbed the best of the ancient religions; but instead of going on to say that it will probably absorb the best of the prevailing religions of the East, he proceeds to assert that there is nothing to indicate that the "primacy of Jesus and the resurrection" will ever be threatened by Buddhism or Mohammedanism. Another instance of the muddiness of the author's thought is that after asserting that the good and bad in religion are alike passed on, he proceeds to declare that "only three religions have any ambition to become

world forces," and that of these Christianity has made the widest appeal! A final chapter is an appeal for "the Christ that is to be"; though the author has succeeded no better than Tennyson in elucidating the meaning of that famous phrase. He defends the idea that Jesus authorized the spread of the gospel among the nations, and after a rather wooden survey of its large opportunities among them, calls for greater devotion to its promulgation.

There are suggestive thoughts and citations in the volume, but it is ineffective as an argument, slip-shod in construction, ordinary in style.

Ambrose W. Vernon.

Brookline.

A Century's Change in Religion. George Harris. The Houghton Mifflin Co. 1914.

Modern Theology and the Preaching of the Gospel. William Adams Brown. Charles Scribner's Sons. 1914.

Dr. Harris's title is more comprehensive than his book, which deals with only one religion, the Christian, and with that mainly as represented in Congregational churches between the Hudson and the sea. Indeed, it would not be unjust to say that Dr. Harris has revealed the changes of his own mind with respect to religion from the time when, as a little boy, he stood proudly by his father's side during the long prayer (p. 198), or, facing the choir during the singing, watched the curved top of the bass viol swaying back and forth (p. 201), until now, when, as sometime professor in Andover Theological Seminary and President Emeritus of Amherst College, he passes autumnal years fruitful in friends and honors. Undoubtedly this limitation of view is responsible for some statements which are quite too sweeping. It is not true of all parts of the country that theatres are closed on Sunday (p. 212), or that everlasting punishment is seldom, if ever, mentioned now; that the word "hell" seldom crosses the lips of any preacher (p. 170); nor is it true that in all churches the people participate in saying the Lord's Prayer, in responsive reading of psalms, and in repetition of the Apostles' Creed (p. 50). Beyond the Hudson, west and south, there are also people, and even New England has churches which do not repeat the Apostles' Creed.

Although Dr. Harris does not say so in terms, the impression made by his fascinating pages is that the fundamental change has been from the ideal of a group of individuals held together, man with man

and man with God, by external law, to that of a family, united brother to brother and son to Father, by the inwardness of love; which altered ideal has penetratingly transformed both the doctrine and the practice of religion. That the essentials abide, he is well assured; but, apparently, the essentials are the doctrines which have survived in his own mind and in the forms which they have there assumed. That the change has been an improvement rather than a deterioration is the witness of his own experience. The principal significance of the book, then, lies just in the fact that it records the progress in religious thought and life of a veteran scholar trained to prove all things and hold fast that which is good, who, having known both the old and the new, unhesitatingly declares that the new is better.

Notwithstanding such testimony, borne not by Dr. Harris alone but by an increasing multitude, there still exists a feeling that the new theology has not the preaching power of the old. To this Professor Brown addresses himself in his book, *Modern Theology and the Preaching of the Gospel.* His method is to describe the needs satisfied by earlier theology, and then show how these needs are met by Christian doctrines in their modern forms. The task was well conceived and has been admirably performed. Many a thoughtful minister will be grateful to Professor Brown for opening a way from study to pulpit by showing how modern thoughts concerning the Bible, God, the Deity of Christ, Salvation, and the Church may be made homiletically effective.

W. W. Fenn.

Harvard University.

The Development of English Theology in the Nineteenth Century, 1800–1860. Vernon F. Storr, Fellow of University College, Oxford, Canon of Winchester Cathedral. Longmans, Green, & Co. 1914. Pp. viii, 486. $3.50.

There is a large place for a work on the development of English theology during the last century. Principal Tulloch's admirable sketch—*Movements of Religious Thought*—is far too brief and has long been out of print. Benn's *History of English Rationalism in the Nineteenth Century* covers the ground, but was written to support a thesis; and Hunt's *Religious Thought in England* is *memoirs pour servir* rather than history. A knowledge of the factors that have influenced English religious thinking during this period and of the resultant point of view is vital not only to the technical theo-

logian but to any one who desires a sympathetic relationship with the thought of his age upon the matters of deepest concern.

The writer who enters this field confronts a task of unusual difficulty. A variety of forces have been at work, and some of the most potent have had only an indirect bearing upon religious thought. The fact is that the movement has been like the drifting of an island from arctic to temperate zones. Fauna and flora have undergone gradual changes which at any one moment seemed trivial, but in their sum, after a considerable period, were startling.

Canon Storr was evidently confronted at the very start with a problem of treatment. He had to choose between the task of an analyst and that of interpreter. The main defect of his work lies in the ambiguity of his aim. Whole sections are as rigidly chronicles as the pages of Hunt; others are as interpretative as those of Tulloch. The result is a certain lack of unity of method. Would it not be possible to treat the entire epoch from an interior point of view, with a result as illuminative as, for example, Professor Seelye's *Expansion of England*? This uncertainty of purpose is reflected in the method of composition. Every page bears witness to the fact that the work in its present form has been a growth, and it frequently happens that the author's fine and large insights, which should have afforded the regulative principle of an extended paragraph or chapter, are reached incidentally at the close of a discussion or in another connection. For example, the suggestion on page 160 that the Deist controversy of the eighteenth century was conducted on inadequate premises by men who had little sense of history and who imperfectly understood the issues involved in the antithesis of natural and supernatural, might well have been made the basis of the critique of Deism in the long chapter devoted to that topic.

To pass from criticisms that may partake of the nature of fault-finding, Canon Storr has given us in these pages a clear and detailed account of the forces at work during the first half of the century to modify religious thought. He is fully acquainted with the material, he sees clearly the issues involved in particular controversies, and his analysis of certain situations is singularly discreet and penetrating. Inevitably the treatment of an epoch like this will be colored by the author's personal bias. The guise of judicial impartiality under which Benn wrote did not in the least conceal his partisanship. Canon Storr does not leave it uncertain that his sympathies are with a generous interpretation of the historic Christian faith; but, for the most part, his representations of the positions

of others are so fair and candid that it would not be easy for the adherents of any school to convict him of prejudice. If Canon Storr's second volume fulfils the promise of the first, he will have made a most useful addition to our English theological literature.

George E. Horr.

The Newton Theological Institution.

The Assumption of the Religious Dress in Monasticism. Ceremonies for the Assumption of the Dress in the Monasticism of the Greek Church. Studies in History and Archaeology. Nicholas Palmov. Tchokoloff, Kiev. 1914. Pp. xv, 420.

By the publication of this learned work (of which only one hundred and sixty copies were printed), Professor Nicholas Palmov, of the Ecclesiastical Academy of Kiev, has filled a gap in the history of Oriental monachism, and has rendered accessible certain Greek liturgical texts of considerable importance for the history of the liturgy.

The work is divided into four sections. The first, which is in some sense an historical introduction to the three which follow it, treats of the origin of the ceremonies for the taking of the habit. Oriental monachism had its birth in Egypt, from which country Byzantium received it. Accordingly, those who desire to fathom the origins of the liturgical ceremonies of Oriental monachism must direct their researches at the outset toward Egyptian monachism, and seek the solution of the liturgical problems they set before themselves in the rituals of the old Egyptian monasteries.

Historical documents attest that the rules to be followed and the ceremonies to be performed in receiving into the monasteries those who presented themselves to embrace the monastic life, were already fixed in the monastery of St. Pachomius the Great. The candidates were minutely interrogated, and put to the test to see whether they were really capable of practising the austerities and the rude mortifications of Oriental asceticism, and afterwards were admitted to assume the monastic garb. This does not, however, imply the existence of a special ceremonial for admission to the monastery. This ritual, the ceremonial which we find in the liturgical documents of the Byzantine Church, is later than St. Pachomius. Nevertheless, the practice followed in the Egyptian monasteries must have had a great influence in the formation of the Byzantine ritual of monachism.

At what time this ritual was composed is not definitely known. Neither in the *Regula Patris nostri Pachomii* nor in the *De Institutis Coenobiorum* of Johannes Cassianus do we find any trace of a form of monastic vows by which the candidate renounces the world. In his second canonical epistle to Amphilochius, St. Basil declares that he knows nothing of the existence of formulas (*ἀνδρῶν ὁμολογίαν*) by which the members of the monastic families pledge themselves to celibacy. Professor Palmov supposes accordingly that St. Basil, a zealous propagator and patron of the monastic life, was the first to require of candidates for the monastic life the reading of a formula professing monastic vows. This new custom was speedily followed by the redaction of a ceremonial for the taking of the habit. In the writings of the pseudo-Areopagite, which go back to the first half of the fifth century, we find the rules to be followed in the taking of the habit already fixed.

The most important liturgical document relative to this ceremony is contained in the Euchologion of St. Mark, a precious literary treasure of the eighth or ninth century, belonging to the Barberini collection of Greek manuscripts now in the Vatican Library. In this manuscript two rituals are found. The first is complete and detailed; it contains the prayers for the first stage of initiation into monachism (*πρῶτον σχῆμα, μικρὸν σχῆμα,* or *σχῆμα τοῦ μανδυώτου*), and then the rites and prayers for the higher degree of monachism (*μέγα σχῆμα, ἀγγελικὸν σχῆμα*). The second ritual contains but the single prayer beginning, *Κύριε, ὁδεύς ἡμῶν, ὁ ἀξίους σου εἶναι κ.τ.ε.*

In connection with the distinction between the *μικρὸν σχῆμα* and the *μέγα σχῆμα* in the Euchologion of St. Mark, Professor Palmov investigates an interesting controversy about the baptismal value of monastic vows, a controversy raised and conducted with much vigor by St. Theodore of the Studium, who maintained that the profession of the monastic life is a sacrament of perfection, *μυστήριον μοναχικῆς τελειώσεως*; in other words, a baptism. Consequently, it is not permissible to repeat the same ceremony for the same candidate for the monastic life. It follows that the distinction between the simple taking of the habit (*μικρόν*) and the solemn taking of the habit has no foundation in the tradition of the Fathers and the doctrine of the Church.

The theory that the monastic profession is a second baptism had no success in the East. The Euchologia, beginning with that of St. Mark, continued to set forth the rituals for the two monastic investitures, deeming that St. Theodore of the Studium went far in his eagerness to give to a voluntary promise to observe

the evangelical counsels the value and the moral efficacy of a sacrament.

After this historical part, Professor Palmov studies the liturgical peculiarities of the rituals in question. The Greek liturgical codices exhibit many variations in the reproduction of the formularies of the *μικρὸν σχῆμα*—a fact which makes it very difficult to classify them. To obviate this difficulty of classification, Palmov decided to compare them with the formularies of the *μέγα σχῆμα*, which is more ancient. Accordingly, the second part of the work is devoted to this *σχῆμα*, and the third to the *μικρὸν σχῆμα*, while the fourth treats of the *πρόσχημα*, or ceremony preparatory to the simple investiture, consisting in the delivery to the candidate for the monastic life of the habit and of the *kamilavki* (the hat worn by the Oriental clergy).

According to Palmov, the *μικρὸν σχῆμα* goes back to the time of Theodore of the Studium (d. 826), and the *πρόσχημα* was added in the fourteenth century. This last form of initiation into the monastic life underwent changes in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. In our day, there is an evident tendency in the orthodox churches to give it the same value as the *μικρὸν σχῆμα*. Those who are received into the monastery with the forms of the *πρόσχημα* are called *rasophori* or *rakendyte*. In the orthodox churches the monastic habit is now given to priests or members of the clergy who, while renouncing marriage, do not wish to live in a monastery, but to devote their activities to pastoral labors. The *πρόσχημα*, then, would be for Professor Palmov the form most suitable to a new type of monachism to be introduced into the Eastern Church. In this he only expresses the wish of Eugene Golubinsky, the great historian of the Russian Church, who thought desirable the adoption of a new form of monachism, in which the monks should not be totally separated from the world and deprived of all participation in the life of society.

The appendix contains extracts from Greek liturgical codices in which the prayers of the monastic rituals are inserted. The most important extracts are from the Euchologion of St. Mark (Cod. Barberini Graec. 336), and the Euchologion No. 474 of the Rumiantzov Museum in Moscow (tenth to eleventh century).

The several parts of the book evince the author's profound knowledge of the Greek liturgy, a knowledge acquired in great part through the study and collation of unpublished Greek sources.

Aurelio Palmieri.

Harvard University Library.

THE PAPACY AND MODERN TIMES. Canon WILLIAM BARRY. (Home University Library.) Williams & Norgate. 1911. Pp. 252.

In this book Dr. Barry has contributed to the Home University Library a brilliant essay. It is not "Church History" in any proper sense of the word, as the author himself announces. It is rather "a political sketch," the manifest intention of which is to explain how it is that "the twentieth of September, 1870, when I saw the Italian army enter Rome, forms a landmark in the story of Western Europe, and by consequence in the development of modern society on both sides of the Atlantic." In the prologue, which forms the first chapter, the author surveys the history and political influence of the papacy from early days down to the Captivity at Avignon. In the following chapters he discusses the inter-relationship of papal and civil policy, giving particular emphasis to the evident crises of history as they appear in the period of the Reforming Councils, at the moment of the Thirty Years' War, in the reigns of Philip II and Louis XIV and Napoleon, in the era of the Italian Risorgimento, and in the promise of American civil and religious liberty. The book is full of learning. The author not only knows familiarly the tendencies of the past, but he is also the friend of the men who guided either for good or for evil the direction that Church and State were to take. His story is marked by keen insight and suggestive interpretation—signs of the historian. To the writer nothing is insignificant; everything emerges from the past and enters the future. His narrative is full of imagination chastened by careful study. For him the Roman Church embodies the spirit of Imperial Rome; it must always stand for universalism in religion.

However, one must not accept the teaching of the book without hesitation. Dr. Barry, with the modesty of a true scholar, warns his readers that "these highest things always admit of an interpretation according to the mind that views them." Dr. Barry's mind is of the class which deplores those episodes of the past that have made for the limitation of the older forms of the Roman Church, and which can see no Providence in the withdrawal of the Pope from the Quirinal to the Vatican. He can hardly draw the conclusion suggested by his own pregnant implication that in America the right relationship of Church and State exists. In other words, remarkably balanced though the essay may be, the author falls into the error so common to writers of the other religious camp: he is unconsciously and consciously a strong partisan. In the interests of knowledge, the little book is of far greater value for the student

familiar with the general outline of the papacy than for the average man whom the Home University Library intends to reach.

Henry B. Washburn.

Episcopal Theological School, Cambridge.

The Vatican: the Center of Government of the Catholic World. The Rt. Rev. Edmond Canon Hugues de Ragnau. D. Appleton & Co. 1913. Pp. 453. $4.00.

Let no one expect to find in this beautifully printed volume any satisfactory description of the Vatican. It gives only a brief account, very much in the style of Italian guide-books. Neither let any one look for any full and intelligent study of the government of the Roman Catholic Church as centered in the Vatican. A scrappy account of the Pope and his office, his chief collaborators and the Roman Curia, nearly all of which might be compiled from easily accessible English sources, occupy, together with a few pages on the Vatican, less than one-fourth of the book (pp. 1–92). The second section of the book, comprising more than one-half, begins with a chapter on the "Organization of the Catholic World" (pp. 97–175), of some general interest as showing how well the system has been worked out. This is followed by a rambling chapter (pp. 176–288) on the "Politico-Religious History of Catholicism," a survey of the relation of the Roman Church to various countries and their governments, principally in the nineteenth century. As history this chapter is at times amusing. The chapter on the "Catholic Faith" (pp. 299–346) is a fairly clear and well-written statement, not of the faith of the Church, but of the place of the Church as the guardian of the faith, illustrated by its dealings with recent dogmatic problems. The third section of the book is a compilation on Catholicism and education. Here some interesting and apparently trust-worthy facts have been collected, in part from sources not accessible in English. "What the Catholic Church teaches" (pp. 394–433) gives a list of the various subjects on which instruction should be given in a Catholic university; but the chapter is stuffed out by a long irrelevant account (pp. 402–426) of the books of the Bible, with some quaint but probably ecclesiastically "correct" statements regarding their dates, authors, and general contents. The book concludes with a very brief description of the "Spiritual and Practical Sides of Catholicism," containing among other things a number of points of Canon Law bearing more directly on private life.

At first sight the reader is at a loss how to characterize such a book, with its feeble grasp of history, its absurdly distorted perspective, and its miscellaneous collection of material compiled chiefly from indifferent manuals. He ought, however, not to quarrel with the book until he is quite sure of the author's real purpose. In spite of the title, that purpose, one can well believe, is not to give an account of the "Vatican: the Center of Government of the Catholic World." The Vatican is for the author but a symbol. His real purpose must have been to produce a work of edification, based upon a contemplation of the Church as a divine system of world-wide activity. Everywhere, accordingly, the Roman Church is shown as always the leader of every form of spiritual progress, religious, moral, and intellectual, as subject to persecution by the powers of evil yet constantly triumphant, as traduced by Protestants and other unbelievers yet forcing its enemies to admit its claims. By its devotion, its faith, its all-embracing programme, by its very numbers, it is made to impress the devout soul. This is, doubtless, a worthy end. Possibly, in attaining it, "omissions," "exaggerated effects," and "suppressions"—faults the author finds in non-Catholic works on history—are necessary and to be tolerated by the faithful for the sake of the edification. The Church and its work are objects of faith and not merely of sight. Many of the hard realities of this present world with its intractable history may be overlooked in the more brilliant vision.

Unfortunately for the author and his purpose of edification, his literary ability is very limited, and his unctuous style, reminiscent of second-rate French devotional works, fails to transmute a crude compilation into a satisfactory picture. The unconscionable padding betrays the amateur and makes the book burdensome to read. The author's grasp of the situation is so feeble that he often misses making a good point. The book contains much many Protestants might well take to heart, but it is so mixed with false, inaccurate, and distorted statements that it will often repel where it might well attract. It stands in the way of a much better book which almost any man with scholarly instincts but as great loyalty to the Roman Church and devotion to its aims, could produce, provided he had a fair amount of literary taste and skill and more knowledge of actual religious conditions than is allowed to filter through "*la bonne presse*," the tone of which is admirably reproduced in this volume.

Joseph Cullen Ayer, Jr.

Philadelphia Divinity School.

Epitome Theologiae Moralis von C. Telch. Oeniponte Typis et Sumptibus Fel. Rauch (L. Pustet). Ratisbonae, Romae, Neo Eboraci et Cincinnati apud Fredericum Pustet. Pp. xxxii, 539.

Dr. Telch is professor of Moral Theology and Canon Law in Joseph College, Columbus, Ohio. In this book, small in size but of 539 closely printed pages, he has made an epitome of the larger and more exhaustive work of Noldin, a recognized authority within the Roman Church. The author has succeeded in giving a simple, clear, and instructive presentation of Roman teaching on matters constantly brought to the attention of confessors and intelligent laymen. The volume should prove useful to either the Protestant or the Romanist who wants a compendium of the conclusions of Romanism on questions relative to pastoral care, social morals, liturgics, etc.

Henry B. Washburn.

Episcopal Theological School, Cambridge.

Praying for the Dead. An Historical Review of the Practice. R. J. Edmond Boggis. Longmans, Green, & Co. 1913. Pp. 272. $1.25.

The author holds that the impulse to pray for departed friends is of high antiquity and universal; and in this book he gathers the evidence, from early Egyptian tombs to the present day. He gives numerous quotations to show that the practice was continued in the Church of England after the Reformation by many who were regarded as entirely orthodox; and he emphasizes the truth underlying the doctrine of purgatory. His position throughout is that of a High Churchman; and his main thesis is that prayer for those in the other world is as legitimate and efficacious as for those in this.

Frederic Palmer.

Harvard University.

Die Christologie des heiligen Ignatius von Antiochien. Professor Michael Rackl. (The fourteenth number of the Freiburger *Theologische Studien.*) Herdersche Verlagshandlung, Freiburg im Breisgau. 1914. Pp. 418. $2.20.

This volume is a valuable contribution to the literature dealing with the Ignatian Letters and their bearing upon the development of Christian theology. Nearly one-fourth of the book deals with the genuineness of these epistles. The remainder is occupied with

an exposition of the Ignatian Christology and a consideration of the bearing of this teaching upon subsequent thought.

In his defence of the genuineness of these letters Dr. Rackl, after reviewing the long debate, undertakes the successful demolition of Völter's arguments against them. He denies that Ignatius' Roman letter is a "tendency forgery," or that the remaining six are to be ascribed to Peregrinus Proteus about 150. He asserts rather that there is no early Christian literature so incontestably vouched for as are the Ignatian letters by Polycarp, a testimony which cannot be overthrown on the ground of interpolation.

In the constructive exposition of Ignatian Christology Rackl first considers the Docetic heresy, against which Ignatius elaborates his arguments for the "true" humanity of Jesus. Docetism, he asserts, arose in an honest effort of certain Christians to overcome "the offence of the cross." It therefore posited the unreality of Jesus' earthly life, especially his sufferings and death. In squarely meeting this heresy and affirming, on scriptural grounds, the real humanity of Jesus, Ignatius rendered a most valuable service to the church.

But Ignatius also stood unequivocally for Jesus' divinity. He is the Messiah (ὁ χριστός). Θεός is repeatedly applied to him, not in a "subjective" (von der Goltz), or an "ethical" (Schultz), but rather in "an objective, metaphysical sense." He is the "unbegotten, eternal creator." Yet Ignatius is not a Patri-passionist. He applies to Christ the philosophical term ἀγέννητος, involving, in Christian writers, absolute eternity, a conception also implied in the ascription ἄχρονος. Christ is also represented as absolute in power and knowledge. Prayer is to be directed to him. Divine virtues are attributed to him. He is the centre and heart of Ignatius' own mystical experience, as also of that of the Church. Ignatius is not a subordinationist. The terms "Son of God" and "Word of God" imply rather Christ's inner divine relationship to God. The union of humanity and divinity in Jesus Ignatius treated as a fact rather than a problem.

Ignatius employed both Old and New Testaments. In Christology he agrees with the Synoptics as to facts, and with the Pauline and Johannine writings as to interpretation of the life of Jesus. His advance beyond the New Testament is merely one of verbal formulation.

Rackl affirms Ignatius' consistent orthodoxy as regards the person of Christ, both from the standpoint of apostolic teaching and of catholic theology. On the one hand Ignatius echoes the lan-

guage and the thought of the Old Roman Symbol, and on the other the speculative conceptions and the philosophical terminology of Nicaea.

In conclusion, we may seriously ask whether our author has not read too largely the philosophical conceptions of a later age into the profoundly religious language of our second-century author.

Henry Hammersley Walker.

Chicago Theological Seminary.

Saint Augustine. Louis Bertrand. Translated by Vincent O'Sullivan. D. Appleton & Co. 1914. Pp. viii, 396. $3.00.

This is a remarkably fine portrait of "the great heart and the great intellect" of Augustine. It is brilliant in description, critical as well as appreciative in spirit, rich in fine spiritual observations on the man and his epoch. Where is there a life or an historical setting surpassing the romantic wandering career of Augustine in interest or instructiveness? The metamorphosis of a gay dissolute youth into the "grand old Bishop" with his stalwart faith, the epic of the inner life of a soul, is the high theme. Bertrand's work is not a scholastic review of Augustine's writings, but the "sole aim is to study Augustine's soul." The human interest is put first. The author follows "this peerless man" through the stages of *infantia*, *pueritia*, *adolescentia*, *vir paganus*, *vir christianus*, especially the merging of the Platonist into the Christian monk, and the succeeding work of the Bishop of Hippo. Particularly valuable are the pen pictures of the cities where Augustine lived: Thagasta, Madaura, Carthage, Rome, Milan, and Hippo. These recover for the reader somewhat of Augustine's world, what he must have seen, heard, and felt. The play of environmental influences upon the many-sided personality of the strangely modern Augustine is depicted with insight and critical independence. The style is vivid and fascinating. The book reads very well, and is as instructive as it is readable.

Where the human interest is foremost, we do not look for labored discussions of theological problems. The author has used Augustine's writings only where the "ardent soul pulsates" in them. Still the work is of great value for understanding Augustine's doctrinal position. Much nonsense has been written about the greatest theologian of the Western Church, largely because his writings have been studied in detachment from his biography, from his practical problems, and the impressions upon him of the age. This is the

perennial vice of the dogmatic method. The man and the *Zeitgeist* alone make the doctrines intelligible.

A good illustration is found in the views of Augustine on the State. He has often been berated for his low estimate of the State. "What are your empires but magnificent robberies?" Well, this savage onslaught of his on the State appears, in the light of Bertrand's chapter, "The City of Gold" to be no more than the naked truth about Roman administration of the provinces, at least in the later history of the Empire. They were continuously ransacked and plundered to feed, adorn, and gratify the insatiable hunger, vanity, and lust of Rome. Roman avarice and the mailed fist had made the Mistress of the World a dazzling *aurata Roma. Acies stupet igne metalli,* said Claudian. And the provinces paid for it. Small wonder provincials were asking themselves whether this Empire was worth all the blood and money that it cost. Nevertheless, since Augustine knew nothing better to take its place, and also knew that without a minimum of safety all spiritual effort is futile, he strove mightily to strengthen the unity of the Church and to deserve the active support of the government. He believed that Catholic unity, the Roman Empire, and civilization belonged together and were mutually interdependent. The same reasoning applies to his appeal to force in suppressing the lawless and violent Donatists, to his inhuman doctrine of grace and predestination, to his ideas of church authority and other peculiarities of his system. The "time's abuse" accounts in most cases for those features of his theology most offensive to the modern mind. Nowhere else is the brilliant success and incomparable superiority of the historical method over the dogmatic more apparent than in the study and interpretation of this master-mind of the Western Church —so human, so modern, so incomparably great in spiritual effort and achievement.

Bertrand's book supplies a long-felt want. It is not too much to say, "no historical, theological, or biographical collection can be considered complete without it."

George C. Cell.

Boston University.

The Spiritual Message of Dante. Rt. Rev. W. Boyd-Carpenter. Harvard University Press. 1914. Pp. xii, 250. $1.50.

"The study of Dante is the literary phenomenon of England and America at the present time"; this was the judgment expressed by the Hon. James Bryce in his Lowell Institute lectures some years

ago. The uniqueness of Dante's personality, the arresting beauty of his speech, the invigorating energy of his passion for righteousness, the truthfulness and wonder of his vivid pictures, are drawing an ever enlarging number of minds within the circle of his power. This latest volume from the able and versatile pen of Dr. Carpenter will not fail to instruct and inspire many readers. The author confesses that he does not attempt to make a comprehensive statement of the spiritual message of Dante, but essays the humbler task of expressing "thoughts on religious experience as exemplified by Dante's poem." That the poet often thought of himself as standing in the succession of the chosen prophets, intrusted by the Infinite Goodness with a message to mankind which he must not fail to make manifest, is evident from many passages in his writings. Although Dante's spiritual teaching is not exhaustively interpreted in this volume, the author sets forth in a thorough and convincing manner the very heart of that message—that "love is over all life." He is intent upon freeing the minds of his readers from the popular notion that Dante was a volcano of wrath and malignity in a constant state of eruption, by portraying the poet in his true character as a lover and a supreme prophet of love. Love first kindled his genius; his life was dedicated to a very wonderful vision of a marvellous way of celebrating love; as he entered hell he was persuaded that love ordained its retributions; love must be set in order if the stained soul would be purified; and finally he discovers that love, changeless, infinite, resistless, binds all the leaves scattered throughout the universe into one volume. This lucid delineation of Dante's true character and essential philosophy is a real and much needed service.

The reviewer, however, cannot but feel that the author finds love more prominent in the *Inferno* than the facts will warrant. Is the *Inferno* a "revelation that at root evil is defection from love"? That is the teaching of the *Purgatorio*. There evil dispositions are shown to grow out of love distorted, defective, and excessive; but in the *Inferno* the poet treats of deeds in their relationship to the inexorable righteousness, sins being estimated by their effects on society. Hence treachery is punished in the lowest pit, and Brutus and Judas are in the mouths of Lucifer. Neither his theme, his material, nor perhaps his disposition in those days, induced him to trace the sins of those dreadful circles to their effect on the "capacities of love."

It may further be questioned whether Bishop Carpenter in his treatment of love conveys precisely the meaning to his readers

which was in the poet's mind. Dante, the scholar, had a passion for truth. He loved with the mind. He adopted the psychology of his day, which made the affections of the heart depend on the perceptions of the mind. "Thou shouldest know," says Beatrice, "that all have delight in proportion as their vision penetrates into truth in which every understanding is at rest. Hence may be seen how beatitude is founded on the act that sees, not on that which loves, which follows after." Hell is to lose the good of the intellect; in Purgatory love is set in order by fixing the attention on the true nature of the virtue to be achieved; in Heaven one moves upward by beholding the beauty of truth enkindled along the stairway of the eternal palace. The nine hierarchies of angels gaze into the Point of Light, and their love is generated and measured by the intensity of their vision. The empyrean is "pure light, light intellectual, full of love." We moderns emphasize the emotional element in love, but Dante laid stress upon its close associations with the perceptions of the mind. To us God is the pitying Father; to Dante he is the revealing, intolerable Light. Dante's mysticism was seated in his intellect and not in his heart. Love in his thought had an intellectual quality which is not so prominent in ours. While Dr. Carpenter clearly states the commanding importance of love in Dante's philosophy, he does not give to his readers quite the same impression of the nature of love which is felt by the readers of the *Divine Comedy*.

These slight criticisms, however, should not blind us to the great merits of a volume of ripe scholarship, rich in spiritual insights, which accurately and vigorously describes the soul-tragedy and victory of one whom Lowell called "the highest spiritual nature that has expressed itself in rhythmical form."

Charles Allen Dinsmore.

Waterbury, Conn.

Traité des Hérétiques; à savoir, si on les doit persécuter, et comment on se doit conduire avec eux, selon l'avis, opinion, et sentence, de plusieurs auteurs, tant anciens, que modernes. Par Sébastien Castellion. Édition nouvelle, publiée par les soins de A. Olivet, pasteur de l'Église de Genève. Préface de E. Choisy, professeur à l'Université de Genève. Genève, A. Jullien. 1913. Pp. x, 198. 3*fr.*

This famous treatise in behalf of a more merciful handling of "heretics," and in favor of a toleration for which the age in general was not ready, was occasioned by the burning of Servetus. Only

three copies of the original French edition are known. Whether Castellion was its sole author is perhaps doubtful, but to him is due the largest credit for an utterance so prophetic of the future, if so unpopular in his own day. It must always stand as one of the milestones in the progress of religious liberty; and it is well that it has been given a fitting reproduction.

WILLISTON WALKER.

YALE UNIVERSITY.

THE RISE OF THE MODERN SPIRIT IN EUROPE. GEORGE S. BUTZ, Ph.D. Sherman, French, & Co. 1912. Pp. 293. $1.25.

This is a series of lectures on the social, scientific, and literary aspects of the Age of the Renaissance, whose chief merit is its clearness and convenience of arrangement, and its excellence of proportion. It will prove a useful manual for college courses "primarily for undergraduates," and may be profitably employed to supplement the ordinary narrative histories of the field with which it deals. Dr. Butz's work, however, is far too superficial to be of much value for more advanced students. It contains few new ideas, is based on secondary authorities, and despite the over-laudatory foreword of Rev. George W. Richards, it can make little claim to critical scholarship. The judgments are often too far-reaching to inspire confidence. To call Alexander VI, bad as he indubitably was, "perhaps the very worst character in all history" (page 172), demands a courage not altogether enviable. There is much mixed metaphor. Ulrich von Hutten "dashes off a quiverful of philippics." The book is marred throughout by many careless mistakes and misprints: "Ezzalino da Romano," page 154; "Chevaleur Bayard," page 156; "*litterae humanieres*," page 154, are characteristic examples. On the other hand, the work is a significant illustration of the recent growth of the broader conception of history as a record of human achievement of all sorts, economic, artistic, scientific, and literary, as well as political and constitutional. It covers a very wide range, and though it never penetrates beneath the surface, it has the merit of giving the reader an adequate impression of the wonderful versatility which characterizes the age with which it deals.

ROGER B. MERRIMAN.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

A Life of John Cosin, Bishop of Durham, 1660–1672. P. H. Osmund. A. R. Mowbray & Co. 1913. Pp. xii, 376. 8*s*. 6*d*.

Peter Smart, maintaining the Low Church side in a sermon against John Cosin and other High Churchmen, accused them of "altar decking, cope wearing, organ playing, piping and singing, crossing of cushions and kissing of clouts, oft starting up and squatting down, nodding of heads, and whirling about till their noses stand eastward, setting basons on the altar, candlesticks and crucifixes, burning wax candles in excessive number when and where is no use of lights; and, what is worst of all, gilding of angels and garnishing of images, and setting them aloft." Cosin liked these things as much as Smart disliked them. He suffered for these preferences when the Puritans came to power, being driven into exile in France, where he served as an English court-chaplain, with little appreciation and less salary. His biographer recalls the sufferings of the Anglican clergy during that period. They were worse, he says, than those which were afterwards the lot of the Nonconformists, and help to explain the energy with which the Puritan parsons were evicted at the Restoration.

Cosin came back less disposed than ever to conciliate those with whom he disagreed, and against all compromise with Presbyterians. He is a type of the honest, dogmatic, overbearing, conscientious prelates, who by their stiff, unimaginative partisanship made dissent so considerable a factor in the religious life of England.

He was a leader in the liturgical revision which made the Prayer Book of 1662, and he composed the first of the two Ember Collects, the Collect for the Third Sunday in Advent, for St. Stephen's Day, for the Sixth Sunday after Epiphany, and for Easter Even. It is pleasant to find in these devout prayers the heart of the man, which was hidden from many of his contemporaries under his thick ecclesiastical cloak.

George Hodges.

Episcopal Theological School, Cambridge.

Religion and Free Will. W. Benett. The Clarendon Press. 1913. Pp. 345. 7*s*. 6*d*.

This book is original, and so suggestive and so condensed in its manner of expression that any short report, even though prepared with care, can hardly avoid being to some extent unfair. It is probably the ablest pragmatic defence ever made of the view that religion is

an emotional and irrational belief which admits of no scientific explanation and commits suicide when it uses rationalistic weapons in self-defence. Dogma, ritual, and priesthood are all necessary to it, though all are liable to abuse. Without dogma, religion inevitably degenerates into a primitive or degraded form. All who cherish the ideal of a rational or purely spiritual and undogmatic religion follow a will o' the wisp.

The main idea of the book is that evolution is a progression of equally necessary opposites. Love and hatred, like the wheat and the tares, must grow together to the end of the world. The ethical optimum is never the mean, but is always a slight lead of one maximum over another. Hatred can never be too strong, provided it is slightly overbalanced and controlled by love. A triumph too complete of love over hatred, of activity over inertia, of the scientific spirit over "the unquantified emotional tendencies of ethics and religion," would be the doom of evolution. "No improvement, in the sense of a rectification of the proportions between good and evil to the advantage of the good, is ever possible." The elimination of evil is not even to be desired, since it is a "necessity to all life that both the conflicting principles should be in active existence."

What is the end of evolution? A survey of its history discloses none. The only conceivable end within the world of experience is pleasure, and one can accept that standard only by giving up his conscience and religion. Yet we cannot escape believing in a final end, for without it there would be no values, "and nothing in life is more certain than the existence of values." Ethical thinking therefore necessarily postulates a transcendental personality and its future existence in a transcendental world. Postulation, however, is not proof, and ethics cannot dispense with religion, which brings definite assurance. A non-religious ethical culture is therefore a vain thing. The ethical values must be reinforced by the religious values, for the good and evil principles are so nearly neck and neck "and the conflict of ideals is so close that to yield odds is to ensure defeat."

While we can never form a clear conception of the transcendental end, our ethical judgments tell us the direction in which it lies, and this is all we need to know. Good is whatever tends in that direction. The province of science is clearly delimited very much after Bergson's fashion. Science deals solely with concepts derived from sensation; it enables us to perfect our instruments and to deal successfully with the physical world, but it is not applicable to internal experience and has nothing to do with values. Consequently, there can never

be a science of ethics. No attempt is made to prove the freedom of the will. The concept is merely defined with great clearness, and the practical results of the substitution of a belief in universal determinism for a belief in free will are set forth. These may be surmised from the statement that free will, conscience, justice, and freedom form one organic connection. When one goes, all go. The last chapter contains an illuminating discussion of punishment, and shows that the substitution of expedience for justice in the treatment of criminals leads to dangerous lenity in times of peace and to equally dangerous excesses of severity at other times.

George R. Dodson.

St. Louis, Mo.

The Faith of Japan. Tasuku Harada, President of The Doshisha. The Macmillan Co. 1914. Pp. xvi, 190. $1.25.

It must be confessed that really thoughtful people not otherwise acquainted with Japan have been and are turned away from deeper study through a sort of contempt for a people who, they think, can give no better contribution to thought and life than a thin superficiality of picturesqueness. To all such disappointed persons, as well as to those of us who suspect that a people made of such gossamer material could hardly have accomplished what the Japanese have done, this book by Dr. Harada will be a welcomed pocket-companion for several reasons: first, it simplifies the interpretation of a more or less confused and confusing subject. Secondly, it is understandable, for the most part, by men or women who have the equivalent of a High School trained mind. Thirdly, it covers the ground in a work-a-day manner in a small volume. With this little book, and with *The Evolution of New Japan*, by J. H. Longford, Professor of Japanese, King's College, London, the average busy men or women can have an intelligent knowledge of modern Japan at the cost of less than two dollars and a few hours of time—distinct advantages in these strenuous days.

In his preface President Harada says of his course of lectures: "Their governing purpose has been not so much a scholar's effort to make the elements of a people's faith clear to scholars, as a Christian's endeavor to interpret the spirit of that faith unto Christians of another race." It is here we feel like offering a suggestion to the writer for the second edition (which we hope will soon be called

for), and that is, to forget the student entirely and expand just a little some of the points now covered by a single sentence. He would thereby make his little book a *vade mecum* to a much wider circle of readers and so increase its enlightening usefulness.

To illustrate, on p. 94 are the following sentences: "He [Honen, 'the real founder of the Jodo sect' of Buddhists] proclaimed salvation for all mankind not by meditation, nor by ritual, nor even by the repetition of a Buddha's name with understanding of its meaning." Then follows this quotation: "It is nothing but the repetition of the name of Buddha Amida with faith in his boundless mercy, whereby we may be born in the Happiest Land of Jodo or the Buddha." The students who first heard these lectures may have understood these two sentences in their relation to each other; but to the ordinary reader, unacquainted with the peculiar tenets of the "Jodo sect of Buddhists" under the leadership of "Honen," there seems to be a contradiction which might easily have been avoided and the whole sentence made plain by a simple statement to the effect that "Honen" preached salvation by an act of repetition of the name of "Buddha Amida", not with understanding, but with faith; not blind faith, but a kind of mystic faith that one can be said to have in a friend whom the person does not fully understand and seeks no question of understanding. As a matter of fact, the "Jodo sect of Buddhists" are among the best of the various bodies of Buddhists in Japan, and their lives are far more consistent with the faith they hold, because it springs from a sense of genuine gratitude toward Buddha Amida, since he has, as Honen preached, boundless mercy upon them. Among the Japanese the sense of gratitude is especially strong where it involves loyalty to one to whom a person has been in the relationship of servant or attendant or pupil.

Perhaps the same end might have been attained and the two sentences have been perfectly clear were the second one worded somewhat as follows: "He proclaimed salvation which would be granted to all mankind on condition not of meditation nor of ritual, not even of an intelligent understanding of the Buddha's name, but on the mere repetition of the words, 'Buddha Amida,' whether understood or not by the believer, but with faith that there was mercy."

We shall let the book speak for itself by giving the subjects of the eight chapters with some additions.

Chapter I, The Introduction, presents a Historical Sketch of the Religious life of Japan under the three forms prior to the advent of Protestant Christianity. Chapter II gives the conception of

Deity called Kami,[1] with an illuminating description of what Buddhism, Shintoism, and Confucianism are, and what are their interrelations. Chapter III is a most suggestive account of Michi, The Way of Life, which means more than the way of living. As one Japanese Shinto writer puts it: "The teaching of the Sages is to teach a man to become a man, not to become a Chinese"; and another: "The Way is the way of Heaven and earth. The Way of the sages of China and the Way of the Gods and men of Japan are alike the Way of the God of Heaven and of earth. The Way of the God of Heaven is one. To name it Confucian, Buddhist, or Taoist, and introduce those names to foreign lands, is the work of those who themselves know not the Way." Chapter IV tells of Satori, The Law of Enlightenment. In Chapter V, devoted to Sukui, the Doctrine of Salvation, one may find a striking proof of the solidarity of human experience and thought in the fact that in Buddhism as developed in Japan there are the two opposing schools of belief how salvation is found, as in Jewish and Christian thinking: the Holy Path of works, Self-help, and the Pure Land Path, the Other-Power-help way. Chapter VI, on Chugi, The Spirit of Loyalty, will enlighten the average reader's curiosity more perhaps than any other in the book, treating, as it does, of "the Alpha and Omega of Bushido, the Way of the Samurai." Dr. Harada's presentation of this elusive subject does not suffer when compared with much larger and longer attempts to make us understand this not complicated though little comprehended and hence often misunderstood subject, especially by us Westerners. Chapter VII is upon Mirai, The idea of Future Life, and reveals the greatest weakness in the faith of Japan; namely, no sure confidence, such as inspired the Hebrew poet when he jubilantly sang, "I shall behold Thy face in righteousness: I shall be satisfied when I awake with Thy likeness." Chapter VIII, The Faith: Old and New, fitly ends this unusually satisfying volume, and should be read as a whole, at least at a second reading; indeed, if possible, most readers would do well to read the entire book consecutively, at least once, for only so will they get out of the work the full help it can give them in understanding a people who have the grace and gumption to understand us about twenty-five times better than we do them.

C. M. Cady.

Y. M. C. A. Library, Boston.

[1] In Romanizing Japanese words, consonants have their usual English sounds ("g" is always hard) and vowels have the Italian. Each vowel (except the diphthongs "ai" and "ei") makes a syllable alone or with the preceding consonant, and the word is supposed to be unaccented.

THE SAVIOUR OF THE WORLD. Sermons preached in the Chapel of Princeton Theological Seminary. BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD, D.D. Hodder & Stoughton. Pp. viii, 270. $1.25.

Most contemporary preachers are bent on adapting Christian truth to the changed intellectual and social conditions of modern life, and theologians seek to aid them and to defend Christianity by manipulating traditional doctrines into adaptable forms; but behind all this endeavor lies an assumption which should not pass unchallenged. Why should Christianity seek to adapt itself to the modern world, instead of laboring to adapt the world to itself? Is its task to be conformed to this world, and not rather to transform it? Is modern thought the standard of Christian truth, and not the reverse? Is not the whole undertaking an implicit denial of Christianity as a revelation of truth? Amidst all the talk about kernel and husk, while the noise of the hammers is in our ears and nut-picks are becoming fashionable theological tools, it is refreshing to hear a clear, strong voice affirming the earlier world-conquering mission of Christian doctrine. Dr. Warfield believes in the unchanging character of Christian truth because it proceeds from God Himself; modern thought is but a transient phase of human thinking and is destined to disappear, while revealed truth must abide, as eternal as God Himself. Hence these sermons are not rooted in "experience" but in the Bible. They are exegetical in character, and the exegesis is that of a thorough scholar, even though other scholars equally thorough may reach different conclusions. They are logical, calling for continuous thinking and well repaying it. It stirs our admiration to read straight Calvinistic doctrine—election, limited atonement, substitution—unflinchingly declared by one who as thinker and scholar needeth not to be ashamed, and who has the preacher's power. For these sermons are instinct with vital energy and carry throughout the urgency of sincere conviction.

W. W. FENN.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

UNIVERSITY SERMONS. HENRY SLOAN COFFIN, D.D. Yale University Press. Pp. 256. $1.50.

This volume contains fifteen sermons preached to students in the chapels of several American universities, by one of the most popular of the younger generation of college preachers. The excellence of these sermons will cause them to be widely welcomed. They are vigorous, straightforward, and hard-hitting; colloquial

and direct rather than literary; illuminated by story and anecdote and touched with an occasional gleam of humor. They are admirable specimens of what is not, perhaps, the highest type of preaching, but a type nevertheless very appealing to young men and women, even if, like most good preaching, it is better heard than read. It is difficult to choose among them; but perhaps the best three are the sermons on "Three Stages in Religious Experience," on "Unexpected Sympathy," and on "Religion—a Load or a Lift?" The volume throughout is an excellent example of practical, direct preaching.

HENRY WILDER FOOTE.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

THE BOOK OF COMMON PRAYER AMONG THE NATIONS OF THE WORLD. A History of Translations of the Prayer Book. W. MUSS-ARNOLT. Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge. London. 1914. Pp. xxii, 473.

Dr. Josiah H. Benton, of the Boston Public Library, has one of the most complete collections in the world of issues and translations of the Prayer Book of the Church of England and of the Protestant Episcopal Church of America. Dr. William Muss-Arnolt has prepared a sumptuous Catalogue of the collection, and also an elaborate record of the translations of the Prayer Book into the 146 different languages into which it has been translated. The Catalogue is privately printed.

FREDERIC PALMER.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.